Monday, 25 May 2026

Shri Santanu T Ray, RP vs Axis Bank Limited - Moreover, the statutory mandate under Section 25(2)(a) of the Code, coupled with the overriding effect under Section 238, continues to govern the field and obligates the Resolution Professional to take immediate control and custody of the assets of the Corporate Debtor.

  NCLT Kolkata (2026.03.27)  in Shri Santanu T Ray, RP vs Axis Bank Limited [I.A. (IBC) 1521(KB) of 2025 In C.P. (IBC) 254(KB) of 2019] held that;-

  • A conjoint reading of the above provisions makes it clear that the Resolution Professional is duty bound to take control and custody of all assets of the Corporate Debtor and the banks are equally obligated to facilitate such control.

  • The overriding effect of Section 238 of the Code leaves no manner of doubt that any action taken by any authority, including statutory authorities, which is inconsistent with the provisions of the Code, cannot be sustained.

  • In that view of the matter, the procedural requirement as envisaged under the aforesaid Circular cannot be applied retrospectively so as to defeat or delay the relief sought in the present application, particularly when the issue pertains to custody and control of the assets of the Corporate Debtor during subsistence of CIRP.

  • Moreover, the statutory mandate under Section 25(2)(a) of the Code, coupled with the overriding effect under Section 238, continues to govern the field and obligates the Resolution Professional to take immediate control and custody of the assets of the Corporate Debtor.

  • Accordingly, notwithstanding the said Circular, we are of the considered view that the asset in question, i.e., the term deposit, is liable to be brought under the control and custody of the Resolution Professional for the purposes of CIRP.

Excerpts of the Order;

# 1. I.A. (IBC) 1521(KB) of 2025

1.1 The instant application has been preferred by Mr. Santanu Ray, RP, seeking orders upon Axis Bank to de-attach term deposit of the Corporate Debtor held with them so that the RP could take control and custody of the said deposit as required under Section 25(2)(a) praying for the following reliefs:-

  • a. Allow the present application;

  • b. The Respondent - Axis Bank Limited, Nagpur branch be directed to de-attach a term deposit held in the name of the Corporate Debtor in account number 911040013677029 having a balance of Rs.26,67,757/- comprising of principal and accrued interest as on 31.12.2023;

  • c. The Respondent be directed to handover control and custody of the term deposit to the RP in terms of Section 25(2)(a);

  • d. The Respondent be directed to act on the instructions of the Applicant in relation to the term deposit accounts and furnish all information relating to the corporate debtor available with them to the Applicant in terms of Section 17(1)(d);

  • e. No encumbrance or 3rd party rights to be created during pendency of this application;

  • f. The amount lying in the term deposit not to be appropriated towards dues of any creditor of the corporate debtor during pendency of this application;

  • g. Costs;

  • h. Ad-interim orders;

  • i. Issue such other necessary orders as may be deemed fit in the matter.


2. Background of the Case

2.1 The Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) of the Corporate Debtor was initiated by this Adjudicating Authority vide order dated 13.12.2019 passed in Company Petition (IB) No. 219/IB/2019 under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. Pursuant thereto, the Applicant herein was appointed as the Interim Resolution Professional (IRP), which appointment was duly communicated on 26.12.2019.

2.2 In compliance with the provisions of the Code, the Applicant made a public announcement in Form-A on 27.12.2019 in widely circulated newspapers, inviting claims from creditors. Upon receipt and verification of claims, the Committee of Creditors (CoC) was constituted and the first CoC meeting was convened on 27.01.2020, wherein the Applicant was confirmed as the Resolution Professional with 100% voting share. The said appointment was taken on record by this Adjudicating Authority vide order dated 06.02.2020.

2.3 During the pendency of the CIRP, the suspended director of the Corporate Debtor preferred an appeal under Section 61 of the Code before the Hon’ble NCLAT challenging the admission order dated 13.12.2019. The Hon’ble NCLAT, vide interim order dated 07.02.2020, inter alia, directed that the CoC shall not approve any resolution plan during pendency of the appeal.

2.4 It is pertinent to note that prior to the said interim order, the CoC had already been constituted by the Applicant in accordance with the CIRP Regulations and a report certifying the same had been filed before this Adjudicating Authority.

2.5 The appeal preferred by the suspended director came to be dismissed by the Hon’ble NCLAT vide order dated 04.10.2021, thereby vacating the interim restrictions. In view of the time lost during pendency of the appeal, the CoC resolved to seek exclusion of the said period, and this Adjudicating Authority vide order dated 16.12.2021 was pleased to allow exclusion of 615 days from the CIRP period.

2.6 Thereafter, efforts were undertaken for revival of the Corporate Debtor by issuance of Form-G inviting Expression of Interest (EOI). However, no EOI was received within the stipulated period. Consequently, in the 7th CoC meeting, the members deliberated upon initiation of liquidation proceedings. The resolution for liquidation was approved with 83.58% voting share.

2.7 In pursuance thereof, the Applicant filed an application seeking initiation of liquidation. However, during the pendency of the said application, the suspended director challenged the NCLAT order before the Hon’ble Supreme Court by way of Civil Appeal No. 1031 of 2022, and the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide order dated 04.03.2022 stayed further proceedings before this Adjudicating Authority.

2.8 The said Civil Appeal came to be finally dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide judgment dated 22.10.2024, thereby affirming the CIRP initiation and bringing finality to the proceedings.

2.9 Subsequent thereto, the CoC, being of the view that revival of the Corporate Debtor was still feasible, resolved to withdraw the liquidation application and to undertake fresh steps for resolution. Accordingly, an application was filed seeking withdrawal of liquidation proceedings, exclusion of further period, and extension of CIRP, which was allowed by this Adjudicating Authority vide order dated 27.02.2025.

2.10 Pursuant thereto, fresh Form-G was issued on 24.03.2025 inviting resolution plans. Two prospective resolution applicants submitted their plans within the prescribed timeline. Considering the time required for evaluation and negotiations, further extension of CIRP period was granted by this Adjudicating Authority vide order dated 10.06.2025.

2.11 The CIRP is presently ongoing, and the CoC is in the process of considering the resolution plans, with further time having been sought for completion of the process.


# 3. Fact in a nutshell -:

3.1 While conducting the CIRP and upon scrutiny of the financial records and bank statements of the Corporate Debtor, the Resolution Professional discovered that the Corporate Debtor is maintaining a term deposit bearing account no. 911040013677029 with Axis Bank, Nagpur branch, originally created on 09.03.2011.

3.2 The said term deposit presently holds a sum of Rs.26,67,757/- as on 31.12.2023, inclusive of principal and accrued interest, and constitutes a valuable asset of the Corporate Debtor forming part of the insolvency estate.

3.3 It is the statutory duty of the Resolution Professional under Section 25(2)(a) of the Code to take control and custody of all assets of the Corporate Debtor. Further, under Section 17(1)(d), the financial institutions maintaining accounts of the Corporate Debtor are obligated to act upon the instructions of the Resolution Professional and provide complete access and information in relation to such accounts.

3.4 However, upon inquiry with the Respondent Bank, the Applicant was informed that a lien has been marked on the said term deposit by the Income Tax Department on 27.09.2023 and subsequently by the Enforcement Directorate on 24.10.2024.

3.5 The Applicant submits that the imposition of such lien during the subsistence of CIRP is in clear violation of the moratorium imposed under Section 14 of the Code, which expressly prohibits any action to foreclose, recover or enforce any security interest or to create any encumbrance over the assets of the Corporate Debtor.

3.6 It is further submitted that the Income Tax Department has already filed its claim before the Resolution Professional, which has been duly admitted. Therefore, any attempt to secure its dues by way of lien over the assets of the Corporate Debtor dehors the mechanism provided under the Code is impermissible in law.

3.7 The Applicant has addressed several communications and emails to the Respondent Bank requesting removal of the lien and release of the term deposit in favour of the Resolution Professional. However, no effective steps have been taken by the Respondent to comply with the provisions of the Code.

3.8 The Applicant submits that in view of Section 238 of the Code, the provisions of the Code have overriding effect over all other laws, and therefore, any action by statutory authorities resulting in encumbrance over the assets of the Corporate Debtor during moratorium cannot be sustained. 

3.9 In the aforesaid circumstances, the present application has been preferred seeking necessary directions against the Respondent Bank to remove the lien, hand over control and custody of the term deposit to the Resolution Professional, and ensure that the said asset remains available for resolution of the Corporate Debtor in accordance with the provisions of the Code.


# 4. Analysis and Findings -:

4.1 We have gone through the case file carefully and perused the pleadings of the parties and documents placed on record by the parties and heard the arguments put forth by learned Counsels for the parties; and after hearing the learned counsels for the parties, we shall now proceed to consider the present petition on its merits, specifically within the ambit of points involved in the instant application.

4.2 The present application has been filed by the Resolution Professional seeking directions against the Respondent Bank for removal of lien marked on the term deposit of the Corporate Debtor and for handing over control and custody of said asset to the Resolution Professional.

4.3 It is not in dispute that the Corporate Debtor is undergoing Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) and that moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is in force. It is also not in dispute that the term deposit in question constitutes an asset of the Corporate Debtor. 

4.4 The short question which arises for consideration is whether the lien created by the Income Tax Department and Enforcement Directorate during the subsistence of CIRP can be sustained in view of the statutory moratorium.

4.5 Before proceeding further, it is apposite to refer to Section 25(2)(a) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, which reads as under:

  • “25.Duties of resolution professional.— 

  • ….

  • (2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), the resolution professional shall undertake the following actions, namely:— 

  • (a) take immediate custody and control of all the assets of the corporate debtor including the business records of the corporate debtor;”

4.6 Section 17(1)(d) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, which reads as under:

  • “17. Management of affairs of corporate debtor by interim resolution professional. –

  • (1) From the date of appointment of the interim resolution professional, -

  • …. 

  • (d) the financial institutions maintaining accounts of the corporate debtor shall act on the instructions of the interim resolution professional in relation to such accounts and furnish all information relating to the corporate debtor available with them to the interim resolution professional.”

4.7 Further, Section 17(1)(d) mandates that financial institutions shall act on the instructions of the Resolution Professional in relation to the accounts of the Corporate Debtor and furnish all necessary information.

4.8 A conjoint reading of the above provisions makes it clear that the Resolution Professional is duty bound to take control and custody of all assets of the Corporate Debtor and the banks are equally obligated to facilitate such control.

4.9 In the present case, the lien on the term deposit has been created by statutory authorities during the CIRP period. Such an act directly falls foul of the moratorium imposed under Section 14 of the Code.

4.10 The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd [(2018) ibclaw.in 30 SC]

  • Given Section 238 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, it is obvious that the Code will override anything inconsistent contained in any other enactment, including the Income-Tax Act. We may also refer in this Connection to (2000) 5 SCC 694 and its progeny, making it clear that income-tax dues, being in the nature of Crown debts, do not take precedence even over secured creditors, who are private persons. We are of the view that the High Court of Delhi, is, therefore, correct in law.”

4.11 The Hon’ble NCLAT in Directorate of Enforcement v. Manoj Kumar Agarwal [(2021) ibclaw.in 182 NCLAT] has categorically held as follows-:

  • “41. Alternatively, even if for any reason it was to be held that Section 14 of IBC would not help, it appears to us that Section 238 of IBC would still apply. Although it is argued that PMLA is a special statute and has an overriding effect still Section 238 of IBC is also a special statute and which is subsequent statute. IBC has specific object, which is to consolidate and amend laws relating to reorganisation and insolvency resolution of corporate persons, partnership firms and individuals in a time-bound manner for maximization of value of assets of such persons and to promote entrepreneurship, availability of credit and balance the interest of all stakeholders including alteration in the order of priority of payment of Government dues.

  • Section 238 of IBC reads as under:

  • “238. The provisions of this Code shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law.”

  • If this Section is perused, the provisions of this Code would have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained “in any other law” for the time being in force. Section 238 of IBC does not give overriding effect merely to Section 14. The other provisions also are material, and will have effect if there is anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. Thus if the Authorities under PMLA on the basis of the attachment or seizure done or possession taken under the said Act resist handing over the properties of the Corporate Debtor to the IRP/RP/Liquidator the consequence of which will be hindrance for them to keep the Corporate Debtor a going concern till resolution takes place or liquidation proceedings are completed, the obstructions will have to be removed.”

4.12 In the present case, the Income Tax Department has already filed its claim before the Resolution Professional and the same has been admitted. Therefore, any attempt to secure its dues by creating lien over the assets of the Corporate Debtor dehors the IBC framework is not permissible.

4.13 The overriding effect of Section 238 of the Code leaves no manner of doubt that any action taken by any authority, including statutory authorities, which is inconsistent with the provisions of the Code, cannot be sustained.

4.14 The Respondent Bank, being a financial institution, is statutorily obligated under Section 17(1)(d) to act on the instructions of the Resolution Professional. Failure to remove the lien and handover custody of the asset is in violation of the provisions of the Code.

4.15 At this juncture, we also take note of the Circular No.IBBI/CIRP/87/2025 dated 04.11.2025 issued by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI), wherein it has been advised that in cases where assets of the Corporate Debtor are attached by the Enforcement Directorate under the provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, the Insolvency Professional may approach the Special Court under Section 8(7) or 8(8) of the PMLA for restitution of such assets.

4.16 The said Circular further provides for furnishing of an undertaking by the Insolvency Professional before the Special Court to facilitate restitution of such attached assets.

4.17 While we are mindful of the aforesaid Circular and the procedure contemplated therein, it is pertinent to note that the present Interlocutory Application was registered on 24.09.2025 and was reserved for orders on 03.11.2025, i.e., prior to the issuance of the said Circular dated 04.11.2025.

4.18 In that view of the matter, the procedural requirement as envisaged under the aforesaid Circular cannot be applied retrospectively so as to defeat or delay the relief sought in the present application, particularly when the issue pertains to custody and control of the assets of the Corporate Debtor during subsistence of CIRP.

4.19 Moreover, the statutory mandate under Section 25(2)(a) of the Code, coupled with the overriding effect under Section 238, continues to govern the field and obligates the Resolution Professional to take immediate control and custody of the assets of the Corporate Debtor.

4.20 Accordingly, notwithstanding the said Circular, we are of the considered view that the asset in question, i.e., the term deposit, is liable to be brought under the control and custody of the Resolution Professional for the purposes of CIRP.

4.21 In view of the foregoing discussion and in light of the judicial pronouncements referred hereinabove, the present application is allowed.

4.22 Accordingly, the following directions are issued:

  • i. The Respondent, Axis Bank Limited, Nagpur Branch, is hereby directed to remove/de-attach the lien marked on the term deposit bearing account no. 911040013677029 held in the name of the Corporate Debtor;

  • ii. The Respondent shall handover control and custody of the said term deposit, having a balance of Rs.26,67,757/- (as on 31.12.2023), to the Resolution Professional forthwith in terms of Section 25(2)(a) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016;

  • iii. The Respondent shall act strictly in accordance with the instructions of the Resolution Professional and furnish all requisite information relating to the account in compliance with Section 17(1)(d) of the Code;

  • iv. It is directed that no encumbrance or third-party rights shall be created over the said term deposit during the subsistence of CIRP;

  • v. The amount lying in the term deposit shall not be appropriated towards dues of any creditor and shall form part of the assets of the Corporate Debtor;

  • vi. The above directions shall be complied with within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of this order.

4.23 The instant I.A. (IBC) 1521(KB) of 2025 is allowed in terms of the above.

4.24 I.A. (IBC) 1521(KB) of 2025 in C.P. (IB) 254(KB) of 2019 is disposed off accordingly.

4.25 The Registry is directed to send copies of the Order forthwith to all the parties and their representative for information and for taking necessary steps.

4.26 Certified copies of this order, if applied for with the Registry of this Adjudicating Authority, be supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities.

-------------------------------------------------


Saturday, 23 May 2026

Chandar Narayan Chavan Vs M. D. Devcon Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. - Therefore, even in absence of a specific provision empowering the Tribunal to recall its order, the Tribunal has power to recall its order. However, such power is to be exercised sparingly, and not as a tool to re-hear the matter. Ordinarily, an application for recall of an order is maintainable on limited grounds, inter alia, where (a) the order is without jurisdiction; (b) the party aggrieved with the order is not served with notice of the proceedings in which the order under recall has been passed; and (c) the order has been obtained by misrepresentation of facts or by playing fraud upon the court/ Tribunal resulting in gross failure of justice.”

 NCLAT (2025.05.07)  in Chandar Narayan Chavan Vs M. D. Devcon Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. [(2026) ibclaw.in 627 NCLAT, Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1370 of 2024] held that;-.

  • The power to recall a judgment will not be exercised when the ground for re-opening the proceedings or vacating the judgment was available in the original action but was not done or where a proper remedy in some other proceeding such as by way of appeal or revision was available but was not availed. The right to seek vacation of a judgment may be lost by waiver, estoppel or acquiescence.”

  • Therefore, even in absence of a specific provision empowering the Tribunal to recall its order, the Tribunal has power to recall its order. However, such power is to be exercised sparingly, and not as a tool to re-hear the matter. Ordinarily, an application for recall of an order is maintainable on limited grounds, inter alia, where (a) the order is without jurisdiction; (b) the party aggrieved with the order is not served with notice of the proceedings in which the order under recall has been passed; and (c) the order has been obtained by misrepresentation of facts or by playing fraud upon the court/ Tribunal resulting in gross failure of justice.”


Excerpts of the Order;

The present appeal has been filed by Mr. Chandar Narayan Chavan against the impugned order dated 12.06.2024 passed by the NCLT, Mumbai in Intervention Petition No. 31/2023 in CP(IB) No. 3574/MB/2019 filed by the Appellant, wherein the Ld. NCLT dismissed the said Intervention Petition.


# 2. In the Intervention Petition No. 31/2023, the Applicant/Appellant had sought two main reliefs as follows:

  • “(i) The Adjudication Authority be graciously pleased to allow the present intervention application and pass an order allowing the Applicant herein to intervene as party in the above-captioned Company Petition; and

  • (ii) The Adjudicating Authority be further pleased to pass an order to recall/vacate the Order dated 27.05.2021 being without jurisdiction and contrary to law.”


# 3. The aforesaid Intervention Petition was dismissed by the Ld. NCLT vide order dated 12.06.2024, and being aggrieved by it the present appeal has been filed.


# 4. The brief facts of this case are as under:

i. CP(IB) No. 3574/MB/2019 was filed by Mr. Indranil Das and Mrs. Nandita Das under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘IBC, 2016’) seeking to initiate Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (hereinafter referred to as the ‘CIRP’) against M.D. Devcon Private Limited (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Corporate Debtor’) alleging default in payment of financial debt.

ii. The Corporate Debtor was carrying on business of construction and development and one of upcoming residential project known as “SAVANNAH” was being constructed on land bearing CTS No. 1285 A/E, Kanjurmarg (East), Mumbai.

iii. The Petitioners, Mr. Indranil Das and Mrs. Nandita Das were allotted Flat No. 1504 on the 15th Floor vide letter allotment dated 25.08.2019.

iv. The Corporate Debtor failed to start the project and the Petitioners wrote letter dated 08.09.2016 and finally, on 13.12.2016 had sent the final termination letter of allotment and requested the Corporate Debtor to refund the amount with interest as per clause 9 of the allotment letter.

v. As per clause 9 of the allotment letter it was clearly mentioned that if the Corporate Debtor fails to execute the agreement for sale or fails to start the construction, then the Petitioners had the right to terminate the letter of allotment and claim the refund amount paid under the allotment letter along with interest @ 15% p.a.

vi. The Petitioners filed the following chart giving the total amount payable by the Corporate Debtor:


Sr. No


Amount paid


Interest@l5% p.a. From 24.09.2019 (i.e. date of filing the petition)

Amount due up to

date of filing of

petition


Rs. 19,00,000/-

Rs. 8,78,750/-

Rs. 27,78,750/-



Total

27, 78, 750/ –

vii. The Petitioners submitted before the Ld. NCLT that FIR has been registered against the Corporate Debtor and the matter is under investigation by Economic Offences Wing and one of the Directors of the Respondent company was arrested and recently granted bail by the Hon’ble Metropolitan Magistrate, 47th Court, Mumbai.

viii. The Ld. NCLT vide order dated 27.05.2021 admitted the Corporate Debtor into CIRP and appointed Mr. Kedar Parshuram Mulye as the Insolvency Resolution Professional (hereinafter referred to as the ‘IRP’).

ix. The Intervention Petition of the Applicant/Appellant requesting for intervention in the company petition bearing CP(IB) No. 3574/MB/2019 and recall of the order dated 27.05.2021 was rejected through the impugned order, as under:

  • “15. We have carefully scrutinized the matter and have given due weightage to the rival contentions.

  • 16. The Applicant/Intervenor seeks to challenge the Admission Order dated 27.05.2021, primarily on the basis that the Petition/ Application filed under Section 7 of the Code failed to meet the statutory threshold as outlined in the second and third proviso to Section 7(1) of the Code. This threshold requires a minimum of either 100 allottees or 10% of the total allottees within the same real estate project, whichever is lower, to file an application u/s 7 of the Code. It is contended that the present challenge does not constitute a mere recall petition but rather entails a review of the order on its substantive merits. We agree with this contention. However, it is crucial to distinguish between a review petition and a recall petition. A review petition prompts the Court to assess the merits of the case, typically when there is a glaring error evident on the face of the record. On the other hand, a recall petition does not delve into the substantive merits but rather focuses on retracting an order passed without affording an opportunity for affected parties to be heard. A five-member bench of the Hon’ble NCLAT in Union Bank of India v/s. Dinakar T.Venkatasubramanian had held (vide its Judgment dated 25th May, 20 No. 3961 of 2022 in Company Appeal (AT)(Ins.) No. 729 of 20 that though the power to review is not conferred upon the Tribunal but power to recall its judgment is inherent in the Tribunal and is preserved by Rule 11 of the NCLT rules,2016. This decision of NCLAT was upheld by a two-judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India vide its Order dated 31.07.2023 passed in Civil Appeal No.4620 of 2023 viz. Union Bank of India vs. Financial Creditors of M/s. Amtek Auto Ltd. & Others. Thus, it is firmly established in legal precedents that neither the Adjudicating Authority nor the Appellate Authority possesses jurisdiction to review their own orders. Indeed, if the Order dated 27.05.2021 is vacated due to the failure of the above-captioned Company Petition to meet the statutory threshold as outlined in the second and third proviso to Section 7(1) of the Code, then, such action, in our considered view, would constitute a review rather than a recall. Hence, we are not inclined to vacate the Order dated 27.05.2021. Accordingly, the prayer made by the Applicant/Intervenor in terms of Para 29, Clause B stands rejected.

  • 17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Budhia Swain & Ors. v/s. Gopinath Deb & Ors. [Citation: (1999) 4 SCC 396] has held as follows:

  • 8. In our opinion a tribunal or a court may recall an order earlier made by it if

  • (i) the proceedings culminating into an order suffer from the inherent lack of jurisdiction and such lack of jurisdiction is patent;

  • (ii) there exists fraud or collusion in obtaining the judgment,

  • (iii) there has been a mistake of the court prejudicing a party, or

  • (iv) a judgment was rendered in ignorance of the fact that a necessary party had not been served at all or had died and the estate was not represented. The power to recall a judgment will not be exercised when the ground for re-opening the proceedings or vacating the judgment was available in the original action but was not done or where a proper remedy in some other proceeding such as by way of appeal or revision was available but was not availed. The right to seek vacation of a judgment may be lost by waiver, estoppel or acquiescence.

  • (Emphasis Supplied)

  • The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority v/s. Prabhjit Singh Soni & Anr. vide Judgment dated February 12, 2024 in Civil Appeal Nos. 7590-7591 of 2023 as follows:

  • “50. …. Therefore, even in absence of a specific provision empowering the Tribunal to recall its order, the Tribunal has power to recall its order. However, such power is to be exercised sparingly, and not as a tool to re-hear the matter. Ordinarily, an application for recall of an order is maintainable on limited grounds, inter alia, where (a) the order is without jurisdiction; (b) the party aggrieved with the order is not served with notice of the proceedings in which the order under recall has been passed; and (c) the order has been obtained by misrepresentation of facts or by playing fraud upon the court/ Tribunal resulting in gross failure of justice.”

  • (Emphasis Supplied)

  • 18. If the Applicant/Intervenor was aggrieved by the Order dated 27.05.2021 passed by the Adjudicating Authority u/s 7 of the Code, then it was open to him to impugn the aforementioned Order in appeal before the Appellate Authority u/s 61 of the Code. However, the said remedy was not pursued. Consequently, we cannot permit the Applicant/ Intervenor to utilize the Tribunal’s inherent power of recall as a means to revisit or re-hear the matter. It is firmly established in legal doctrine that objectives which cannot be attained directly cannot be pursued indirectly. Hence, by allowing the time limit for filing an appeal under Section 61 of the Code to expire, the Applicant/ Intervenor is deemed to have forfeited his right to contest the Admission Order. Therefore, he cannot now seek to achieve the same outcome indirectly by requesting a recall of the aforementioned order.

  • 19. The Admission Order dated 27.05.2021 cannot be said to have been passed by the Adjudicating Authority without jurisdiction, nor is it the case of the Applicant that he was a party to the case who was not served with notice of the proceedings in which the order under recall has been passed. Although the Applicant has alleged collusion between the Petitioner and the Corporate Debtor in the aforementioned Company Petition, such allegations remain unsubstantiated by any documentary evidence or material on record. Furthermore, the initiation of a civil suit against the Corporate Debtor holds no relevance to the proceedings under Section 7 of the Code. Consequently, the accusations of concealment and misrepresentation of facts are entirely unfounded. The Applicant has failed to establish any valid grounds for the recall of the Order dated 27.05.2021, and thus, the present application warrants dismissal.

  • 20. The Admission Order was issued on 27h May 2021, whereas the present application was filed by the Applicant on 26th June 2023, resulting in a time gap of over 2 years. The Applicant has failed to provide a satisfactory explanation to the Bench regarding the reason for this significant delay in filing the current application. The Applicant has stated in Paragraph 20 of their application that they became aware of the name of the proposed IRP, Mr. Partha Sarathy Sarkar, for the first time on 03.01.2023. Additionally, in Paragraph 23 of the application, the Applicant mentions that their advocates only learnt of the email address of the advocates for the CoC handling the Company Petition in question on 12.06.2023, following which they promptly contacted them for all relevant documents and proceedings. However, in our assessment these explanations do not sufficiently justify the time lag or the delay in filing the present application. Therefore, the instant application is liable to be dismissed on the grounds of delay and laches.

  • 21. The Hon’ble NCLAT in Vekas Kumar Garg v/s. DMI Finance Pvt. Ltd. (Citation: 2021 SCC Online NCLAT 72) has held as follows:

  • “3. After hearing learned counsel for the Appellant and going through the record, we are of the view that the ground projected by the Appellant in his capacity as Resolution Professional of NDL for seeking impleadment in CP IB21 15/ ND/2019 pending consideration before the Adjudicating Authority does not warrant impleadment of Appellant as party Respondent. In an application under Section 7, the Financial Creditor and the Corporate Debtor alone are the necessary party and the Adjudicating Authority iS, at the pre-admission stage, only required to satisfy itself that there is a financial debt in respect whereof the Corporate Debtor has committed a default warranting triggering of CIRP. The Adjudicating Authority is required to satisfy itself in regard to there being a financial debt and default thereof on the part of the Corporate Debtor besides the application being complete as mandated under Section 7(5) of the ‘I&B Code’ and then pass an order of admission or rejection on merit as mandated under subsection (4) of Section 7 within 14 days. No third-party intervention is contemplated at that stage.”

  • (Emphasis Supplied)

  • The Hon’ble NCLAT in Prayag Polytech Pvt Ltd. v/s. Hind Tradex Ltd. (Citation: 2019 SCC Online NCLAT 1029) had observed as follows:

  • “4. From the plain reading of Section 7 of IBC it is clear that the Adjudicating Authority, on being satisfied and if the application is complete, after notice and hearing the ‘Corporate Debtor’, may either admit the application or reject it. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also noticed the aforesaid mandate of law. In that view of the matter, we are of the view that there is no requirement for intervention of any Directors or shareholders of the ‘Financial Creditor’ or any other party before admission of Application under Section 7 of IBC. If the application is admitted, it would be open to any aggrieved party to move before this Appellate Tribunal.”

  • (Emphasis Supplied)

  • 22. Based on the precedents established by the Hon’ble NCLAT, as referenced in the preceding paragraph, it is our considered opinion that in an application filed under Section 7 of the Code, the Applicant-Financial Creditor and the Corporate Debtor are the only necessary parties, and no third-party intervention is envisaged at that juncture. During the pre-admission phase, the sole requirement is to satisfy the conditions stipulated under Section 7, namely the existence of a financial debt and default on the part of the Corporate Debtor. Therefore, there is no necessity to involve any other party prior to the admission of an application under Section 7 of the Code, 2016. Consequently, we find that the Applicant lacks the standing to intervene at either the pre-admission or post-admission stages of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) of the Corporate Debtor. Thus, in regards to the plea for intervention, the present application is subject to dismissal due to a lack of locus.

  • 23. 23.1. Counsel for the Applicant/ Intervenor has drawn our attention to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Beacon Trusteeship Ltd. v/s. Earthcon Infracon Pvt Ltd. [Citation: 2020 SCC Online SC 1233] pleaded by the Applicant to buttress his submission that intervention can be allowed and the intervenors have to be heard before any order of admission u/s 7 of the Code is passed for initiating CIRP of the Corporate Debtor. We have gone through the aforesaid ruling of the Hon’ble Apex Court. The aforesaid ruling does not deal with the issue of intervention. The Hon’ble Apex Coya Beacon Trusteeship case (supra) had held as follows:

  • “7. Considering the provision of Section 65 of the IBC, it is necessary for the Adjudicating Authority in case such an allegation is raised to go into the same case, such an objection is raised or application is filed before the Adjudicating Authority, obviously, it has to be dealt with in accordance with law. The plea of collusion could not have been raised for the first time in the appeal before the NCLAT or before this Court in this appeal. Thus, we relegate the appellant to the remedy before the Adjudicating Authority.

  • 8. In case, a proper application is filed, aspect whether the proceedings have been initiated in collusive manner will be looked into, in accordance with law and the appropriate orders have to be passed, considering the facts and circumstances of the case. We have made it clear that we have not commented on the merit of the case. We set aside the impugned order passed by the NCLAT and dispose of the appeal in accordance with the aforesaid direction.”

  • 23.2. From a straightforward interpretation of the quoted judgment, it is evident that whenever allegations of fraud, collusion, or malicious intent are raised or an application to that effect is filed before the Adjudicating Authority, it is incumbent upon the Authority to look into the same and pass appropriate orders. If the Applicant/Intervenor had asserted during the proceedings of the aforementioned petition that collusion existed between the Petitioners/Financial Creditors and the Corporate Debtor, and if the Adjudicating Authority had passed the Admission Order dated 27.05.2021 without affording the Applicant/Intervenor an opportunity to be heard or without considering his objections, then the Applicant/ Intervenor’s case would align squarely with the principles outlined in the referenced ruling. However, in the present case, during the proceedings of the aforementioned Company Petition, no objections of fraud, collusion, or malice were raised by the Applicant/ Intervenor, nor was any application to that effect filed. Consequently, the ruling cited by the Applicant/ Intervenor is irrelevant to the circumstances of the current case and thus not applicable.

  • 24. No further contentions have been raised on behalf of the Applicant/ Intervenor, Thus, there are no remaining issues to be addressed.

  • 25. Therefore, based on the aforementioned discussions, analysis, and findings, we hold the opinion that the application in question should be dismissed. Accordingly, Intervention Petition No. 31 of 2023 is hereby dismissed, with no order as to costs.”


# 5. The Ld. Counsel appearing for the Appellant submitted that they were 725 homebuyers in the project and Suit was pending before the Hon’ble Bombay High Court and only allotees of one Flat, namely, Mr. Indranil Das and Mrs. Nandita Das had filed the petition under Section 7 of the IBC, 2016.

5.1 It is the submission of the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant that as per amended Section 7, a petition underSection 7 can be filed jointly by not less than 100 allotees or not less than 10% of the total allotees under the same real estate project, whichever is less.

5.2 It is submitted that as per third proviso to Section 7, the pending applications were to be modified to comply with the requirements of second proviso within 30 days of the commencement of the amendment Act, 2020 i.e. within 30 days of 28.12.2019. The relevant portion of Section 7 is as under: . . . .

5.3 It is submitted that since the provisions of third proviso of Section 7 were not complied with, the order of Ld. NCLT dated 27.05.2021 was bad in law and should have been recalled by the Ld. NCLT.


# 6. Heard. Perused the records.


# 7. Though the Appellant has alleged collusion between original petitioners and the Corporate Debtor, no evidence regarding this was presented before the Ld. NCLT or this Tribunal. We note that there was considerable delay and laches in filing the Intervention Petition as the order for admission under Section 7 was passed on 27.05.2021 whereas the Intervention Petition seeking intervention and recall was filed in June, 2023 after more than two years.


# 8. The Ld. NCLT has power to recall its own order but has no power to review its own order. We now examine the pre-conditions to exercise power of recall of order. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Budhia Swain & Ors. v/s. Gopinath Deb & Ors., reported in [(2017) ibclaw.in 282 SC] : (1999) 4 SCC 396 has held as under:

  • 8. In our opinion a tribunal or a court may recall an order earlier made by it if

  • (i) the proceedings culminating into an order suffer from the inherent lack of jurisdiction and such lack of jurisdiction is patent;

  • (ii) there exists fraud or collusion in obtaining the judgment,

  • (iii) there has been a mistake of the court prejudicing a party, or

  • (iv) a judgment was rendered in ignorance of the fact that a necessary party had not been served at all or had died and the estate was not represented. The power to recall a judgment will not be exercised when the ground for re-opening the proceedings or vacating the judgment was available in the original action but was not done or where a proper remedy in some other proceeding such as by way of appeal or revision was available but was not availed. The right to seek vacation of a judgment may be lost by waiver, estoppel or acquiescence.

  • (Emphasis Supplied)


# 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority v/s. Prabhjit Singh Soni & Anr. [(2024) ibclaw.in 53 SC] vide Judgment dated February 12, 2024 in Civil Appeal Nos. 7590-7591 of 2023 as follows:

  • 50. …. Therefore, even in absence of a specific provision empowering the Tribunal to recall its order, the Tribunal has power to recall its order. However, such power is to be exercised sparingly, and not as a tool to re-hear the matter. Ordinarily, an application for recall of an order is maintainable on limited grounds, inter alia, where (a) the order is without jurisdiction; (b) the party aggrieved with the order is not served with notice of the proceedings in which the order under recall has been passed; and (c) the order has been obtained by misrepresentation of facts or by playing fraud upon the court/ Tribunal resulting in gross failure of justice.

  • (Emphasis supplied)


# 10. This Tribunal in the case of Col. Ashish Khanna, SM (Retd) v/s Delhi Gymkhana Club Limited & Anr. [(2025) ibclaw.in 1113 NCLAT] in I.A. No. 6314 of 2025 in Company Appeal (AT) No. 203 of 2025 has held as under:

  • “8. ………There is no doubt to the preposition of law that this Tribunal has a power to recall its own order but such power can be exercised only when (i) order passed is without jurisdiction; (ii) it is obtained by practicing fraud or collusion; (iii) there exists a fundamental procedural error viz necessary party not being served; (iv) the order being passed on misunderstanding of facts which resulted in prejudice to a party; (v) and gross failure of justice.

  • 9. We do not find any of the ingredients of (i) to (v) as above; necessary for recall of the judgment/order dated 08.09.2025, present in this application, and hence we are not inclined to allow this application and we dispose it of as above……..”


# 11. In the present case, the Ld. NCLT has rightly noted that during the pre-admission phase, the sole requirement is to satisfy the conditions stipulated under Section 7 of the IBC, namely the existence of financial ‘debt’ and ‘default’ on the part of the Corporate Debtor and that the Applicant/Financial Creditor and Corporate Debtor are only necessary party, and no third-party intervention is envisaged at this stage. Since intervention was not allowed there was no question of any notice or hearing being granted to the Applicants in the Intervention Petition. We concur with the decision of Ld. NCLT in not allowing intervention.


3 12. From the facts of this case, we find that none of the ingredients which are pre-requisite for recalling of the order are present in this case. There is no case to recall the order as the order was not without jurisdiction, no fraud or collusion was proved, there was no fundamental procedural error, namely, service on the necessary party, there was no misunderstanding of facts or gross failure of justice. Regarding compliance of third proviso to Section 7 of the IBC, 2016, we find that the petition under Section 7 has been admitted on the basis of financial debt, which was above the threshold as prescribed then under Section 4 of the IBC, 2016. We note that the Petitioners were no longer homebuyers, as they had invoked clause 9 of the allotment letter and exercised the option of cancellation of allotment and to seek refund along with interest and thus, they can no longer be treated as homebuyers. It was a debt of Rs. 19,00,000/- plus interest which was due from the Corporate Debtor. In the circumstances, there was no necessity to comply with the provisions of third proviso of Section 7 of the IBC, 2016.


# 13. In conclusion, on the basis of above analysis, we find no reason to interfere in the impugned order of Ld. NCLT. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. Pending application(s), if any, are also disposed of.

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Disclaimer:

The sole purpose of this post is to create awareness on the "IBC - Case Law" and to provide synopsis of the concerned case law, must not be used as a guide for taking or recommending any action or decision. A reader must refer to the full citation of the order & do one's own research and seek professional advice if he intends to take any action or decision in the matters covered in this post.