Positron Biogenics Pvt. Ltd. vs Uttar Pradesh State Industrial Development Authority and Anr. - The outstanding dues of the property tax relating to period prior to sale confirmation are thus dues that are akin to claim of an unsecured creditor (Bhatpara Municipality in the present case) and should be discharged in terms of the properties regarding distribution of assets given in section 53 of IBC. The auction-purchaser cannot be held liable to pay any such dues relating to period prior confirmation of sale as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of AI Champdany Industries Ltd. vs. The Official Liquidator & Anr. (supra).”

  NCLT All. (2026.09.02) in Positron Biogenics Pvt. Ltd. vs Uttar Pradesh State Industrial Development Authority and Anr. [(2026) ibclaw.in 3509 NCLT, IA No. 485 of 2023 in CP(IB) No. 55/ALD/2017] held that; 

• In view of the above, the mere “as is where is” condition or the subsequent transfer of the leasehold interest cannot convert the pre-CIRP liability of the Corporate Debtor into an independent personal liability of the Applicant. The pre-CIRP dues of the Corporate Debtor were required to be dealt with through the liquidation process in accordance with Section 53 of the Code, particularly when the Respondent No. 1 had already lodged its claim in the liquidation proceedings of the Corporate Debtor.

• The outstanding dues of the property tax relating to period prior to sale confirmation are thus dues that are akin to claim of an unsecured creditor (Bhatpara Municipality in the present case) and should be discharged in terms of the properties regarding distribution of assets given in section 53 of IBC. The auction-purchaser cannot be held liable to pay any such dues relating to period prior confirmation of sale as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of AI Champdany Industries Ltd. vs. The Official Liquidator & Anr. (supra).”

• Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble NCLAT in Bhatpara Municipality Through its Chairperson v. Nicco Eastern Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the outstanding dues pertaining to the period prior to the issuance of the Sale Certificate/handing over of possession are to be treated as pre-CIRP liabilities of the Corporate Debtor and dealt with in accordance with the waterfall mechanism prescribed under Section 53 of the Code, and cannot simultaneously be recovered from the auction purchaser merely because the purchaser required transfer of the leasehold interest in its favour. Accordingly, the Applicant/Auction Purchaser cannot be held liable to pay the pre-CIRP dues of the Corporate Debtor.

• 
  

Excerpts of the order;

# 1. The instant application has been filed on 08.10.2023, by M/s Positron Biogenics Private Limited (hereinafter referred as “Applicant/ Auction Purchaser”) under section 60(5) and Section 53(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC/Code”) read with Rule 11 of National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 against Uttar Pradesh State Industrial Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as “Respondent No.1/UPSIDA”) and the Liquidator (hereinafter referred to as “Respondent No.2”) of M/s L.M.L. Limited i.e., Corporate Debtor. The Applicant inter alia seeks the following prayers:

• a) Allow the present application;

• b) Kindly pass an order to the Respondent No.1 Uttar Pradesh State Industrial Development Authority (UPSIDA) to Transfer the Part of Parcel A,B & C, Site-03, Panki Industrial Area, Kanpur and Refund an Amount of Rs 82, 53,013.37 (INR Eighty Two Lakhs Fifty Three Thousand Thirteen and Paise Thirty Seven Only) to Applicant which paid UNDER PROTEST towards the dues of Respondent No 2 i.e. LML Limited to avoid the delay in implementation of the Project;

• c) Pass an order declaring that Respondent No.1 Uttar Pradesh State Industrial Development Authority (UPSIDA) is not entitled to claim any dues of Respondent no 2 over the property of the Applicant;

• d) Pass such other or further order(s) as may be deemed fit and proper the facts and circumstances of the instant case.”

# 2. The brief facts as submitted by the Applicant are as follows:

• a. The Corporate Debtor i.e., M/s L.M.L Limited was admitted into Liquidation on 23.03.2018, on an application filed by the Resolution Professional.

• b. Pursuant to the issuance of Public Announcement in Form-A, the Respondent No.1 has filed a claim to the tune of Rs. 2,77,12,397/-, which has been admitted in toto by the Resolution Professional under the category of ‘Operational Creditor’.

• c. Subsequently, the Liquidator issued an auction notice dated 07.09.2022 for sale of assets of the Corporate Debtor and thereafter, E-auction was held on 04.10.2022. The Applicant herein was declared as the successful bidder for Property No. Parcel A, B and C, Site-III, Panki Industrial Area, Kanpur. A sale certificate was executed ‘as is where is basis’, ‘no recourse basis’ on 28.12.2022, and possession of the aforesaid property was handed over to the Applicant on 30.12.2022.

• d. However, on application for transfer of the aforesaid plot to the Applicant being the auction purchaser, the Respondent No.1 rejected the transfer and raised a demand of Rs. 82,53,013.53 being the rental dues for the year 2000-2008 in order to execute the transfer of the aforesaid plot. Detailed distribution of outstanding demand over the period of 2000 to 2008 as stated in the Application has been reproduced below: . . . . 

• e. The Applicant submits that the demand of Rs. 82,53,013.53 was paid under protest by the Applicant to the Respondent No.1 to register the transfer of land on the understanding that the same shall be repaid by the Respondent No.1 pending the outcome of this application.

# 3. The Applicant submits that it is a bona fide purchaser of the said property conducted through the legally established procedure under the Code, and has already deposited the entire sale proceeds in the liquidation account of the Corporate Debtor. The Applicant also submits that the sale proceeds received by the Liquidator were also duly distributed in accordance with Section 53(1) of the IBC.

# 4. It is further submitted that the creditors of the Corporate Debtor would receive their dues in terms of the waterfall mechanism provided under Section 53(1) of the IBC. In this regard reliance has been placed on the Judgement of Hon’ble NCLAT in Bhatpara Municipality Th. Chairperson v. Nicco Eastern Pvt. Ltd., (Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 714 of 2021).

# 5. The Applicant finally submits that the demand of Respondent No.1 is not maintainable in terms of provisions of the Code and the Applicant cannot be asked to pay the alleged dues for pre-CIRP period.

REPLY OF RESPONDENT NO.1

# 6. The Respondent No.1 /UPSIDA in its reply filed vide diary no. 656 dated 13.03.2024 disputes and denies the relief made in the present application and submits as follows:

a. The Respondent No.1/ UPSIDA submits that the aforesaid property was leased to the Corporate Debtor for a period of 66 years vide lease deed dated 23.12.1994 and the Corporate Debtor being the original lessee should have informed Respondent No.1/lessor that the company is undergoing insolvency proceedings.

b. The Respondent No.1 contends that a Transfer memorandum was issued by UPSIDA on 05.09.2023 only on execution of an affidavit and indemnity bond by the Applicant on 05.09.2023 in favour of Respondent No.1 stating that the Applicant shall immediately pay all demands raised by UPSIDA.

c. Furthermore, as submitted, Clause 2 of the said Transfer Memorandum stipulates as follows:

• “2. Deposits made by ex-allottee against the plot will be adjusted first towards interest and Lease Rent upto payment and balance if any, towards premium. In case a balance playability is found after adjustment as above, the same shall be payable by you.”

d. It is further submitted that the Applicant is bound by covenants of lease deed and thus cannot evade payment of arrears of lease rentals as well as rentals thereon.

e. The Respondent No.1 further submits that sale was made in “as is where is basis”, “As is what is basis”, “Whatever there is basis” and “No recourse basis” as per certificate of sale deed dated 28.12.2022, which in itself creates contractual obligations to discharge the payment of past lease rentals and interest thereon.

REPLY OF RESPONDENT NO.2

# 7. The Respondent No.2 / Liquidator has filed his reply dated 24.01.2024, in which he submits as follows:

a. The Applicant was declared as successful bidder for aforementioned property and it was sold on “as is where is basis”, “As is what is basis”, “Whatever there is basis” and “No recourse basis” as mentioned in clause Q of e-auction process document dated 07.09.2022 as well as certificate of sale dated 19.10.2022.

b. The Respondent No.2 further submits that the claim of Respondent No.1 has been admitted and it will be distributed to stakeholders by the liquidators as per Section 53 of the Code and payment to operational creditors are covered under Section 53(1)(f) of the Code.

c. It is also submitted that he does not have any role in the present matter and all allegations are bought up against Respondent No.1.

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

# 8. The Applicant also filed written submissions on 14.03.2024, wherein the submissions already dealt with in the preceding paragraphs have been reiterated.

FINDINGS AND ORDER

# 9. We have heard the learned counsels for the Applicant and Respondents and perused the material on record.

# 10. The instant application has been filed by the Applicant/Auction Purchaser under section 60(5) of the Code against U.P. State Industrial Development Authority (UPSIDA) claiming refund of the amount which has been deposited under protest as per the demand raised by UPSIDA on the property sold through e-auction by the liquidator during liquidation of the Corporate Debtor. The principle issue for consideration is whether the amount paid by the Applicant under protest to the Respondent No.1/UPSIDA is liable to be refunded.

# 11. It is not in dispute that the Applicant was declared the successful auction purchaser of the said properties pursuant to the e-auction held on 04.10.2022. The Certificate of Sale dated 28.12.2022 and the Possession/Delivery Letter dated 30.12.2022 have been placed on record as Annexure-5 and Annexure-6, respectively. Accordingly, the Applicant acquired the leasehold interest in the said properties pursuant to the sale conducted in the liquidation proceedings on 28.12.2022.

# 12. In the facts of the present case, it is also relevant to consider the circumstances in which the Applicant deposited the amount of Rs.82,53,014/- with Respondent No.1. Upon perusal of the letters dated 17.08.2023 and 25.08.2023 addressed by the Applicant to UPSIDA attached as Annexure 10, it is evident that the Applicant had, at the outset, disputed its liability to discharge the pre-liquidation dues of the Corporate Debtor and specifically requested Respondent No.1 to lodge its claim with the Liquidator in accordance with the provisions of the Code.

# 13. In the aforesaid letters, the Applicant further stated that its pharmaceutical project was being stalled on account of the pending transfer of the subject property and, therefore, while reserving its rights and proposing to approach this Adjudicating Authority under Section 60(5) of the Code, deposited the demanded amount of Rs.82,53,014/- vide Demand Draft No.496798 dated 25.08.2023 under protest. The Applicant also expressly recorded its understanding that the said amount would be refunded to it, with interest, in the event of the application being decided in its favour. Also, the affidavit and indemnity executed by the Applicant formed part of the documents furnished in connection with the transfer of the assets, and was given in the context of the payment made under protest. Therefore, the documents furnished for seeking transfer of the assets were consequential to the protest payment and cannot be treated as an independent undertaking or deposit by the Applicant towards the pre-CIRP dues of the Corporate Debtor.

# 14. Further, during the course of hearing held on 03.08.2026, the learned Counsel appearing for the Applicant submitted that, as UPSIDA was not executing the transfer documents, the Applicant was compelled to deposit the pre-CIRP dues under protest. Thus, the payment cannot be construed as a voluntary acceptance of the underlying liability or as an admission that the pre-CIRP dues of the Corporate Debtor were payable by the Applicant.

# 15. Further, on perusal of the E-Auction Process Document it is noted that the asset was sold on “AS IS WHERE IS, AS IS WHAT IS, WHATEVER THERE IS AND WITHOUT RECOURSE BASIS” and required the bidder to make their own independent inquiries regarding “claims/rights/dues” affecting the asset. Thus, while the Applicant was put on notice regarding the dues affecting the asset, the said document does not specifically provide that the Applicant would assume the pre-CIRP debt of the Corporate Debtor towards UPSIDA as its own liability over and above the sale consideration of Rs. 26.73 crore.

# 16. This position is further borne out from the Terms and Condition attached as Annexure-1 to the Certificate of Sale. Though Clause 7 thereof records that the Applicant has conducted due diligence and has satisfied itself regarding the “dues in respect of Asset”, the Certificate of Sale does not contain any express undertaking by the Applicant to discharge the pre-CIRP dues of Corporate Debtor towards UPSIDA. On the contrary, Clause 12 records that the original lease deed dated 04.07.2000 between UPSIDC and Corporate Debtor was handed over as a title document. Thus, what was transferred was the leasehold interest of the Corporate Debtor in the asset pursuant to the liquidation sale and not, in express terms, the pre-CIRP liabilities of the Corporate Debtor.

# 17. The nature of UPSIDA’s claim is also corroborated by the claim record available on the IBBI website, which records a claim of Rs. 2,77,12,397/- lodged by UPSIDA. The said claim was lodged more than one year prior to the auction sale in favour of the Applicant and it has been admitted in full. Although the said amount differs from the subsequent demand of Rs. 82,53,013.37/-, the record establishes that UPSIDA had already asserted its monetary claim against the Corporate Debtor in the insolvency proceedings prior to the Applicant’s acquisition of the property.

# 18. Now, proceeding to examine the nature of the demand, it is evident from the demand letter dated 14.08.2023 that Respondent No.1/UPSIDA demanded an amount of Rs.82,53,013.37/- towards maintenance charges, interest on maintenance charges, lease rent and GST on lease rent. The period-wise computation shows that the maintenance charges relate to the period from 01.07.2000 to 31.03.2009. The Respondent No.1/ UPSIDA has not specifically denied, in its reply, the period to which the aforesaid maintenance charges pertain. Thus, the principal maintenance dues had accrued during the period when the Corporate Debtor was the lessee of the subject properties, much prior to commencement of the CIRP on 30.05.2017 and the subsequent acquisition of the properties by the Applicant pursuant to the liquidation sale in 2022. Accordingly, the liability towards the principal maintenance charges had accrued against the Corporate Debtor, being the lessee during the relevant period, and could not merely by virtue of the subsequent liquidation sale, be treated as a liability originally incurred by the Applicant.

# 19. Further, the amount of Rs. 63,30,997.37/- towards interest on maintenance charges was thereafter calculated on the aforesaid defaults up to 31.08.2023 and the demand also includes Rs. 30,638/- towards lease rent and Rs. 5,515/- towards GST on lease rent. The fact that interest was computed up to a date subsequent to commencement of CIRP or even subsequent to the auction sale does not alter the character of the underlying principal liability. The interest is consequential upon the failure of Corporate Debtor to discharge the maintenance charges which had already fallen due between 2000 and 2009. All these amounts are therefore arising from a pre-CIRP liability demanded from the Applicant on account of Corporate Debtor.

# 20. The subsequent Lease Deed dated 06.11.2023 also does not alter the above position. The said Lease Deed creates continuing obligations upon the Applicant as the present lessee, including payment of lease rent and maintenance/service charges during its own tenure. It does not expressly state that the Applicant has assumed the already accrued pre-CIRP debt of the Corporate Debtor. The condition in the Transfer Memorandum dated 05.09.2023 that dues of the “ex-allottee” found payable in future may be recovered from the “current transferee” also cannot, in the facts of the present case, be treated as an unequivocal novation of UPSIDA’s already lodged and collated pre-CIRP claim, particularly when the Applicant’s payment was expressly made under protest.

# 21. Further, during the course of hearing on 03.08.2026, on the point of distribution in accordance with Section 53 of the Code, the Ld. Counsels representing the respective parties submitted as follows:

• “1. Ld. Counsel representing the applicant states that she is the successful Auction Purchaser and has purchased the assets in an open e-auction as a going concern in the auction process conducted by the Liquidator.

• 2. She states that there was a claim lodged by UPSIDA during the CIRP / liquidation process and the claim has been collated for pre-CIRP outstanding amount. However, UPSIDA was not executing the documents of transfer/ mutation. Ld. Counsel further submits that since the UPSIDA was not executing the documents, therefore it was compelled to deposit the dues of the pre-CIRP under protest.

• 3. The present applications have therefore been filed for seeking refund of the amount paid by the applicants to the UPSIDA on account of the formalities to be completed for the said purpose.

• 4. Ld. Counsel representing the Liquidator states that the liquidation assets have already been sold to the extent of about 280 crore, and out of which, approximately Rs. 259 crore has already been distributed. The remaining amount is also in the process of being distributed in accordance with the provisions of section 53 of Code.

• 5. Ld. Counsel, Mr. Rahul Kr. Jadaun, has put in appearance for UPSIDA and states that he would not have any grievance, if the distribution takes place in accordance with Section 53 of the Code and as per the entitlement of the UPSIDA.”

# 22. In view of the above, the mere “as is where is” condition or the subsequent transfer of the leasehold interest cannot convert the pre-CIRP liability of the Corporate Debtor into an independent personal liability of the Applicant. The pre-CIRP dues of the Corporate Debtor were required to be dealt with through the liquidation process in accordance with Section 53 of the Code, particularly when the Respondent No. 1 had already lodged its claim in the liquidation proceedings of the Corporate Debtor.

# 23. At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer to the law laid down by the Hon’ble NCLAT in Bhatpara Municipality Through its Chairperson v. Nicco Eastern Pvt. Ltd., (2021) (Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 714 of 2021) wherein it was held as follows:

• “14. Thus the liquidator had a duty to prepare an asset memorandum containing the value of the assets. Clause (f) of sub regulation 2 of regulation 34 stipulates the inclusion of “any other information that may be relevant for the sale of the asset”. Regulation 13 of the said Regulations (supra) enjoins upon the liquidator to submit a preliminary report to the Adjudicating Authority with the Asset Memorandum. Therefore, the liabilities with respect to the assets should have been brought to the notice of the Adjudicating Authority by the liquidator.

• 15. Clause (g) of sub section 1 of section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 binds the seller as hereunder: –

• “(1) The seller is bound –

• (g) to pay all public charges and rent accrued due in respect of the property up to the date of the sale, the interest on all encumbrances on such property due on such date, and, except where the property is sold subject to encumbrances, to discharge all encumbrances on the property then existing.

• 16. The outstanding dues of the property tax relating to period prior to sale confirmation are thus dues that are akin to claim of an unsecured creditor (Bhatpara Municipality in the present case) and should be discharged in terms of the properties regarding distribution of assets given in section 53 of IBC. The auction-purchaser cannot be held liable to pay any such dues relating to period prior confirmation of sale as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of AI Champdany Industries Ltd. vs. The Official Liquidator & Anr. (supra).”

# 24. Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble NCLAT in Bhatpara Municipality Through its Chairperson v. Nicco Eastern Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the outstanding dues pertaining to the period prior to the issuance of the Sale Certificate/handing over of possession are to be treated as pre-CIRP liabilities of the Corporate Debtor and dealt with in accordance with the waterfall mechanism prescribed under Section 53 of the Code, and cannot simultaneously be recovered from the auction purchaser merely because the purchaser required transfer of the leasehold interest in its favour. Accordingly, the Applicant/Auction Purchaser cannot be held liable to pay the pre-CIRP dues of the Corporate Debtor.

# 25. In view of the foregoing discussion, the amount of Rs. 82,53,013.37/-, as demanded by UPSIDA vide letter dated 14.08.2023 and paid by the Applicant under protest towards the pre-CIRP dues of the Corporate Debtor, is not liable to be borne by the Applicant merely on account of its purchase of the asset in liquidation. The Applicant is accordingly entitled to refund of the said amount. UPSIDA shall remain entitled to receive its admissible claim against the liquidation estate in accordance with Section 53 of the Code, as also recorded in the order dated 03.08.2026, wherein the Ld. Counsel representing UPSIDA submitted that UPSIDA would have no grievance if the distribution takes place in accordance with Section 53 of the Code and as per its entitlement.

# 26. The Respondent No.1/ UPSIDA is directed to refund an amount of Rs. 82,53,013.53/- to the Applicant.

# 27. Accordingly, the present application bearing IA No. 485 of 2023 is allowed in the aforesaid terms.

--------------------------------------------------

Thiruvengada Pillai vs Navaneethammal & Anr. - The Indian Stamp Act, 1899 nowhere prescribes any expiry date for use of a stamp paper. Section 54 merely provides that a person possessing a stamp paper for which he has no immediate use (which is not spoiled or rendered unfit or useless), can seek refund of the value thereof by surrendering such stamp paper to the Collector provided it was purchased within the period of six months next preceding the date on which it was so surrendered.

 SCI (2008.02.19) in Thiruvengada Pillai vs Navaneethammal & Anr. [2008 (4) SCC 530, Writ Petition (civil)  290 of 2001] held that; 

• The Indian Stamp Act, 1899 nowhere prescribes any expiry date for use of a stamp paper. Section 54 merely provides that a person possessing a stamp paper for which he has no immediate use (which is not spoiled or rendered unfit or useless), can seek refund of the value thereof by surrendering such stamp paper to the Collector provided it was purchased within the period of six months next preceding the date on which it was so surrendered.

• The stipulation of the period of six months prescribed in section 54 is only for the purpose of seeking refund of the value of the unused stamp paper, and not for use of the stamp paper. Section 54 does not require the person who has purchased a stamp paper, to use it within six months. Therefore, there is no impediment for a stamp paper purchased more than six months prior to the proposed date of execution, being used for a document.

• In the absence of any Rule requiring consecutively numbered stamp papers purchased on the same day, being used for an instrument which is not intended to be registered, a document cannot be termed as invalid merely because it is written on two stamp papers purchased by the same person on different dates. Even assuming that use of such stamp papers is an irregularity, the court can only deem the document to be not properly stamped, but cannot, only on that ground, hold the document to be invalid.

• Even if an agreement is not executed on requisite stamp paper, it is admissible in evidence on payment of duty and penalty under section 35 or 37 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. If an agreement executed on a plain paper could be admitted in evidence by paying duty and penalty, there is no reason why an agreement executed on two stamp papers, even assuming that they were defective, cannot be accepted on payment of duty and penalty.

• The fact that very old stamp papers of different dates have been used, may certainly be a circumstance that can be used as a piece of evidence to cast doubt on the authenticity of the agreement. But that cannot be a clinching evidence. There is also a possibility that a lay man unfamiliar with legal provisions relating to stamps, may bona fide think that he could use the old unused stamp papers lying with him for preparation of the document and accordingly use the old stamp papers.

Excerpts of the order;

This appeal by special leave is by the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance - OS No.290/1980 on the file of District Munsiff, Tindivanam.

Pleadings

# 2. In the plaint, the plaintiff (appellant) alleged that the first defendant (Adilakshmi) agreed to sell the suit schedule property to him under an agreement of sale dated 5.1.1980 for a consideration of Rs.3,000/-, and received Rs.2,000/- as advance. She agreed to execute a sale deed by receiving the balance consideration of Rs.1,000/- within three months. Possession of the suit property was delivered to him, under the said agreement. He issued a notice dated 14.2.1980 calling upon the first defendant to receive the balance price and execute the sale deed. The first defendant sent a reply denying the agreement. To avoid performing the agreement of sale, the first defendant executed a nominal sale deed in regard to the suit property in favour of the second defendant (first respondent herein), who was her close relative. The said sale was neither valid nor binding on him. On the said averments, he sought specific performance of the agreement of sale, against the defendant, alleging that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.

# 3. The defendants denied the allegation that the first defendant had executed an agreement of sale dated 5.1.1980 in favour of the plaintiff or that she had delivered possession of the suit property to him. They contended that plaintiff had concocted and forged the document with the help of his henchmen to defraud the defendants. They claimed that the first defendant had executed a valid sale deed dated 11.2.1980 in favour of the second defendant and had delivered possession of the suit property to her; and that the second defendant had put up a hut in the schedule property and was actually residing therein. The second defendant raised an additional contention that she was a bona fide purchaser for value and therefore, the sale in her favour was valid.

# 4. During the pendency of the suit first defendant died, and the third defendant (second respondent herein) was impleaded as her legal representative, who adopted the written statement of the second defendant.

Issues and the Judgment

# 5. On the said pleadings, three issues were framed by the trial court : (i) whether the agreement put forth by the plaintiff was true or concocted ? (ii) whether the second defendant had purchased the suit property for valid consideration ? and (iii) whether the plaintiff was entitled to the relief of specific performance ? The plaintiff examined himself as PW-1 and the scribe of the agreement (Ramaswami Pillai) as PW-2 and an attesting witness to the sale agreement (Venkatesha Pillai) as PW-3. The agreement of sale was exhibited as Ex. A-1. The notice and reply were marked as Ex. A2 and A4. The second defendant, (purchaser of the site), gave evidence as DW-1 and the third defendant, who was also a witness to the sale deed dated 11.2.1980, was examined as DW-2. The sale deed dated 11.2.1980 executed by first defendant in favour of second defendant was marked as Ex.B2 and previous title deed was exhibited as Ex. B4. The plaintiff and his witnesses gave evidence that the sale agreement was duly executed by first defendant in favour of plaintiff. The defendants gave evidence about the sale in favour of second defendant and denied execution of any agreement of sale in favour of plaintiff.

# 6. The trial court after appreciating the evidence, dismissed the suit by judgment and decree dated 28.2.1984. It held that the agreement of sale put forth by plaintiff was false and must have been created after the sale on 11.2.1980 in favour of second defendant, by using some old stamp papers in his possession. The said finding was based on the following facts and circumstances :

• (a) The sale agreement (A-1) was not executed on currently purchased stamp paper, but was written on two stamp papers, one purchased on 25.8.1973 in the name of Thiruvengadam and another purchased on 7.8.1978 in the name of Thiruvengadam Pillai.

• (b) The two attestors to the agreement were close relatives of plaintiff. One of them was Kannan, brother of the plaintiff and he was not examined. The other was Venkatesa Pillai, uncle of plaintiff examined as PW3. The scribe (PW-2) was a caste-man of plaintiff. Their evidence was not trustworthy.

• (c) Though the agreement of sale recited that the possession of the suit property was delivered to plaintiff, no such possession was delivered. On the other hand, the second defendant was put in possession on execution of the sale deed and she put up a thatched hut in the schedule property and was in actual physical possession. This falsified the agreement.

• (d) If really there was an agreement of sale, in the normal course, the plaintiff would have obtained the title deeds from the first defendant. But the earlier title deeds were not delivered to him. On the other hand, they were delivered to the second defendant who produced them as Ex.B3 and Ex.B4.

• (e) In spite of defendants denying the agreement (Ex.A1), the plaintiff failed to discharge his onus to prove that execution of the agreement as he did not seek reference to a fingerprint expert to establish that the thumb impression on the agreement was that of the first defendant.

The first & second appeals

# 6. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff filed an appeal before the Sub-Court, Tindivanam. The first appellate court allowed the plaintiff's appeal by judgment dated 12.1.1987, held that the agreement of sale was proved and decreed the suit granting specific performance. The following reasons were given by the first appellant court in support of its finding :

• (a) The evidence of PW1 (plaintiff), the scribe (PW2) and the attestor (PW3) proved the due execution of the agreement by the first defendant. As the scribe (PW2) was not related to plaintiff and as PW3 was not a close relative of plaintiff, their evidence could not have been rejected.

• (b) The burden of proving that the agreement of sale was concocted and forged was on the defendants and they ought to have taken steps to have the document examined by a Finger Print expert, to establish that the disputed thumb mark in the agreement of sale (Ex.A1), was different from the admitted thumb mark of the first defendant in the sale deed (Ex.B2). They failed to do so.

• (c) There appeared to be no marked difference between the finger impression in the agreement of sale (Ex.A1) and the finger impression in the sale deed in favour of the second defendant (Ex.B2), on a perusal of the said two documents. Therefore, it could be inferred that first defendant had executed the agreement.

• (d) Execution of the agreement of sale on two stamp papers purchased on different dates, did not invalidate the agreement.

# 8. Being aggrieved, the second defendant filed a second appeal. The High Court allowed the second appeal and dismissed the suit, by judgment dated 17.2.1999. The High Court while restoring the decision of the trial court held that the agreement of sale was not genuine for the following reasons:

• (i) The first appellate court had placed the onus wrongly on the defendants to prove the negative. As the first defendant denied execution of the agreement, the burden of establishing the execution of document, was on the plaintiff. The plaintiff had failed to establish by acceptable evidence that Ex. A-1 was a true and valid agreement of sale. The evidence, examined as a whole, threw considerable doubt as to whether it was truly and validly executed.

• (ii) A perusal of the agreement (Ex.A1) showed that the thumb impression was very pale and not clear. The first appellate court could not, by a casual comparison of the disputed thumb impression in the agreement with the admitted thumb impression in the sale deed, record a finding that there were no marked differences in the thumb impressions in the two documents (Ex.A1 and Ex.B2). In the absence of an expert's opinion that the thumb impression on the agreement of the sale was that of the first defendant, the first appellate court ought not to have concluded that the agreement of sale was executed by the first defendant.

• (iii) In the normal course, an agreement would be executed on stamp papers purchased immediately prior to the execution of the agreement. The fact that the agreement was written on two stamp papers bearing the dates 25.8.1973 and 7.8.1978 purchased in two different names showed that it was not genuine, but was anti-dated and forged.

• (iv) The attesting witnesses to the agreement of sale were close relatives of plaintiff. Their evidence was not trustworthy.

Points for consideration

# 8. The said judgment of the High Court is challenged in this appeal by special leave. The appellant contended that having regard to the provisions of Evidence Act, 1872, there was nothing improper in the first appellate court comparing the disputed thumb impression in Ex. A-1 with the admitted thumb impression of first defendant in Ex. B-2; and the finding of the first appellate court on such comparison, that there were no marked differences between the two thumb impressions, being a finding of fact, was not open to interference in second appeal. It was next contended that the execution of the agreement of sale was duly proved by the evidence of plaintiff (PW1), the scribe (PW-2) and one of the attesting witnesses (PW3). It was pointed out there was no evidence to rebut the evidence of PW1, PW2 and PW3 regarding due execution as first defendant died without giving evidence, and as the defendants did not seek reference to a finger print expert to prove that the thumb impression on the agreement of sale was not that of first defendant. It was submitted that an agreement cannot be doubted or invalidated merely on account of the fact that the two stamp papers used for the agreement were purchased on different dates. The Appellant therefore submitted that the sale agreement was duly proved.

# 9. On the contentions urged, the following questions arise for consideration :

• (i) Whether the agreement of sale executed on two stamp papers purchased on different dates and more than six months prior to date of execution is not valid?

• (ii) Whether the first appellate court was justified in comparing the disputed thumb impression with the admitted thumb impression and recording a finding about the authenticity of the thumb impression, without the benefit of any opinion of an expert?

• (iii) Whether the High Court erred in reversing the judgment of the first appellate court in second appeal?

Re : Question (i)

# 11. The Trial Court and the High Court have doubted the genuineness of the agreement dated 5.1.1980 because it was written on two stamp papers purchased on 25.8.1973 and 7.8.1978. The learned counsel for first respondent submitted that apart from raising a doubt about the authenticity of the document, the use of such old stamp papers invalidated the agreement itself for two reasons. Firstly, it was illegal to use stamp papers purchased on different dates for execution of a document. Secondly, as the stamp papers used in the agreement of sale were more than six months old, they were not valid stamp papers and consequently, the agreement prepared on such 'expired' papers was also not valid. We will deal with the second contention first. The Indian Stamp Act, 1899 nowhere prescribes any expiry date for use of a stamp paper. Section 54 merely provides that a person possessing a stamp paper for which he has no immediate use (which is not spoiled or rendered unfit or useless), can seek refund of the value thereof by surrendering such stamp paper to the Collector provided it was purchased within the period of six months next preceding the date on which it was so surrendered. The stipulation of the period of six months prescribed in section 54 is only for the purpose of seeking refund of the value of the unused stamp paper, and not for use of the stamp paper. Section 54 does not require the person who has purchased a stamp paper, to use it within six months. Therefore, there is no impediment for a stamp paper purchased more than six months prior to the proposed date of execution, being used for a document.

# 12. The Stamp Rules in many States provide that when a person wants to purchase stamp papers of a specified value and a single stamp paper of such value is not available, the stamp vendor can supply appropriate number of stamp papers required to make up the specified value; and that when more than one stamp paper is issued in regard to a single transaction, the stamp vendor is required to give consecutive numbers. In some States, the rules further require an endorsement by the stamp vendor on the stamp paper certifying that a single sheet of required value was not available and therefore more than one sheet (specifying the number of sheets) have been issued to make up the requisite stamp value. But the Indian Stamp Rules, 1925 applicable to Tamil Nadu, do not contain any provision that the stamp papers of required value should be purchased together from the same vendor with consecutive serial numbers. The Rules merely provide that where two or more sheets of paper on which stamps are engraved or embossed are used to make up the amount of duty chargeable in respect of any instrument, a portion of such instrument shall be written on each sheet so used. No other Rule was brought to our notice which required use of consecutively numbered stamp papers in the State of Tamil Nadu. The Stamp Act is a fiscal enactment intended to secure revenue for the State. In the absence of any Rule requiring consecutively numbered stamp papers purchased on the same day, being used for an instrument which is not intended to be registered, a document cannot be termed as invalid merely because it is written on two stamp papers purchased by the same person on different dates. Even assuming that use of such stamp papers is an irregularity, the court can only deem the document to be not properly stamped, but cannot, only on that ground, hold the document to be invalid. Even if an agreement is not executed on requisite stamp paper, it is admissible in evidence on payment of duty and penalty under section 35 or 37 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. If an agreement executed on a plain paper could be admitted in evidence by paying duty and penalty, there is no reason why an agreement executed on two stamp papers, even assuming that they were defective, cannot be accepted on payment of duty and penalty. But admissibility of a document into evidence and proof of genuineness of such document are different issues.

# 13. If a person wants to create or a back-dated agreement, the first hurdle he faces is the non-availability of stamp paper of such old date. Therefore tampering of the date of issue and seal affixed by the stamp vendor, as also the entries made by the stamp vendor, are quite common in a forged document. When the agreement is dated 5.1.1980, and the stamp papers used are purchased in the years 1973 and 1978, one of the possible inferences is that the plaintiff not being able to secure an anti-dated stamp paper for creating the agreement (bearing a date prior to the date of sale in favour of second defendant), made use of some old stamp papers that were available with him, to fabricate the document. The fact that very old stamp papers of different dates have been used, may certainly be a circumstance that can be used as a piece of evidence to cast doubt on the authenticity of the agreement. But that cannot be a clinching evidence. There is also a possibility that a lay man unfamiliar with legal provisions relating to stamps, may bona fide think that he could use the old unused stamp papers lying with him for preparation of the document and accordingly use the old stamp papers.

Re : Point No.(ii)

# 14. Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 relates to 'opinion of experts'. It provides inter alia that when the court has to form an opinion as to identity of handwriting or finger impressions, the opinion upon that point of persons specially skilled in questions as to identity or handwriting or finger impressions are relevant facts. Section 73 provides that in order to ascertain whether a finger impression is that of the person by whom it purports to have been made, any finger impression admitted to have been made by that person, may be compared with the one which is to be proved. These provisions have been the subject matter of several decisions of this Court.

14.1) In The State (Delhi Administration) v. Pali Ram [1979 (2) SCC 158] this Court held that a court does not exceed its power under section 73 if it compares the disputed writing with the admitted writing of the party so as to reach its own conclusion. But this Court cautioned :

• "Although there is no legal bar to the Judge using his own eyes to compare the disputed writing with the admitted writing, even without the aid of the evidence of any handwriting expert, the Judge should, as a matter of prudence and caution, hesitate to base his finding with regard to the identity of a handwriting which forms the sheet-anchor of the prosecution case against a person accused of an offence, solely on comparison made by himself. It is therefore, not advisable that a Judge should take upon himself the task of comparing the admitted writing with the disputed one to find out whether the two agree with each other; and the prudent course is to obtain the opinion and assistance of an expert."

The caution was reiterated in O. Bharathan vs. K. Sudhakaran  1996 (2) SCC 704. Again in Ajit Savant Majagvai v. State of Karnataka [1997 (7) SCC 110] referring to section 73 of the Evidence Act, this Court held :

• "The section does not specify by whom the comparison shall be made. However, looking to the other provisions of the Act, it is clear that such comparison may either be made by a handwriting expert under Section 45 or by anyone familiar with the handwriting of the person concerned as provided by Section 47 or by the Court itself.

• As a matter of extreme caution and judicial sobriety, the Court should not normally take upon itself the responsibility of comparing the disputed signature with that of the admitted signature or handwriting and in the event of the slightest doubt, leave the matter to the wisdom of experts. But this does not mean that the Court has not the power to compare the dispute signature with the admitted signature as this power is clearly available under Section 73 of the Act."

14.2) In Murari Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh - 1980 (1) SCC 704, this Court indicated the circumstances in which the Court may itself compare disputed and admitted writings, thus :

• "The argument that the court should not venture to compare writings itself, as it would thereby assume to itself the role of an expert is entirely without force. Section 73 of the Evidence Act expressly enables the court to compare disputed writings with admitted or proved writings to ascertain whether a writing is that of the person by whom it purports to have been written. If it is hazardous to do so, as sometimes said, we are afraid it is one of the hazards to which judge and litigant must expose themselves whenever it becomes necessary. There may be cases where both sides call experts and the voices of science are heard. There may be cases where neither side calls an expert, being ill able to afford him. In all such cases, it becomes the plain duty of the court to compare the writings and come to its own conclusions. The duty cannot be avoided by recourse to the statement that the court is no expert. Where there are expert opinions, they will aid the court. Where there is none, the court will have to seek guidance from some authoritative textbook and the court's own experience and knowledge. But discharge it must, its plain duty, with or without expert, with or without other evidence."

The decision in Murari Lal (supra) was followed in Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank & Ors. [2003 (3) SCC 583].

# 15. While there is no doubt that court can compare the disputed handwriting/signature/finger impression with the admitted handwriting/ signature/finger impression, such comparison by court without the assistance of any expert, has always been considered to be hazardous and risky. When it is said that there is no bar to a court to compare the disputed finger impression with the admitted finger impression, it goes without saying that it can record an opinion or finding on such comparison, only after an analysis of the characteristics of the admitted finger impression and after verifying whether the same characteristics are found in the disputed finger impression. The comparison of the two thumb impressions cannot be casual or by a mere glance. Further, a finding in the judgment that there appeared to be no marked differences between the admitted thumb impression and disputed thumb impression, without anything more, cannot be accepted as a valid finding that the disputed signature is of the person who has put the admitted thumb impression. Where the Court finds that the disputed finger impression and admitted thumb impression are clear and where the court is in a position to identify the characteristics of finger prints, the court may record a finding on comparison, even in the absence of an expert's opinion. But where the disputed thumb impression is smudgy, vague or very light, the court should not hazard a guess by a casual perusal. The decision in Muralilal (supra) and Lalit Popli (supra) should not be construed as laying a proposition that the court is bound to compare the disputed and admitted finger impressions and record a finding thereon, irrespective of the condition of the disputed finger impression. When there is a positive denial by the person who is said to have affixed his finger impression and where the finger impression in the disputed document is vague or smudgy or not clear, making it difficult for comparison, the court should hesitate to venture a decision based on its own comparison of the disputed and admitted finger impressions. Further even in cases where the court is constrained to take up such comparison, it should make a thorough study, if necessary with the assistance of counsel, to ascertain the characteristics, similarities and dissimilarities. Necessarily, the judgment should contain the reasons for any conclusion based on comparison of the thumb impression, if it chooses to record a finding thereon. The court should avoid reaching conclusions based on a mere casual or routine glance or perusal.

# 16. In this case the first defendant had denied having put her finger impression on Ex. A-1. She died during the pendency of the suit before her turn came for giving evidence. The High Court having examined the document has clearly recorded the finding that the thumb mark in Ex. A-1 was pale (that is light) and not clear. The document though dated 1980, was executed on two stamp papers which were purchased in 1973 and 1978. Contrary to the recital in the agreement that possession had been delivered to the plaintiff, the possession was not in fact delivered to plaintiff, but continued with the first defendant and she delivered the possession to the second defendant. The title deeds were not delivered to plaintiff. The attesting witnesses were close relatives of plaintiff and one of them was not examined. The scribe's evidence was unsatisfactory. It was also difficult to believe that the first defendant, an illiterate old woman from a village, would enter into an agreement of sale on 5.1.1980 with plaintiff, and even when he is ready to complete the sale, sell the property to someone else hardly a month thereafter, on 11.2.1980. In this background, the finding by the first appellant court, recorded without the benefit of any expert opinion, merely on a casual perusal, that there appeared to be no marked differences between the two thumb impressions, and therefore Ex. A-1 (sale agreement) must have been executed by first defendant, was unsound. The High Court was justified in interfering with the finding of the first appellate court that the Ex.A1 was executed by first defendant.

Re : Point No.(iii)

# 17. The trial court had analyzed the evidence properly and had dismissed the suit by giving cogent reasons. The first appellate court reversed it by wrongly placing onus on the defendants. Its observation that when the execution of an unregistered document put forth by the plaintiff was denied by the defendants, it was for the defendants to establish that the document was forged or concocted, is not sound proposition. The first appellate court proceeded on the basis that it is for the party who asserts something to prove that thing; and as the defendants alleged that the agreement was forged, it was for them to prove it. But the first appellate court lost sight of the fact that the party who propounds the document will have to prove it. In this case plaintiffs came to court alleging that the first defendant had executed an agreement of sale in favour. The first defendant having denied it, the burden was on the plaintiff to prove that the first defendant had executed the agreement and not on the first defendant to prove the negative. The issues also placed the burden on the plaintiff to prove the document to be true. No doubt, the plaintiff attempted to discharge his burden by examining himself as also scribe and one of the attesting witnesses. But the various circumstances enumerated by the trial court and High Court referred to earlier, when taken together, rightly create a doubt about the genuineness of the agreement and dislodge the effect of the evidence of PW 1 to 3. We are therefore of the view that the decision of the High Court, reversing the decision of the first appellate court, does not call for interference.

# 18. We, therefore, find no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed. Parties to bear their respective costs.

--------------------------------------------------