Achal Kumar Jindal Vs. Sanjay Kumar Bhuwalka and Anr. - Secondly, if the legislative philosophy behind an insolvency resolution process is about reviving the corporate debtor, then does not an offer of settlement by the promotors or the suspended board of the corporate debtor indicate an idea that the suspended directors themselves are keen to revive the company that they have promoted?

 NCLAT (2026.06.30) in Achal Kumar Jindal Vs. Sanjay Kumar Bhuwalka and Anr. [[2026) ibclaw.in 793 NCLAT,Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 2341 of 2024] held that;

• To repeat, here in this case, there is just one creditor, who constitutes the sole member of the CoC. And, the debt said to be in default is now offered to be repaid by the suspended director of the CD, which the only creditor has rejected. The issue therefore, is no more about the justification for commencing CIRP but about refusing a settlement. The issue at hand is required to be tested on the plane of law as stated above:

• Secondly, if the legislative philosophy behind an insolvency resolution process is about reviving the corporate debtor, then does not an offer of settlement by the promotors or the suspended board of the corporate debtor indicate an idea that the suspended directors themselves are keen to revive the company that they have promoted?

• Now, under Sec.12A, a decision on settlement and withdrawal has to be approved by a 90% vote of the CoC, but if the offer of settlement is understood as conveying an intention of the suspended board to revive the corporate debtor, can the CoC decide against it and reject the offer of settlement arbitrarily and without assigning justifiable reasons?

Excerpts of the Order; 

This appeal is preferred by the suspended director of the corporate debtor, who challenges the Order of the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT, Kolkata Bench) in C.P. (IB) No. 69/KB/2024, dated 13.12.2024, by which the CD was admitted to CIRP under Sec.7 IBC in a proceeding initiated by the first respondent. Right at the outset it may be stated, as the proceeding progressed before us, the focus of appeal shifted from a contest on the merit of the Order of the Adjudicating Authority to the advisability of continuing CIRP on grounds of malice within the meaning of Sec.65 IBC.

# 2. The material facts are:

a) Sulojay Realty Pvt. Ltd., is the Corporate Debtor and the appellant is one of its suspended Directors. The CD was incorporated on 20.03.2021, and at the relevant point of time, Sanjay Kumar Bhuwalka, the first respondent herein, was also one of its directors and indeed was its majority shareholder.

b) Between April, 2021 and May, 2022, the first respondent had advanced various sums to the Corporate Debtor through banking channels, aggregating ₹.7,47,32,000/-. And, in June, 2021, the CD had made a partial repayment of Rs.1,85,01,399/- towards the said liability. As to the balance payable, CD had acknowledged the same in its annual report for the FY 2021-22 and also for the FY 2022-23, which shows the balance liability due payable at ₹.6,43,51,360/- as on 31.03.2023.

c) While so, on 02.06.2022, the entire shareholding of the family holding of Bhuwalka (from which the first respondent hails) and Agarwala families in the Corporate Debtor stood transferred to M/s Exclusive Motors Private Limited pursuant to a Share Purchase Agreement. Consequently, the first respondent along with another director of the CD resigned from the Board of the Corporate Debtor, while the present appellant along with Mr. Satya Prakash Bagla assumed control and management of the Corporate Debtor.

d) Subsequent to the change in management, substantial amounts, aggregating approximately Rs.55.66 crores, was paid through the Corporate Debtor to members of the Agarwala family towards repayment of their alleged loans. Respondent No.1 relied on the Annual Report for FY 2022-23 to contend that the Corporate Debtor continued to acknowledge the outstanding liability payable to him, which stood reflected at Rs.6,43,51,360/- as on 31.03.2023.

e) Since repayment was not forthcoming, the first respondent issued a demand notice dated 29.02.2024 claiming an amount of Rs.7,54,79,326/- which included the subsequent interest payable, and since the amount so demanded was not paid, the first respondent instituted a proceeding under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 before the Adjudicating Authority in CP (IB) No.69/KB/2024.

f) The CD resisted the proceedings with its dispute over the nature and existence of the alleged financial debt, and further contended that the proceedings arose due to the deterioration of personal and commercial relations between the parties.

g) The Adjudicating Authority, vide its Order dated 13.12.2024, which is now impugned before us, allowed the application filed under Section 7 of the Code and initiated CIRP against the Corporate Debtor.

# 3. As outlined earlier, this appeal was filed challenging the aforesaid Order. When the appeal was moved, on 18.12.2024, this Tribunal passed an interim order restraining further progress of CIRP save and except collation of claims by the IRP on condition that the appellant deposited the entire amount claimed by the first respondent together with accrued interest. Thereafter, the appellant sought termination of CIRP on the ground that the entire debt amount has been deposited.

Arguments

# 4. Before embarking to narrate the arguments advanced by the rival parties, few facts are required to be placed on record:

a) that the CoC is comprised of a sole member, the petitioning creditor, the first respondent herein. And, the Interim Resolution Professional has made a statement that when he invited claims, he has received none. This implies, that the corporate debtor has just one creditor, and he constitutes the one member CoC;

b) In the course of the argument, the learned counsel for the appellant has made a submission that the amount deposited by the appellant before this tribunal pursuant to the Order dated 18.12.2024 may be withdrawn by the first respondent towards satisfaction of the claim.

c) The first respondent, however, rejected this offer on the ground that the amount was deposited not with any intent to pay the debt, but with an intent to show bonafide for obtaining an interim order of stay, and not voluntarily but only as directed by the tribunal.

# 5. Turning to the arguments, keeping aside his contention on the merit of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that irrespective of the merit of the defence which the corporate debtor has taken before the Adjudicating Authority, the fact now remains that the entire amount whose payment was alleged to have been defaulted by the sole creditor of the CD has been deposited with interest, when in law payment of interest is not even required to be offered, and that the petitioning-creditor can satisfy himself towards his claim. This is a subsequent turn of events which is ascertainable from the records, and hence, to let the CIRP initiated against the corporate debtor to continue would now constitute abuse of process of this tribunal.

# 6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent argued:

a) when once the existence of financial debt and default stands established, the Adjudicating Authority is left with no discretion but to admit the Corporate Debtor into CIRP and considerations relating to settlement or solvency are wholly irrelevant at that stage. And, indeed, the appellant has chosen not to contest the merit of the Order passed by the tribunal below.

b) the deposit of the amount defaulted was made before this Appellate Tribunal pursuant to the interim orders does not amount to settlement of the dispute nor can the same compel the withdrawal of CIRP dehors the statutory mechanism contained under Section 12A of the Code. Any withdrawal of CIRP after admission can be permitted only in the manner contemplated under Section 12A read with Regulation 30A and in terms of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in GLAS Trust Co. LLC v. Byju Raveendran [(2024) ibclaw.in 275 SC] : [(2025) 3 SCC 625], namely upon an application by the original applicant founded on a concluded settlement between the parties.

c) Pleas founded on Section 12A, Section 65 of the Code and Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules were neither raised before the Adjudicating Authority nor pleaded in the Memorandum of Appeal and, therefore, the appellant cannot be permitted to set up an altogether new case at the appellate stage. Respondent No.1 has never consented to settlement of the proceedings and refusal to accept the amount deposited before this Tribunal cannot be construed as malicious conduct or abuse of process. At any rate that the conduct of the first respondent in insisting upon continuation of CIRP strictly in accordance with the statutory framework of the Code, by any stretch, cannot be construed as mala fide or malicious.

d) Sec.65 of the Code cannot be invoked in the absence of specific pleadings and material establishing fraudulent or malicious initiation of insolvency proceedings and, in any event, such plea cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in appeal.

e) that the liabilities of the Corporate Debtor are far in excess of its assets and continuation of CIRP is therefore necessary for carrying the insolvency process to its logical conclusion in accordance with the provisions of the Code.

# 7. In reply, the learned counsel for the appellant argued:

a) even if it is presumed that there existed any ground for initiating a CIRP against the corporate debtor, today, with the amount so alleged to have been defaulted having been deposited by the appellant with a plea to the sole creditor to withdraw it towards satisfaction of his debt, the justification for initiating CIRP is lost and to let it to continue will now fall outside Sec.12A of the Code, but will fall within Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules as it constitutes an abuse of judicial process of the tribunal.

b) the refusal of the first Respondent, being the sole creditor of the Corporate Debtor, to accept repayment despite availability of the entire amount demonstrates that the proceedings are being pursued for purposes other than genuine insolvency resolution.

c) Sec.65 of the Code is intended to prevent fraudulent or malicious initiation of insolvency proceedings and once malicious intent becomes evident from the conduct of the CIRP applicant, such intent necessarily relates back to the initiation of proceedings under Section 7 of the Code.

Decision & Discussion

# 8. One creditor. The repayment of the amount which this creditor claims as having been defaulted by the corporate debtor, is now deposited by the appellant. If it were a suit for recovery of money, the game should have ended here. However, this is IBC scenario, where on admission of the corporate debtor to CIRP, the proceedings assume the character of what the Hon’ble Supreme Court describes as ‘proceedings in rem’ in which the interest of all the creditors of the corporate debtor will automatically be brought within the fold of insolvency resolution process, with a specific statutory mechanism to settle and withdraw a CIRP in Sec.12A to be read with Regulation 30. Therefore, what now stands between the appellant and the first respondent is not the refusal of the latter to accept the offer made by the former, to emphasis, to the only creditor who constitutes the sole-member CoC, but the Order of the Adjudicating Authority admitting the corporate debtor to CIRP. Indeed, the first respondent is well within his right to reject the offer to settle, but the issue is, can his resistance to settle should deny the tribunal of its power to terminate the CIRP? The appellant contends, that the refusal of the first respondent to settle, given the fact that there is no other creditor in the fray could be termed as demonstrating his malicious intent and does it constitute abuse of process remediable under Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules?

# 9. Before delving into the merit of the contention of the appellant to terminate the CIRP, it is necessary to remind at least relevant facets of law which the Supreme Court has declared on an interpretation of the Code:

a) In Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd., & another Vs Union of India & others [(2019) ibclaw.in 03 SC] : [(2019)4 SCC 17] and Kridhan Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs Venkatesan Sankaranarayanan and others [(2020) ibclaw.in 32 SC] : [(2021) 6 SCC 94], Hon’ble Supreme Court spotlighted the legislative philosophy behind the insolvency resolution process, where it was declared that the principal aim of the Code is to revive and resurrect a financially crippled corporate debtor, and that the liquidation of the corporate debtor should be the last resort, and should not be attempted till the insolvency resolution process is exhausted.

b) In M. Suresh Kumar Reddy Vs Canara Bank & Others [(2023) ibclaw.in 67 SC] : [(2023)8 SCC 387] it is held that before initiating CIRP, the Adjudicating Authority is only required to examine the criteria prescribed in Sec.7 or 9 IBC, and not to examine the solvency of the corporate debtor, since the Code has not required it as a pre-requisite.

c) In GLAS Trust Co. LLC v. Byju Raveendran [(2024) ibclaw.in 275 SC] : [(2025) 3 SCC 625] it is held that for settlement and withdrawal of CIRP the inherent powers of the tribunal shall not be summoned since the Code has made a specific provision in Sec.12A to be read with Regulation 30 of the CIRP Regulation for the said purpose.

# 10. To repeat, here in this case, there is just one creditor, who constitutes the sole member of the CoC. And, the debt said to be in default is now offered to be repaid by the suspended director of the CD, which the only creditor has rejected. The issue therefore, is no more about the justification for commencing CIRP but about refusing a settlement. The issue at hand is required to be tested on the plane of law as stated above:

a) Firstly, only for commencement of CIRP, it is stipulated that the tribunal has to only ascertain existence of a debt and the default in repaying the same and not required to examine the solvency of the corporate debtor. There is a reason for it. A CIRP has to be completed within the timeline prescribed, and investigation into the solvency of the corporate debtor can divert the issue in another track which may defeat the statutory objective of meeting the timeline. However, if during the CIRP, an offer of settlement has forthcome, can it be sabotaged without justification because there is justification for commencing CIRP? It needs to be underscored that the factors necessary for commencing a CIRP need not remain the same for terminating it on settlement. After all, the scheme of Sec.12A which provides for settlement and withdrawal of CIRP has not required the CoC which is authorised to consider and take a decision on any offer of settlement to be bound by the criteria necessary for commencing the CIRP.

b) Secondly, if the legislative philosophy behind an insolvency resolution process is about reviving the corporate debtor, then does not an offer of settlement by the promotors or the suspended board of the corporate debtor indicate an idea that the suspended directors themselves are keen to revive the company that they have promoted?

c) Thirdly, IBC is not designed as an exproprietary enactment as mandating compulsory divestiture of the property, which a corporate debtor is in the hands of its promotors or shareholders, once it has defaulted in repaying the debt of the petitioning-creditor. As we have observed in Suyog Suryakant Talekar Vs Trivenimudrai Project Ltd., & another [(2026) ibclaw.in 439 NCLAT] : [Com.Appeal (IB)(Ins) 247 of 2026], the entire fulcrum of insolvency process rests on a presumption that once the corporate debtor has committed default in paying a solitary debt – the debt due to the petitioning-creditor, such default is necessarily owing to its insolvency. However, if the basic character or objective of the Code is understood not as an exproprietary statute like the land acquisition legislation, then there is a compelling need to limit the operation of this underlying presumption behind initiating a CIRP right at the point where a genuine offer of settlement is made, more so where there is a one member CoC, constituted of only the petitioning-creditor. Otherwise, the Code will end up producing Shylocks out of creditors of the corporate debtor. A default in paying the debt may generally be understood as a situation where the debtor did not possess the money to repay the debt (which the Code treats as an act of insolvency), but is it an irredeemable sin if the debt-amount is offered later, but before third party interests are created in the assets of the corporate debtor?

d) Now, under Sec.12A, a decision on settlement and withdrawal has to be approved by a 90% vote of the CoC, but if the offer of settlement is understood as conveying an intention of the suspended board to revive the corporate debtor, can the CoC decide against it and reject the offer of settlement arbitrarily and without assigning justifiable reasons?

# 11. And, here in this case, the CoC has a solitary member, who incidentally is the only creditor of the corporate debtor. The money due to him has already been deposited by the appellant, no matter the circumstances in which it was deposited. And it is now offered towards repayment of debt which this creditor claims as due to him. It may be true, that when this money was due for repayment, it was not paid, but when it is offered on a platter the creditor rejects, especially when he has no one to consult, or decide for him. Is it then fair for this one creditor-one member- CoC to reject the offer, merely because there existed grounds for commencing CIRP? What exactly this creditor wants – the blood of the suspended board of the corporate debtor, or its revival? If CIRP is all about revival of the corporate debtor and about settling any personal scores, and if the first respondent believes in the legislative philosophy of the Code, then what legal or moral grounds has he when the suspended director himself indicates his intent to revive and keep alive the corporate debtor with his offer of settlement? Does not the conduct of the creditor reflect an intention to misuse IBC and its process? If the first respondent’s keenness to continue the CIRP does not reflect malice, what else will?

# 12. We are not able to appreciate the attitude of the first respondent. The scenario may be different if there had been more creditors than one, but not in this case. The rejection of the offer of settlement is plainly without justification and we sense an anxiety in the first respondent to abuse the Code, its philosophy and intent. Turning to Sec.65 of the Code, while the text of this provision provides for imposition of penalty for fraudulent and malicious initiation of CIRP and appears as an ex-post facto proceeding, where a malicious intent becomes evident even during the course of the proceedings, should the tribunal watch with glee the misuse of the Code, and wait to remedy a wrong when it has the powers to prevent? It would be a travesty of justice if we choose to abdicate our authority when there is a need to act and accept the contentions of the first respondent and to oversee what we consider as a shameless attempt to abuse the Code, its objectives, and the judicial process of this tribunal.

# 13. Taking cognizance of the developments during the pendency of this appeal, we find every reason to terminate the CIRP initiated against the corporate debtor, and it is terminated. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.

----------------------------------------------

Teena Saraswat Pandey (RP) Vs. Kishore Associates AOP - Whether the SRA’s failure to meet the payment schedule amounts to a “wilful” failure to implement the approved resolution plan attracting penal action under Section 74(3) this is answered in negative.

  NCLT Indore (2026.06.05) in Teena Saraswat Pandey (RP) Vs. Kishore Associates AOP [(2026) ibclaw.in 1976 NCLT, I.A. 502 of 2025 and I.A. 503 of 2025 in T.P. No. 123 of 2019] held that;

• Whether the SRA’s failure to meet the payment schedule amounts to a “wilful” failure to implement the approved resolution plan attracting penal action under Section 74(3) this is answered in negative.

• In light of the judgment cited above, it becomes clear that under the facts and circumstances of the case, an extension granted in the payment timelines envisaged under the Resolution Plan does not amount to modification in the resolution plan. Hence, the second question is answered in negative.

• Therefore the present petition for commencement of liquidation is premature. There is a real possibility that limited additional time and supervision may permit implementation, preserving going‑concern value that liquidation may destroy. Thus Whether the present Application for commencement of liquidation ought to be allowed at this stage the answer is in negative.

• Thus this Tribunal recognized the possibility of revival of the corporate debtor based on the resolution plan and grant 45 days additional time to enable implementation of the resolution plan, consistent with the IBC’s object to promote revival and maximize value.

Excerpts of the Order; 

Interlocutory Applications No. 502, 503, and 542 (hereinafter collectively referred to as ‘the three IAs’) are interconnected and arise out of the same set of facts in the present matter. The issues raised in all three IAs are common/substantially the same. In view of the common questions of fact and law, it is therefore appropriate and in the interests of justice that the three IAs be taken up and decided jointly. Accordingly, all the three IAs are being decided simultaneously by this order.

# 1. The present Application has been filed by Ms. Teena Saraswat Pandey, Resolution Professional of M/s. Indison Agro Foods Ltd. (“Corporate Debtor” or “CD”) under Section 33 (3) & (4) of the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”) seeking liquidation of Corporate Debtor on account of failure of M/s. Kishore Associates AOP (“Successful Resolution Applicant” or “SRA”) to implement the resolution plan, which was approved by this Hon’ble Tribunal vide Order dated 18.06.2025. seeking following prayers:

• a. to pass appropriate order holding the Respondent / SRA guilty of ‘knowingly’ and ‘willingly’ contravened with the implementation of the Resolution Plan approved by this Hon’ble Tribunal vide its Order dated 18.06.2025;

• b. to pass appropriate order directing the initiation of penal proceeding under Section 74(3), IBC against the Respondent/ SRA for its failure to make the payment of resolution amount as per the approved Resolution Plan, as such for contravention to implement the resolution plan therein.

• c. allow the present Application and pass an Order directing the commencement of liquidation proceedings of the Corporate Debtor i.e., M/s. Indison Agro Foods Ltd;

• d. pass consequent order appointing the Applicant herein i.e., Smt. Teena Saraswat Pandey, Insolvency Professional as the Liquidator of the Corporate Debtor;

• e. pass any further order(s)/direction(s) as may deem fit to this Hon’ble Tribunal.

# 2. The averments made by the Applicant in its application are as follows:

# 3. The Tribunal ordered CIRP to begin on 03.03.2023 based on an Indian Bank (formerly Allahabad Bank) Section 7 application. Ms. Teena Saraswat Pandey was appointed as Interim Resolution Professional and later confirmed as Resolution Professional.

# 4. The IRP received the CIRP order on 03.03.2023 and published the statutory Form A public notice on 05.03.2023 in Free Press and Raj Express (Indore) and Indian Express and Dainik Navjyoti (Jodhpur), inviting creditors to submit claims. The IRP also informed the relevant statutory authorities in Indore and Jodhpur about commencement of the CIRP.

# 5. The IRP received claims after the public notice and formed a three-member Committee of Creditors (CoC) under Section 21(1) and relevant CIRP Regulations. The CoC was formally constituted on 25.03.2023 and held its first meeting on 01.04.2023. The three financial creditors and their voting percentages are listed in the application as follows:

i) State Bank of India: 52.71%

ii) Indian Bank: 36.30%

iii) ICICI Bank.: 10.99%

# 6. The Applicant appointed IBBI-registered valuers on 15.04.2023 (under the Code and Regulation 27) to determine the Corporate Debtor’s fair value and liquidation value for plant & machinery, land & buildings, and securities & financial assets.

Meetings of CoC

# 7. In the 2nd CoC meeting (24.04.2023) the Applicant published Form G (04.05.2023) under Regulation 36A(1) to invite EOIs, with 19.05.2023 as deadline. Several parties showed interest, but three prospective resolution applicants (PRAs) submitted formal EOIs with the required Rs.25 lakh EMD. The list of PRAs was circulated on 29.05.2023 to PRAs and CoC members for objections by 03.06.2023.The list of PRAs is as follow:

• a. JICS Logistics Ltd.;

• b. M/s. Kishore Associates AOP;

• c. Kalyan Toll Infrastructure Ltd.

The final PRA list was circulated on 13.06.2023, with resolution plans due by 18.07.2023. Two plans were submitted on time from M/s. Kishore Associates AOP and M/s. Kalyan Toll Infrastructure Ltd. each accompanied by a refundable deposit of Rs.50 lakh.

# 8. At the 5th CoC meeting on 24.07.2023, the Applicant, having vetted both resolution plans and found them compliant with the Code and related rules/regulations, circulated them to CoC members upon receipt of required confidentiality undertakings and then presented the plans for CoC discussion and deliberation.

# 9. At the 6th CoC meeting on 14.08.2023, members unanimously (100%) approved a 90‑day CIRP extension. The Applicant filed under IA No. 249 (MP)/2023 under Section 12(2), and the Tribunal allowed the extension on 31.08.2023, extending CIRP to 27.11.2023.

# 10. At the 7th CoC meeting on 22.08.2023 the resolution plans were re‑presented, discussed in detail, and put to vote with voting lines arranged per CoC members’ request. The minutes of that meeting are annexed as ANNEXURE‑A/1.

# 11. At the 9th CoC meeting on 21.11.2023 the CoC approved seeking exclusion of 70 days (15.09.2023–23.11.2023) because of pending litigation with State Bank of India, to extend the CIRP (which was due to expire on 27.11.2023). The Applicant filed IA No. 364 (MP)/2023 for this relief, but the Tribunal dismissed it as infructuous on 10.05.2024.

The Tribunal’s 05.01.2024 order disposed of two applications: IA 166 (MP)/2023 (seeking replacement of the RP) was dismissed, and IA 251 (MP)/2023 (seeking reconsideration of a claim) was disposed of directing the Applicant to reconsider State Bank of India’s claim in accordance with the Tribunal’s observations in paragraph 10 of the order.

# 12. At the 10th CoC meeting on 24.01.2024 the Applicant reported that as per the Tribunal’s 05.01.2024 order, it had recomputed the three financial creditors’ claims (adjusting chargeable and penal interest) and reallocated their voting shares. The CoC discussed statutory agendas under Regulations 39B–39D (estimated liquidation cost, sale as a going concern, liquidator’s fees) and unanimously (100%) approved seeking exclusion of 100 days (15.09.2023–06.03.2024).

# 13. At the 11th CoC meeting on 02.03.2024 the CoC discussed sale/liquidation of the Corporate Debtor and put the approval of resolution plans from M/s. Kishore Associates AOP and M/s. Kalyan Toll Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., and the agenda for liquidation, to e‑vote. Minutes are annexed as ANNEXURE–A/3.

# 14. M/s. Kishore Associates’ plan received 47.29% votes and was rejected with (52.71% voting). M/s. Kalyan Toll Infrastructure’s plan was unanimously rejected (100% against). The liquidation resolution was passed by 52.71% votes. With no plan achieving the required 66% and the extended CIRP expiring on 06.03.2024, the Applicant filed IA(Liq.) No.1(MP)/2024 under Section 33(1)(a) to commence liquidation. Kishore Associates then filed IA/1(MP)/2024 seeking leave to submit a revised/financially improved plan. The Tribunal’s 02.09.2024 order allowed any revised plan to be placed before the CoC for final decision (order annexed as ANNEXURE‑A/4).

# 15. At the 14th CoC meeting on 25.09.2024, held in compliance with the Tribunal’s 02.09.2024 order, the Applicant presented the revised resolution plans submitted by the PRAs, which were discussed and clarifications sought. Minutes are annexed as ANNEXURE‑A/5.

# 16. The Applicant received a final revised plan from M/s. Kishore Associates AOP and held the 16th CoC meeting on 04.11.2024 to decide. Kishore’s representative attended, the plan was discussed for the final time, and the CoC agreed to put the resolution‑plan approval and liquidation agendas to e‑voting. Minutes are annexed as ANNEXURE‑A/7.

# 17. The CoC, after considering the SRA’s representations and assurances, approved the resolution plan by 100% via e‑voting (concluded 22.11.2024), rejected liquidation, and declared M/s Kishore Associates AOP the Successful Resolution Applicant to acquire the Corporate Debtor as a going concern.

# 18. The Applicant filed IA (Plan) No.3(MP)/2024 for approval of the SRA’s resolution plan. The Tribunal found the plan compliant with the IBC and related rules and approved it by order dated 18.06.2025. A copy of the approval order is annexed as ANNEXURE‑A/8.

# 19. The approved Resolution Plan required the SRA to pay Rs. 23,50,06,108/- in two tranches, plus any additional/excess CIRP costs, within 90 days of the Tribunal’s approval (18.06.2025).

# 20. The SRA had to pay the first tranche of Rs. 7,05,01,832 by 02.08.2025 (45 days from 18.06.2025). Instead, invoking Clause 16.3, the SRA emailed on 31.07.2025 requesting a 15‑day cure period to regularize that payment, citing “unforeseen logistical constraints.” A copy of the email is annexed as ANNEXURE‑A/9.

# 21. The Applicant (Chairman) convened the 2nd Monitoring Committee meeting on 01.08.2025 with the SRA and financial creditor representatives. The Committee unanimously granted a 15‑day cure period, requiring the SRA to pay Rs. 7,05,01,832 by 17.08.2025 and warned that no further extensions for the remaining resolution amount would be allowed. Minutes are annexed as ANNEXURE‑A/10.

# 22. The SRA missed the 17.08.2025 payment deadline despite an extension from the Monitoring Committee. On 17.08.2025, SRA representative Mr. Rajiv Goyal requested an additional 60-day extension, citing his mother’s death (she owned 10% of the SRA consortium with net worth Rs. 23,50,88,304) and resultant delays in executing documents and arranging funds, for payment of Rs. 7,05,01,832/-. The SRA said it had applied to State Bank of India on 11.08.2025 for a new term loan and reiterated its commitment to implement the plan. The email of 17.08.2025 is attached as Annexure A/11.

# 23. The Applicant called the Monitoring Committee’s 3rd meeting on 21.08.2025 after receiving the SRA’s 17.08.2025 email. The Committee considered and unanimously rejected SRA’s request for 60-day extension to pay the resolution amount, stating it lacked authority to grant such an extension. The meeting minutes were circulated to all members, including the SRA. The minutes are attached as Annexure A/12

# 24. The Applicant requested a legal opinion (per Monitoring Committee members) after the SRA failed to implement the Resolution Plan. The opinion was received and circulated on 09.09.2025. The Committee met again on 11.09.2025 to review the opinion and possible legal steps against the SRA. After deliberation, the Committee decided to include, among other items, a ballot vote on filing a liquidation commencement application as follows:

• 1. Monitoring Committee to approve the forfeiture of EMD and Performance Bank Guarantee submitted by SRA (entire amount deposited)

• 2. Monitoring committee to approve payment of outstanding Insolvency Process cost out of the amount so forfeited including Security expense, Professional fees including fees of Resolution Professional / Chairperson incurred from date of approval of Resolution plan, outstanding CIRP cost, reimbursement of CIRP Costs Contribution by COC members.

• 3. Monitoring Committee to approve filing of Interlocutory Application before NCLT, Indore Bench for initiation of liquidation of Corporate Debtor i.e., M/s. Indison Agro Foods Ltd. under Section 33, IB Code.

• 4. Monitoring Committee to approve the filling of an Application before NCLT, Indore Bench against SRA seeking directions to IBBI to initiate appropriate penal proceedings under Section 74(3), IB Code, 2016.

# 25. The Financial Creditor/members of the Monitoring Committee unanimously approved the proposed agendas, including filing an application to commence liquidation proceedings against the Corporate Debtor, by ballot vote. The minutes of the 4th meeting and the voting results are attached as Annexure A/13.

# 26. The SRA emailed the Applicant on 18.09.2025 asking the Monitoring Committee/Financial Creditors to reconsider their refusal to grant an extension for paying the resolution amount. The Applicant replied the same day, confirming the Committee could not grant any extension. The SRA’s 18.09.2025 email is attached as Annexure A/14.

# 27. Respondent No.2 was obliged to meet the payment schedule in its own Resolution Plan. When it submitted the Plan, the SRA claimed strong financial capacity to pay the approved amount and revive the corporate debtor. To demonstrate funding sources, the SRA presented two “in principle” sanction letters—one from Kotak Mahindra Bank dated 13.07.2023 and one from HDFC Bank dated 04.11.2024, each for Rs. 20 crore—indicating it could obtain term loans if needed to implement the Plan.

# 28. There was a long gap between COC approval of the resolution plan (22.11.2024) and NCLT approval (18.06.2025), giving the SRA ample time to arrange funds for the remaining payments it had proposed. Once the COC approves a plan, the SRA is reasonably expected to have arranged financing to implement the plan and pay creditors on time, unless funding depends on ongoing litigation or other proceedings.

# 29. Mrs. Goyal’s death was not disclosed to the COC, the RP, or the Tribunal during plan consideration, and the SRA did not explain how her death would materially affect plan implementation. She held only 10% of the AOP; the other members (90%) remain able to perform but have not done so. The SRA’s stated reason “difficulties in executing necessary documents” is vague and does not explain how it prevents arranging funds or meeting payment obligations. The Plan also pledged, under Clause 11.2, that working-capital infusion would fund creditor liabilities and CIRP costs per Schedule B is as follows :

# 30. The SRA’s excuse for missing the payment timeline lacks a reasonable connection to implementing the resolution plan and fails to inspire confidence. The AOP members (Rajiv Kumar Goyal, Anand Prakash Goyal, Shivani Goyal, Mirabai Goyal now deceased and Nisha Goyal) had originally submitted an undertaking to the Applicant that they had sufficient net worth to pay the entire resolution plan amount. A true copy of that undertaking is annexed as ANNEXURE‑A/11.

# 31. The Monitoring Committee seeks penal action under Section 74(3) IBC against the SRA for knowingly and willfully failing to implement the Resolution Plan (approved 18.06.2025), requests the Tribunal to initiate liquidation of the Corporate Debtor and appoint the Applicant as Liquidator (with Smt. Teena Saraswat Pandey having already consented and been nominated), citing the CoC’s prior decision to liquidate.

REPLY ON THE BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT:

# 32. The deponent states that they are duly authorized to file this reply, are familiar with the case facts, and competent to swear the affidavit on behalf of the Respondent. They oppose the Application, deny all its contents unless specifically admitted, and contend the Application is false, misleading (suppressio veri and suggestio falsi), and an abuse of the legal process.

# 33. Respondent says there was no breach: SRA has resumed the implementation schedule by bringing in an investor. The payment delay was not deliberate or wilful but caused by circumstances beyond SRA’s control specifically the sudden death of Ms. Mira Bai Goyal (10% interest holder) on 30.10.2024, which disrupted execution of documents and finalising lender funding (State Bank of India, Kotak Mahindra Bank) required by the Resolution Plan. The death and related funding difficulties are presented as bona fide grounds for an extension; death certificate and her net worth are annexed as Annexure‑A.

# 34. The Applicant acted in good faith, having already paid Rs. 4.10 Crores (EMD and PBG), and seeks a time extension to arrange the remaining funds arguing this is a procedural adjustment, not a modification of the approved Resolution Plan, and does not change its substance or creditors’ rights.

# 35. Respondent has filed IA 542/2025 seeking a 60‑day extension to implement the resolution plan, arguing extensions are legally permissible and not a modification of the plan, and relies on precedents including NCLAT decisions in Ashok Dattatray Atre v. SBI, Cosmos Cooperative Bank v. Edelweiss, and an NCLT Chandigarh order in Deepinder Singh v. Sanyam Goel.

# 36. The Respondent says the Monitoring Committee wrongly rejected its extension request despite a supporting legal opinion (Annexure‑B) and instead moved to forfeit and liquidate; this refusal was arbitrary, ignored precedents, and undermines the CIRP’s objective of reviving the Corporate Debtor.

# 37. Unless a 60‑day extension is granted, the Resolution Plan cannot be implemented and the corporate debtor’s revival will be frustrated; a short extension would allow the Respondent to infuse remaining funds, complete implementation, and better serve the IBC’s objective of resolution and value maximization for all stakeholders.

# 38. The Respondent paid Rs. 5,00,000 (proof at Annexure‑C) in good faith while seeking the extension, and proposed an addendum to the Resolution Plan to bring in Kalyan Halol Shamlaji Tollway Limited as a new investor/shareholder to implement the plan (email and addendum at Annexure‑D).

# 39. The Respondent’s addendum to bring in Kalyan Halol Shamlaji Tollway Ltd. was placed before the CoC on 09.01.2026 the CoC said the matter is sub‑judice and they would await the NCLT’s decision (Annexure‑E), and at the 21st CoC meeting on 09.02.2026 the CoC recorded its willingness to liquidate the Corporate Debtor without permitting any modification to the Resolution Plan (Annexure‑F).

# 40. The Respondent says the CoC’s position is inconsistent calling the matter sub‑judice while refusing any modification and therefore the CoC should be made a party before the Tribunal; the Respondent has proposed a substitute investor and asks the Tribunal to allow induction of the new investor to revive the Corporate Debtor in line with the IBC’s objective.

# 41. The deponent argues the Applicant’s petition is not maintainable and should be dismissed with costs, claiming the Applicant filed prematurely and carelessly without verifying facts or disclosing subsequent developments.

Analysis and Observation:

# 42. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Applicant and the respondent and have perused the relevant materials available on record. It is noted that:1. The present Application has been filed by Ms. Teena Saraswat Pandey, the Resolution Professional (“Applicant”/”RP”) of M/s Indison Agro Foods Ltd. (“Corporate Debtor”/”CD”) under Sections 33(3) and 33(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“the Code”) seeking

-(i) a declaration that M/s Kishore Associates AOP (“Respondent”/”SRA”) knowingly and wilfully contravened the implementation of the Resolution Plan approved by this Tribunal on 18.06.2025;

(ii) initiation of penal proceedings under Section 74(3) of the Code against the SRA;

(iii) commencement of liquidation of the Corporate Debtor under Section 33(1) read with Section 33(3) and appointment of the Applicant as Liquidator; and

(iv) other consequential reliefs.

The SRA has filed a reply opposing liquidation and seeking a short extension/induction of an investor to implement the approved Resolution Plan.

2. CIRP of the Corporate Debtor commenced on 03.03.2023. The Applicant was appointed IRP and later confirmed as RP.

3. CoC formation, valuation, and invitation for EOIs and submission of resolution plans were done as per the record. The CoC considered plans and, after appropriate meetings and e‑voting, approved the Resolution Plan of M/s Kishore Associates AOP by 100% on 22.11.2024. This Tribunal approved that plan on 18.06.2025.

4. The approved Resolution Plan required payment of Rs. 23,50,06,108 in two tranches, with the first tranche of Rs. 7,05,01,832 to be paid within 45 days of approval, i.e. by 02.08.2025.

5. The SRA sought a 15‑day cure period by an email dated 31.07.2025 (invoking clause 16.3) and later sought a further 60‑day extension on 17.08.2025 citing the death of a 10% AOP member and consequent funding/document execution issues. The Monitoring Committee allowed a 15‑day cure period but rejected the 60‑day extension request as not within its authority.

6. The SRA did not pay the first tranche by the extended date and has not completed implementation as per the approved plan. The CoC/Monitoring Committee approved steps including forfeiture of EMD/PBG and filing for liquidation and for initiating penal action under Section 74(3) IBC. The RP has filed the present application accordingly.

7. The Respondent contends that the delay was bona fide, caused by the death of Ms. Mirabai/Mira Bai Goyal (10% AOP member) and consequent lender/funding issues; it has sought judicial permission for a 60‑day extension and proposed induction of a new investor (Kalyan Halol Shamlaji Tollway Ltd.) and has placed on record certain payments and an addendum proposing funds.

8. Issues for determination:

(a) Whether the SRA’s failure to meet the payment schedule amounts to a “wilful” failure to implement the approved resolution plan attracting penal action under Section 74(3).

(b)Whether such extension amounts to modification of the Resolution plan?

(c) Whether the present Application for commencement of liquidation ought to be allowed at this stage.

(d) Whether limited additional time should be granted to enable implementation of the resolution plan, consistent with the IBC’s object to promote revival and maximize value.

# 9. Findings and Reasons:

9.1 Whether the SRA’s failure to meet the payment schedule amounts to a “wilful” failure to implement the approved resolution plan attracting penal action under Section 74(3): The IBC’s objective is to maximize value and revive corporate debtors, and once a resolution plan is approved under Section 31 it is binding on the debtor, members, creditors and guarantors; non‑implementation can lead to remedies under Section 33 (including liquidation) and penal action under Section 74(3) only where contravention is “knowingly and wilfully” committed, so facts and intent must be closely examined before terminating a Tribunal‑sanctioned plan. Here, the CoC and Tribunal approved the plan on 18.06.2025, creating finality that should not be disturbed lightly when there are credible, bona fide implementation efforts: the SRA repeatedly represented funding availability, produced sanction letters, paid deposits and proposed an investor, sought extensions citing logistical/funding problems and the death of an AOP member, and filed an application and evidence of lender communications; the Monitoring Committee granted a short cure period but later moved to forfeit guarantees and seek liquidation after rejecting a longer extension. Taken together, these facts indicate prima facie bona fide difficulty rather than clear wilful default, and the record is insufficient to show the culpable intent required to start penal proceedings under Section 74(3).

In Deepinder Singh and Ors. v. Sanyam Goel and Anr., the NCLT recognized that delays caused by pending appellate proceedings and bona fide efforts by the SRA, including deposit of the entire plan amount and extension of the Performance Bank Guarantee, did not amount to wilful default. The Tribunal granted a limited extension to implement the plan, emphasizing that pendency of litigation is not an absolute bar to extension if the delay is not due to willful default or lack of bona fide intent.

Deepinder Singh and Ors. v. Sanyam Goel and Anr. 1443 NCLT 24.

viii) “We draw strength from the decisions of the Hon’ble NCLAT and the Hon’ble Supreme Court in cases like Cosmos Cooperative Bank Ltd. vs. Vaibhav Shah & Ors., Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 363 of 2019 and State Bank of India Stressed Asset Resolution Group vs. MBL Infrastructure Limited and Another [Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 539 of 2022], where extensions were granted in certain circumstances, including those involving litigation, to facilitate the successful implementation of a Resolution Plan. These cases underscore that the Adjudicating Authority has the discretion to grant extensions when it is in the interest of maximizing the value of the Corporate Debtor and ensuring the success of the resolution process, provided the delay is not a result of willful default or a lack of bona fide intent.”

Thus the first issue, Whether the SRA’s failure to meet the payment schedule amounts to a “wilful” failure to implement the approved resolution plan attracting penal action under Section 74(3) this is answered in negative.

9.2 Whether such extension amounts to modification of the Resolution plan?

Mere extension of the timeline for implementation, especially a short one granted under exceptional circumstances and without altering the core terms of the plan (such as the payout amount or the nature of the resolution) do not constitute a “modification” in the sense that would require a full re-approval process. It is viewed as a procedural adjustment necessary to overcome unforeseen delays caused by external factors like litigation.

Referring to the case in Deepinder Singh and Ors. v. Sanyam Goel and Anr., 1443 NCLT

v. While the Code does not explicitly define “modification” of a Resolution Plan, judicial interpretation has generally held that any change that alters the fundamental terms of the plan, affects the rights of stakeholders, or changes the value proposition requires a formal modification process, including potential re-submission to the CoC and the Adjudicating Authority.

vi. However, a distinction can be drawn between a material modification that changes the substance of the plan and a procedural adjustment, such as a short extension of time for implementation, necessitated by unforeseen circumstances and not impacting the core economic terms or the rights of stakeholders.

vii. In the present case, the requested extension of 78 days is solely for the purpose of regularizing the implementation timeline. It does not alter the amount to be paid under the Resolution Plan, the manner of payment, the treatment of creditors, or any other substantive term. The entire Resolution Plan amount has already been deposited by the SRA. The extension is a pragmatic step to ensure the successful culmination of the approved plan, which has faced temporary hurdles due to the appellate process.

viii. We are guided by the principle that the Adjudicating Authority, in exercise of its powers under Section 60(5) of the Code and Rule 15 of the NCLT Rules, has the inherent power to issue directions and make adjustments of a procedural nature to facilitate the effective implementation of an approved Resolution Plan, provided such adjustments do not amount to a material modification of the plan or prejudice the rights of any stakeholder.

ix. Considering that the extension sought is minimal, the entire plan amount is infused, and the core terms of the Resolution Plan remain unchanged, we conclude that granting a 78-day extension for implementation in this case does not constitute a material modification of the Resolution Plan that would necessitate a full re-approval process. It is a necessary procedural adjustment to ensure the successful outcome of the insolvency resolution.”

In light of the judgment cited above, it becomes clear that under the facts and circumstances of the case, an extension granted in the payment timelines envisaged under the Resolution Plan does not amount to modification in the resolution plan. Hence, the second question is answered in negative.

9.3 Whether the present Application for commencement of liquidation ought to be allowed at this stage: Section 33 contemplates commencement of liquidation where the resolution professional reports failure to secure implementation of the plan or the CoC passes resolution for liquidation and the Tribunal is convinced the plan cannot be implemented. Where credible steps to implement the plan continue and the SRA seeks limited time, the Tribunal should balance the interest of creditors with the IBC’s objective of revival given

i) The CoC originally and decisively approved the plan;

ii) The SRA’s ongoing communications and steps to bring in alternate investor/funding;

iii) Absence of conclusive evidence of deliberate default or futile prospects of implementation;

Talking about the commercial wisdom of the CoC having placed heavy reliance on the doctrine of commercial wisdom this Tribunal does not dispute the centrality of that doctrine to the IBC framework. However, as authoritatively held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K. Sashidhar v. Indian Overseas Bank and Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta, the deference accorded to commercial wisdom is premised on the CoC having exercised its wisdom fairly, in possession of complete information, and in conformity with the objectives of the Code. Where any of these conditions is absent, the decision cannot claim the protection of the commercial wisdom doctrine; accordingly, even where the CoC has approved liquidation, the court (or tribunal) retains jurisdiction to intervene to uphold justice and ensure compliance with the statutory safeguards and the Code’s purpose.

The Tribunal finds great persuasive force in the judgment of the Hon’ble NCLAT dated 06.02.2026 in Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) Nos. 2330 & 2331 of 2024 (Pragiti Construction v. Committee of Creditors of the Corporate Debtor) The Appellate Tribunal held that the supremacy of commercial wisdom cannot be extended to shield a process that is fundamentally flawed on account of conflict of interest. It was authoritatively held that although the commercial wisdom of the CoC is paramount, such wisdom must be exercised in furtherance of the objectives of the IBC, particularly the maximization of the value of the assets of the Corporate Debtor. The Appellate Tribunal further observed that sectoral incompatibility by itself cannot override the statutory objective of value maximization without a proper assessment of feasibility and viability. It was also held that delay cannot be cited as a ground when the consideration of the plan itself had been directed by the Adjudicating Authority

Also Referring to the judgement of Pradeep Kumar Goenka RP, (2022) ibclaw.in 141 NCLT

32. We find that the CoC /FC has lost the sight of the prime objectives of the IBC. It does not show the Doctrine of Prudence to advance argument for Liquidation instead of Resolution of the Stressed Assets that it is a Commercial Wisdom/Commercial Decision to reject the amount offered to them in terms of the Resolution Plan is more than the twenty times of the Liquidation Value. Issues like a Suit filed by the CD, a Writ pending before the Hon’ble High Court, FIR filed with an Investigating Agency, report submitted to the RBI for declaring the CD, Suspended Directors as Wilful Defaulters are apparently not related matter at this stage to be considered for rejection of the the Resolution Plan and rescue of the Stressed Assets with its employees from the Liquidation. The objectives of the IBC are very clear and liquidation of a MSME Unit is the last resort.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No. 1792 of 2021- K.N Rajakumar vs. V. Nagarajan & Ors with Civil Appeal No. 2901 OF 2021 has held that

“It could thus be seen that one of the principal objects of the IBC is providing for revival of the Corporate Debtor and to make it a going concern. Every attempt has to be first made to revive the concern and make it a going concern, liquidation being the last resort.”

33. In our considered opinion, it is neither Commercial Wisdom nor a Commercial Decision of the CoC /FC to reject a Resolution Plan which offer to them an amount of Twenty times more than the Liquidation Value. In view of this the prayer made by the Applicant for liquidation of the CD needs to be rejected in achieving the Objectives of the IBC and the interest of all Stakeholders including the sole FC and the stalled MSME Unit.

34. Hence this IA No. 10/2021 in CP (IB) No. 37/GB/2021 filed for Liquidation is hereby rejected with the observations mentioned above and the Directions given below for Compliance.

Therefore the present petition for commencement of liquidation is premature. There is a real possibility that limited additional time and supervision may permit implementation, preserving going‑concern value that liquidation may destroy. Thus Whether the present Application for commencement of liquidation ought to be allowed at this stage the answer is in negative.

9.4 Whether limited additional time should be granted to enable implementation of the resolution plan, consistent with the IBC’s object to promote revival and maximize value:

Limited additional time may be granted to implement the resolution plan consistent with the IBC’s objectives, provided there is no willful contravention by the resolution applicant and liquidation has been rejected. The extension must be balanced against the need for timely resolution to prevent value erosion and protect stakeholders’ interests.

In State Bank of India and Ors. v. The Consortium of Mr. Murari Lal Jalan and Mr. Florian Fritsch and Anr., (2024) 290 SC, the Supreme Court emphasized that the Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA) has a profound responsibility to implement the resolution plan fully and in good faith, reflecting a commitment to the corporate debtor’s revival. The Court also noted that lenders and creditors must cooperate constructively to facilitate implementation, avoiding unnecessary obstruction. While the IBC prioritizes speed to prevent value erosion, the Court recognized that extensions of time may be warranted to ensure successful revival, but such extensions must be granted judiciously and not mechanically, weighing the consequences on the resolution plan’s implementation

Also Referring to the case in Pranav J. Damania the national company law tribunal Mumbai Bench IA No. 4372 of 2023 in Company Petition (IB) No. 4304 (MB) of 201

8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in ―Essar Steel India Ltd. through Authorised Signatory v. Satish Kumar Gupta & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 8766-67/2019) dated 15.11.2019” had observed at Para 79 of the Judgment as under:

“The effect of this declaration is that ordinarily the time taken in relation to the corporate resolution process of the corporate debtor must be completed within the outer limit of 330 days from the insolvency commencement date, including extensions and the time taken in legal proceedings. However, on the facts of a given case, if it can be shown to the Adjudicating Authority and/or Appellate Tribunal under the Code that only a short period is left for completion of the insolvency resolution process beyond 330 days, and that it would be in the interest of all stakeholders that the corporate debtor be put back on its feet instead of being sent into liquidation and that the time taken in legal proceedings is largely due to factors owing to which the fault cannot be ascribed to the litigants before the Adjudicating Authority and/or Appellate Tribunal, the delay or a large part thereof being attributable to the tardy process of the Adjudicating Authority and/or the Appellate Tribunal itself, it may be open in such cases for the Adjudicating Authority and/or Appellate Tribunal to extend time beyond 330 days. Likewise, even under the newly added proviso to Section 12, if by reason of all the aforesaid factors the grace period of 90 days from the date of commencement of the Amending Act of 2019 is exceeded, there again a discretion can be exercised by the Adjudicating Authority and/or Appellate Tribunal to further extend time keeping the aforesaid parameters in mind. It is only in such exceptional cases that time can be extended, the general rule being that 330 days is the outer limit within which resolution of the stressed assets of the corporate debtor must take place beyond which the corporate debtor is to be driven into liquidation.”

9. Keeping in view the law laid down in the above cited cases, it emerges that the primary object of the IB Code, 2016 is value maximization as well as revival/resolution of the financially stressed corporate debtors. Keeping that in mind, we are of the considered view that since one resolution plan has been received by the CoC during the pendency of liquidation application which the CoC intends to consider to save the Corporate Debtor from liquidation, it would be just and proper to give another chance which may help revive/resolve the Corporate Debtor. No doubt considerable time has already elapsed. However, in our considered view, despite that, a last-ditch effort can be afforded to the CoC keeping in view the overall interests of all the stakeholders involved. Even otherwise, as it has been held in Essar Steel India Ltd v/s Satish Kumar Gupta’s case (supra), the time frames are directory and not mandatory in nature. As a result of the following, we allow the present application is allowed.

Thus this Tribunal recognized the possibility of revival of the corporate debtor based on the resolution plan and grant 45 days additional time to enable implementation of the resolution plan, consistent with the IBC’s object to promote revival and maximize value.

ORDER

10.1. The Interlocutory Application No. 502(MP) 2025 under Section 33(3) & (4) seeking commencement of liquidation of M/s. Indison Agro Foods Ltd. is dismissed at this stage as it is premature. No order is passed for liquidation.

10.2. The Interlocutory Application No. 503(MP) 2025 seeking Penal proceedings under Section 74(3) against the Respondent (SRA) are not initiated at this stage for lack of satisfaction of “knowing and wilful” contravention on the present record. Therefore IA No. 503(MP) 2025 is dismissed.

10.3. Interlocutory Application No. 542(MP) 2025 is partly allowed. The Tribunal grants the Respondent a final, limited opportunity to implement the approved resolution plan within 45 days from the date of this order and take all necessary steps to implement the Resolution Plan in full.

10.4. Accordingly, the IAs i.e. IA/503(MP)2025 & IA/502(MP)2025 are dismissed and disposed of as the facts and grounds are same of both the IAs. In relation to the IA/542(MP)2025, the extension sought by the SRA is given only 45 days and the same is partly allowed & disposed of.

----------------------------------------------