Nitendra Kumar Tomer vs Unox S.P.A. and Anr. - Section 17(1)(a) of the Code provides that, from the date of appointment of the interim resolution professional, the management of the affairs of the corporate debtor shall vest in the interim resolution professional.

 SCI (2026.04.10) in Nitendra Kumar Tomer vs Unox S.P.A. and Anr..[(2026) ibclaw.in 195 SC, Civil Appeal No. 3607 of 2026] held that;-

• Section 17(1)(a) of the Code provides that, from the date of appointment of the interim resolution professional, the management of the affairs of the corporate debtor shall vest in the interim resolution professional.

• Once the interim resolution professional was named by the NCLT in the admission order, Section 17(1)(a) of the Code would become operative. Therefore, with effect from the date of admission in the case on hand, i.e., 18.04.2024, the management of the affairs of the corporate debtor, Ambro Asia Private Limited, stood vested in Piyush Moona, Interim Resolution Professional, and it was not open to the suspended director of the corporate debtor to file an appeal in the name of the corporate debtor, Ambro Asia Private Limited, claiming to be its director and authorized representative.

Excerpts of the Order;

# 1. Nitendra Kumar Tomer, a suspended director of Ambro Asia Private Limited, the corporate debtor, filed the present appeal under Section 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 20161, aggrieved by the judgment dated 07.01.2026 passed by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi (hereinafter, ‘the NCLAT’), in Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 931 of 2024. By the said judgment, the NCLAT confirmed the order dated 18.04.2024 passed by the National Company Law Tribunal, New Delhi Bench (hereinafter, ‘the NCLT’), admitting CP (IB) No. 722/ND/2021, an application filed under Section 9 of the Code by Unox S.P.A., an operational creditor, respondent No. 1 herein.

# 2. At the outset, we entertained a doubt as to how the appeal before the NCLAT had been filed in the name of the corporate debtor, Ambro Asia Private Limited, after admission of the Section 9 application by the NCLT, vide order dated 18.04.2024. Thereupon, we were informed that this aspect was taken note of by the NCLAT. Our attention was drawn to the order dated 12.08.2025 passed by the NCLAT. Therein, the NCLAT noted that the appeal had been filed in the name of the corporate debtor whereas, after admission of the application under Section 9, the corporate debtor could be represented only by the interim resolution professional but the appeal, as instituted, was verified by Nitendra Kumar Tomer, a suspended director of the corporate debtor. The NCLAT further noted that an appeal in the name of the corporate debtor was not maintainable against an order of admission of an application under Section 9.

# 3. Having stated so, the NCLAT surprisingly went on to state that for the ends of justice, it deemed it appropriate to provide an opportunity to the appellant to amend the memo of appeal by filing an appropriate application and granted time. Thereafter, IA No. 4983 of 2025 was filed seeking amendment of the memo of appeal and the NCLAT allowed that application on 29.08.2025, permitting the appeal to be prosecuted by Nitendra Kumar Tomer, the suspended director of the corporate debtor. The appeal memo was taken on record, but we find that the final judgment dated 07.01.2026, presently under challenge before us, did not take note of the amended appeal memo and the judgment, as it stands, reflects the name of the corporate debtor as the appellant.

# 4. Having given thoughtful consideration to the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the NCLAT grossly erred in permitting a wholly incompetent appeal to be converted in the manner it was done. We may note that this incompetent appeal was filed on 24.04.2024 or thereabouts, assailing the order of admission dated 18.04.2024, and it was verified in the name of the corporate debtor, viz., Ambro Asia Private Limited, by Nitendra Kumar Tomer, claiming to be its director and authorized representative. However, respondent No. 2 in the appeal was none other than Piyush Moona, Interim Resolution Professional, who was appointed by the NCLT, vide the admission order dated 18.04.2024.

# 5. In this regard, reference may be made to Section 16 of the Code, titled ‘Appointment and tenure of interim resolution professional’. Insofar as an application under Section 9 of the Code is concerned, Section 16(3) is of relevance and it reads as under: –

• ‘(3) Where the application for corporate insolvency resolution process is made by an operational creditor and –

• (a) no proposal for an interim resolution professional is made, the Adjudicating Authority shall make a reference to the Board for the recommendation of an insolvency professional who may act as an interim resolution professional;

• (b) a proposal for an interim resolution professional is made under sub-section (4) of section 9, the resolution professional as proposed, shall be appointed as the interim resolution professional, if no disciplinary proceedings are pending against him.’

# 6. Section 17(1)(a) of the Code provides that, from the date of appointment of the interim resolution professional, the management of the affairs of the corporate debtor shall vest in the interim resolution professional. In the case on hand, it is clear that the application filed by Unox S.P.A. under Section 9 of the Code itself named the proposed interim resolution professional, as the order dated 18.04.2024, which is conveniently not placed on record along with this appeal, named Piyush Moona as the Interim Resolution Professional and he was, accordingly, shown as respondent No. 2 in the appeal filed before the NCLAT. Once the interim resolution professional was named by the NCLT in the admission order, Section 17(1)(a) of the Code would become operative. Therefore, with effect from the date of admission in the case on hand, i.e., 18.04.2024, the management of the affairs of the corporate debtor, Ambro Asia Private Limited, stood vested in Piyush Moona, Interim Resolution Professional, and it was not open to the suspended director of the corporate debtor to file an appeal in the name of the corporate debtor, Ambro Asia Private Limited, claiming to be its director and authorized representative. The appeal as framed and filed on 24.04.2024 was, therefore, wholly incompetent. It was not merely a ‘defective’ appeal as it was not maintainable in its very inception.

# 7. In this regard, the limitation prescribed under Section 61(2) of the Code assumes importance. In terms thereof, an appeal before the NCLAT must be filed within the time frames fixed thereunder. The normal period of limitation prescribed under Section 61(2) is 30 days but the proviso thereto permits the NCLAT to condone the delay of up to 15 days, if sufficient cause is shown for not filing the appeal within the prescribed period of 30 days. Notably, no discretion is left in the NCLAT to condone delay beyond the prescribed condonable period of 15 days. This being the legal position, the indulgence shown by the NCLAT on 12.08.2025 completely desecrated the aforestated statutory prescription.

# 8. Nitendra Kumar Tomer, the suspended director of the corporate debtor, could have filed an appeal against the admission order dated 18.04.2024 only within the limitation period prescribed under Section 61(2) of the Code. The misconceived appeal filed by him in the name of the corporate debtor, Ambro Asia Private Limited, professing to be its director and authorized representative, was wholly incompetent and was not an appeal with a ‘curable’ defect, which could have been attended to at a later point of time. It was, therefore, not open to the said suspended director to seek modification of the cause title in this incompetent appeal. Unfortunately, the NCLAT lost sight of this aspect and treated the wholly incompetent appeal as a merely defective one, whereby it deemed it appropriate to grant time to the suspended director to amend the memo of the appeal. Once the prescribed limitation period under Section 61(2) expired, it was not open to the suspended director to take steps to convert the incompetent appeal and maintain an appeal in his own name in August, 2025, long after expiry of the prescribed limitation. The NCLAT ought not to have permitted him to do so, whereby a time-barred appeal in the name of the suspended director was presented and entertained.

# 9. Though, the learned senior counsel appearing for the suspended director placed reliance on case law in support of his contention that the NCLAT was justified in permitting the amendment of the memo of appeal, we find the decisions relied upon to be wholly inapplicable. In Uday Shankar Triyar vs. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh and another2, this Court was dealing with a defective appeal, wherein two appellants were shown in the appeal memo but the vakalatnama was signed by only one of them. The High Court permitted the other appellant to come on record and pursue the appeal before the appellate Court. The said decision was subjected to challenge before this Court. In this context, this Court observed that any defect in signing the memorandum of appeal or any defect in the authority of the person signing the memorandum of appeal or the omission to file the vakalatnama executed by the appellant along with the appeal would not invalidate the memorandum of appeal, if such omission or defect is not deliberate. These observations were made in the context of an omission or defect, being one relatable to procedure which could be corrected subsequently. As already noted, the appeal in the case on hand was not a merely defective appeal but a wholly incompetent appeal, having been presented in the name of the corporate debtor by a suspended director even though he had no right to file such an appeal after the interim resolution professional was appointed. Therefore, the observations in the aforestated decision have no application.

# 10. In Varun Pahwa vs. Renu Chaudhary [(2019) ibclaw.in 314 SC]3, the plaint was not properly drafted inasmuch as, in the memo of parties, the plaintiff was described as Varun Pahwa through director of Siddharth Garments Private Limited, though it should have read as Siddharth Garments Private Limited through its director, Varun Pahwa. Holding this to be an inadvertent mistake in the plaint, which the trial Court should have allowed to be corrected so as to permit the company to sue as a plaintiff, this Court set aside the order declining to correct the memo of parties. Reference was made to the earlier decision in Uday Shankar Triyar (supra), wherein it was held that procedural defects and irregularities which are curable should not be allowed to defeat substantive rights or to cause injustice. Significantly, this Court had also observed therein that non-compliance with any procedural requirement relating to a pleading, memorandum of appeal or application or petition for relief should not entail automatic dismissal or rejection, unless the relevant statute or rule so mandates.

# 11. Presently, we find that the appeal, as framed and filed in the name of the corporate debtor by a suspended director claiming to be its authorized representative, was contrary to the mandate of the Code and was, therefore, not at all maintainable. Permitting it to be converted to an appeal by the suspended director at a later point of time, throwing the prescription of limitation to the winds, was a further violation of the Code. The question of rectifying or modifying a wholly incompetent appeal in violation of the mandate of the Code did not arise and the NCLAT, therefore, ought not to have extended indulgence in that regard. Varun Pahwa (supra), therefore, does not further the appellant’s case.

# 12. Lastly, reliance is placed on Innovators Cleantech Pvt. Ltd. vs. Pasari Multi Projects Pvt. Ltd. [(2024) ibclaw.in 452 NCLAT]4. This was a case involving defects in an appeal filed before the NCLAT and the curing of such defects within the time prescribed under the rules. This decision also does not further the case of the appellant, as we have already held that this was not a defective appeal that the NCLAT was dealing with but a wholly incompetent appeal.

# 13. Though, the order dated 12.08.2025 passed by the NCLAT and its later order dated 29.08.2025, permitting the amendment of the appeal, were not subjected to challenge by Unox S.P.A., the operational creditor, or by Piyush Moona, the Interim Resolution Professional, we are of the opinion that, despite such failure on their part, we must give primacy to the provisions of the Code, which lay down strict mandates in terms of time, which are sacrosanct and cannot be lightly discarded. Therefore, notwithstanding the aforestated orders attaining finality, the legal position obtaining under the Code is that the appeal, as framed and filed, was not maintainable being wholly incompetent and it could not have been converted into a ‘maintainable appeal’ after expiry of the period of limitation under Section 61(2) of the Code. The NCLAT erred grievously in permitting such an exercise to be undertaken and adjudicating the appeal on merits thereafter. Though the decision finally rendered by the NCLAT in the said appeal went against the suspended director, whereby he is now before this Court, we are not prepared to look into the merits of the said order, as the said appeal ought not to have been entertained.

The appeal is dismissed on the aforestated grounds.

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Zameer Pawan Kumar Agarwal & Ors vs Pankaj Prabhudayal Goenka, RP of Personal Guarantor & Ors. - The application which was filed on 14.03.2023 was clearly barred by time. We do not find any error in the order of the Adjudicating Authority rejecting Section 94 application as barred by time.

  NCLAT (2025.12.01) in Zameer Pawan Kumar Agarwal & Ors vs Pankaj Prabhudayal Goenka, RP of Personal Guarantor & Ors.[(2025) ibclaw.in 1044 NCLAT, Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 1118, 1120 & 1121 of 2025] held that;-

• These appeals have been filed against the order dated 16.05.2025 by which Section 94 application filed by the Appellant has been dismissed as barred by time.

• The Limitation against the Appellant to file or take steps for resolution under IBC, arose atleast from the date when recovery certificate was issued. The mere facts that the Appellant gave and OTS proposal to BoB shall not give any benefit under Section 18 to the Appellant for computing the Limitation from 12.06.2017.

• The application which was filed on 14.03.2023 was clearly barred by time. We do not find any error in the order of the Adjudicating Authority rejecting Section 94 application as barred by time.

Blogger’s comments; The bigger question is,-          

• “Whether limitation is required to be looked into in an application filed under section 94 of the IBC.”

Hon’ble Supreme Court (1992.04.20) in Punjab National Bank And Ors vs Surendra Prasad Sinha (Criminal Appeal No. 254 of 1992.) held that;

• "The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy  the rights of the parties.  Section 3 of  the Limitation Act only bars the remedy, but does not destroy the right which the remedy relates to. The right to  the debt continues to exist notwithstanding the remedy is barred by the limitation. Only exception in which the remedy also becomes  barred  by limitation is the right is destroyed.  Though the right to enforce the debt by judicial process  is barred, the right to debt remains. The time barred debt does not cease to exist by reason of s.3. That right can be exercised in any other manner than by means of a suit. The debt is not extinguished, but the remedy to enforce the liability is destroyed.  What s.3. refers only to the remedy but not to the right of the creditors. Such debt continues to subsists so long as it is not paid. It is not obligatory to file a suit to recover the debt."

Hon’ble Supreme Court (2018.10.11) in B.K. Educational Services Private Limited Vs. Parag Gupta and Associates [Civil Appeal  No.23988 of 2017] has in length noted the difference between debt “due and payable” from debts “due and recoverable”. ;

• # 19. Shri Dholakia also referred to and relied upon Section 60 and 61 of the Contract Act which are set out hereunder:

• “60. Application of payment where debt to be discharged is not indicated.—Where the debtor has omitted to intimate, and there are no other circumstances indicating to which debt the payment is to be applied, the creditor may apply it at his discretion to any lawful debt actually due and payable to him from the debtor, whether its recovery is or is not barred by the law in force for the time being as to the limitation of suits. 

• 61. Application of payment where neither party appropriates.—Where neither party makes any appropriation the payment shall be applied in discharge of the debts in order of time, whether they are or are not barred by the law in force for the time being as to the limitation of suits. If the debts are of equal standing, the payment shall be applied in discharge of each proportionably.”

• These Sections also recognize the fact that limitation bars the remedy but not the right. In the context in which Section 60 appears, it is interesting to note that Section 60 uses the phrase “actually due and payable to him….” whether its recovery is or is not barred by the limitation law. The expression “actually” makes it clear that in fact a debt must be due and payable notwithstanding the law of limitation. From this, it is very difficult to infer that in the context of the Contract Act, the expression “due and payable” by itself would connote an amount that may be due even though it is time-barred, for otherwise, it would be unnecessary for Section 60 to contain the word “actually” together with the later words, “whether its recovery is or is not barred by the law in force for the time being as to the limitation of suits”.

• # 20. Shri Dholakia went on to cite Bhimsen Gupta v. Bishwanath Prasad Gupta, (2004) 4 SCC 95, and In re Sir Harilal Nemchand Gosalia, AIR 1950 Bom 74, for the proposition that debts “due and payable” must be differentiated from debts “due and recoverable”. .

• In the former case, Section 11(1)(d) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 provided for eviction of a tenant where the amount of two months’ rent “lawfully payable by the tenant and due from him” was in arrears. This Court followed Bombay Dyeing (Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 328 ), stating as follows:

• “6. Section 11 of the said Act, 1982 deals with eviction of tenants. It begins with non obstante clause. It states that notwithstanding anything  contained in any contract or law to the contrary, no tenant shall be liable to be evicted except in execution of a decree passed by the court on one or more of the grounds mentioned in Sections 11(1)(a) to (f). In this case we are concerned with the ground of default which falls under Section 11(1)(d) and which states that where the amount of two months’ rent, lawfully payable by the tenant and due from him is in arrears by reason of non-payment within the time fixed by the contract or in the absence of such contract by the last day of the month next following that for which rent is payable then such default would constitute ground for eviction. It is interesting to note that the expression used in Section 11(1)(d) is “lawfully payable” and not “lawfully recoverable” and therefore, Section 11(1) (d) has nothing to do with recovery of arrears of rent. On the contrary, Section 11(1)(d) provides a ground for eviction of the tenant in the eviction suit. It is well settled that law of limitation bars the remedy of the claimant to recover the rent for the period beyond three years prior to the institution of the suit, but that cannot be a ground for defeating the claim of the landlord for decree of eviction on satisfaction of the ingredients of Section 11(1)(d) of the said Act, 1982. In the case of Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay [AIR 1958 SC 328] it has been held that when the debt becomes time-barred the amount is not recoverable lawfully through the process of the court, but it will not mean that the amount has become not lawfully payable. Law does not bar a debtor to pay nor a creditor to accept a barred debt.”

Excerpts of the Order;

(Hybrid Mode) 01.12.2025 Heard Ld. Counsel for the Appellant and the Respondent.

These appeals have been filed against the order dated 16.05.2025 by which Section 94 application filed by the Appellant has been dismissed as barred by time.

Brief facts necessary for deciding the appeals are: the Appellants are Personal Guarantor to the Corporate Debtor namely the "Roselabs Bioscience Limited", various financial facilities were extended to the CD to which the Appellants stood as Personal Guarantors. There was default by CD. Financial Creditor issued the demand notice under Section 13(2) and thereafter filed an application under Section 19 of the Debt Recovery Act, 1993 and the Debt Recovery Tribunal allowed the application in O.A. No. 437 of 2025 on 12.06.2017, recovery certificate was also issued. The Appellant filed Section 94 application on 14.03.2023.

In the application Resolution Professional was appointed who recommended for admission of Section 94 application. The Personal Guarantor (Appellant) also filed an affidavit opposing the application. Adjudicating Authority heard the parties, by the impugned order it held that application having been filed beyond the Limitation is to be rejected.

Ld. Counsel for the Appellant challenging the order submits that the Appellant has given a settlement proposal to Bank of Baroda on 23.02.2022, hence the application filed on 14.03.2023 cannot be barred by Limitation. He further submitted that after recovery certificate which was issued on 12.06.2017, three years period expired during the period under Section 10A, hence the Appellant shall also be entitled to benefit of the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Suo Moto Writ Petition 3 of 2020.

Ld. Counsel for the Bank refuting the submission submits that the application was barred by time the cause of action to the Appellant to pray for its resolution under Section 94 arose when demand notice was issued in 2015 and when recovery certificate was issued on 12.06.2017. Within three years period, the Appellant did not initiate the proceedings, he further submits that even after giving the benefit of period from 25.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 the application is still barred by time. He submits that the OTS given by Bank of Baroda shall not give an extension of Limitation under Section 18 of the Limitation Act to the Appellant.

We have considered the submissions of the parties and perused the record.

Ld. Counsel for the Respondent submitted that infact the demand notice was issued on 24.08.2015. It is true that the Appellant defaulted in re-payment when the demand notice was issued in the year of 2015 by the Financial Institution, however, even accepting the case of the Appellant that he will have further 3 years period after the recovery certificate was issued on 12.06.2017, we need to examine as to whether application filed on 14.03.2023 is within time, giving the benefit of date 12.06.2017 when recovery certificate was issued.

Section 18 of the Limitation Act provides effect of acknowledgement in writing.

• Section 18(1) provides as follows: -

• Where, before the expiration of the prescribed period for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by any person through whom he derives his title or liability, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed.

OTS proposal is given by the Appellant to Bank of Baroda. Section 18 cannot be applicable in extending the Limitation against the BoB. The Limitation against the Appellant to file or take steps for resolution under IBC, arose atleast from the date when recovery certificate was issued. The mere facts that the Appellant gave and OTS proposal to BoB shall not give any benefit under Section 18 to the Appellant for computing the Limitation from 12.06.2017. By giving the benefit of the period under the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Suo moto Writ Petition the Limitation shall expire in 2022.

The application which was filed on 14.03.2023 was clearly barred by time. We do not find any error in the order of the Adjudicating Authority rejecting Section 94 application as barred by time. We do not find any merit in these appeals.

Appeals are dismissed accordingly.

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IBBI - Guidelines for Committee of Creditors

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India

7th Floor, Mayur Bhawan, Shankar Market, Connaught Circus, 

New Delhi –110001

6th August, 2024

GUIDELINES FOR COMMITTEE OF CREDITORS

Introduction

Under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors (CoC) drives the procedures to attain the objective of value maximization of the distressed assets.

2. The members of the CoC largely represent financial creditors and most of them are under regulatory oversight of the financial sector regulators other than Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI).

3. Nevertheless, to foster more effective and time bound decision making by the CoC members, these self-regulating guidelines are being issued, to stem the value erosion, through curtailment of procedural delays and enhancement of transparency and coordinated approach of decision making by the members of the CoC.

4. The guidelines would help in resolution under the Code in a time bound manner in the interest of maximisation of value of the assets of the corporate debtor.

5. Short title and commencement

• (a) These guidelines may be called the Guidelines for Committee of Creditors.

• (b) These Guidelines shall come into immediate effect.

6. Guidelines

A member of the CoC shall: – 

• Objectivity and Integrity

• (a) follow relevant provisions of the Code and regulations, in letter and spirit, while performing their roles and functions.

• (b) maintain integrity in discharging their roles and functions as envisioned under the Code.

• (c) maintain objectivity during the decision-making process.

• (d) foster informed decision making and share with the CoC/ Insolvency  Professional any relevant information relating to transactions, guarantees, recoveries, claims, etc. relating to the corporate debtor. Independence and impartiality

• (e) disclose to the CoC/ Insolvency Professional the details of any existing or potential conflict of interest arising due to pecuniary, personal orprofessional relationship with any stakeholder, immediately on becoming aware of it.

• Professional competence and participation

• (f) keep themselves updated with the provisions of the Code, rules and regulations and the role and responsibilities assigned thereunder.

• (g) nominate representative with proper authorisation and sufficient mandate to effectively participate in meetings. The nominated representative may endeavour to obtain approval of the competent authority, if required, at the earliest.

• (h) participate actively, constructively and effectively in deliberations and decision making of the CoC. Co-operation, supervision and timeliness

• (i) supervise and facilitate the Insolvency Professional in discharging his duties under the Code.

• (j) facilitate expeditious appointment of various professionals within the timelines prescribed under the Code and regulations.

• (k) endeavour to resolve any inter-se disputes between the members, particularly in relation to claims, preferably, through dialogue, or other nonadversarial means, with a view to avoid litigation to the extent possible. Confidentiality

• (l) ensure at all times complete adherence to the undertaking regarding confidentiality of information.

• Costs

• (m) take necessary measures to ensure that the insolvency resolution process  cost is reasonable.

• (n) expeditiously decide on all the expenses to be incurred by the Insolvency Professional including the going concern expenses of the corporate debtor and his fee.

• (o) prudently fix the fee payable to the liquidator while deciding to liquidate the corporate debtor. 

• Meeting of the CoC

• (p) regularly monitor the activities of the Insolvency Professional and seek,rationale of decisions/actions taken by him.

• (q) diligently recommend for the inclusion or otherwise of the belated claims collated by the Insolvency Professional and categorised as acceptable, in the list of creditors and its treatment in the resolution plan, if any.

• (r) actively participate in the presentation of valuation methodologies made by the Registered Valuers.

• (s) ensure the conduct of the meeting at regular intervals as specified in the regulations. Sharing of information 

• (t) proactively share the latest financial statements, relevant extract from the audits of the corporate debtor, conducted by the creditors such as stock audit, transaction audit, forensic audit, etc. and other relevant information available, with the Insolvency Professional to enable efficient conduct of the process.

• (u) seek details of all litigation filed against or by the corporate debtor from Insolvency Professional and recommend necessary actions to Insolvency Professional to safeguard the interest of the corporate debtor. Feasibility and viability of corporate debtor

• (v) carefully review and assess the information memorandum prepared by Insolvency Professional and offer additional insights. 

• (w) duly contribute to the preparation of the marketing strategy by the Insolvency Professional and may also take measures for marketing of the assets of the corporate debtor, if necessary. 

• (x) ensure that all resolution plans as received by Insolvency Professional are placed before CoC.

• (y) suitably consider the requirement of a monitoring committee for the implementation of the resolution plan.

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