Showing posts with label creditors-in-a-class. Show all posts
Showing posts with label creditors-in-a-class. Show all posts

Friday, 8 December 2023

Ms. Amita Saurabh Bihani and Ors. Vs. E&G Global Estates Ltd. and Ors. - CIRP and avoidance applications are, thus by their very nature, a separate set of proceedings. The former is time bound whereas the latter requires a proper discovery of suspect transactions that are time consuming. The scheme of the IBC reinforces this difference and thus adjudication of an avoidance application is independent of the resolution of the corporate debtor and can survive CIRP.

  NCLAT (05.12.2023) in Ms. Amita Saurabh Bihani and Ors. Vs. E&G Global Estates Ltd. and Ors. [Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 1214-1215 and 1217-1218 of 2023] held that.

  • If related parties are allowed on the CoC, it is sufficient to render the constitution of CoC illegal and their decisions null and void. Submitting that a resolution plan approved by a wrongly constituted CoC is invalid and non-est in the eyes of law,

  • That individual home buyers constituting the financial creditors cannot object to the resolution plan once such resolution plan has been approved by the requisite majority of the homebuyers.

  • It becomes abundantly clear that Home Buyers can vote for or against the Plan only as a class and if there are some Home Buyers pitted against the Resolution Plan, who are otherwise in minority, they have absolutely no locus to oppose the Plan in the capacity of dissatisfied or dissenting Home Buyers.

  • When the statutory scheme clearly states that it is the duty of Resolution Professional to determine the nature of such transactions and file an appropriate application before the Adjudicating Authority, neither the Appellants-1 being home buyers themselves nor the GSC as unsuccessful resolution applicant are entitled on their own to file applications seeking avoidance of transactions.

  • The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Jaypee matter has emphasized that the democratic principles of a determinative role of majority opinion have been enshrined in the statutory construct of the IBC and hence the minority homebuyers have to necessarily sail with the majority within the class. Once the CoC has approved the resolution plan by requisite majority and the same is in consonance with applicable provisions of law, the same cannot be a subject matter of judicial review and modification.

  • Section 26 of IBC further provides that application for avoidance of transactions is not to affect CIRP proceedings and therefore such applications can continue even after completion of the CIRP. Section 26 of the IBC clearly stipulates that the pendency of any avoidance application shall not come in the way of the approval of the resolution plan.

  • CIRP and avoidance applications are, thus by their very nature, a separate set of proceedings. The former is time bound whereas the latter requires a proper discovery of suspect transactions that are time consuming. The scheme of the IBC reinforces this difference and thus adjudication of an avoidance application is independent of the resolution of the corporate debtor and can survive CIRP.

  • Recently, a division bench of the Delhi High Court in Tata Steel BSL Limited v. Venus Recruiter Private Limited and Others [(2023) SCC OnLine Del 155] has held that avoidance applications which are initiated by the RP shall continue irrespective of the finalisation of the Resolution Plan and the conclusion of the CIRP.

  • In view of the above reasons, we are of the considered opinion that simply because the Appellants have raised the issue of avoidance application, it does not stand to reason that the approval of the resolution plan needs to be put on hold or kept in abeyance. We also find that the present resolution plan also provides that recovery under Section 43, 45, 50 and 66 of the IBC would be the exclusive rights of the CoC of the Corporate Debtor. We therefore affirm the approval of the resolution plan by the Adjudicating Authority.


Excerpts of the Order;    

These two sets of appeals have been filed challenging the impugned orders dated 11.08.2023 passed in I.A. Nos. IA No.1777, 1150 and 1609 of 2021 by the Adjudicating Authority in CP (IB) No.2995/MB/2019. The first set of appeal filed under Section 61 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC” in short) by the Appellants/Homebuyers (hereinafter referred to as ‘Appellants-1’) arises out of the Order dated 11.08.2023 (hereinafter referred to as “First Impugned Order”) passed by the Adjudicating Authority (National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai Bench-V) in IA No.1777 of 2021 in CP (IB) No.2995/MB/2019. By the first impugned order, the Adjudicating Authority dismissed the challenge raised by the Appellants-1 to the constitution of the Committee of Creditors (“CoC” in short) for the purposes of initiating Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (‘CIRP’ in short) against the Corporate Debtor. These Appellants have also challenged another Order dated 11.08.2023 (hereinafter referred to as “Second Impugned Order”) passed by the said Adjudicating Authority in IA No.1150 of 2021 in the same company petition at supra by which the resolution plan of the Successful Resolution Applicant has been approved. The second set of appeal filed by M/s. G.S. Constructions (hereinafter referred to as ‘Appellant-2’) also arises out of the Order dated 11.08.2023 (hereinafter referred to as “Third Impugned Order”) in I.A. 1609 of 2021 wherein the same Adjudicating Authority dismissed the challenge raised by this Appellant to the constitution of the CoC. This Appellant has also challenged the second impugned order passed by the same Adjudicating Authority in IA No.1150 of 2021 approving the resolution plan of the Successful Resolution Applicant.


# 4. It was further submitted that the RP admitted the claims of these illegitimate home owners who had committed irregularities by way of fraudulent transactions and gave them access to the CoC at a time when in IA 107 of 2021, the RP had himself prayed for reconstitution of the CoC. Further the RP not only allowed their entry into the CoC but also allowed these illegitimate home buyers to discuss and approve the resolution plan. Had the votes of the illegitimate home owners been excluded, the results of the voting on the resolution plan of SRA would have been different. It has, therefore, been contended that when the composition of the CoC itself is under cloud and the question of reconstitution of CoC was still pending in IA 107 of 2021, the approval of the resolution plan of the SRA by the Adjudicating Authority was against the fundamental tenets of IBC. The Appellants have relied on the judgment of this Tribunal in Jayanta Banerjee v. Shashi Agarwal and Anr. in CA (AT) (Ins.) No. 348 of 2020 (‘Jayanta’ in short) which has held that if the constitution of CoC is a nullity in the eye of law, the entire CIRP process is vitiated. In support of their contention, they have also relied upon the judgment of this Tribunal on similar lines in Hindalco Industries Ltd. v. Hirakud Industrial Works Ltd. & Ors. in CA (AT) (Ins.) No. 42 of 2022 (‘Hindalco’ in short) in that if related parties are allowed on the CoC, it is sufficient to render the constitution of CoC illegal and their decisions null and void. Submitting that a resolution plan approved by a wrongly constituted CoC is invalid and non-est in the eyes of law, it was also articulated that the resolution plan of the SRA was commercially less viable than the plan submitted by another resolution applicant, namely, GSC.


# 5. The Learned Counsels appearing for the SRA and suspended directors of the Corporate Debtor have opposed the submissions made by both set of Appellants. Since their submissions largely overlap, the same have been clubbed together. It has been contended that IA 1777 of 2021 was filed by the Appellants-1 challenging the constitution of CoC only after the rejection of the resolution plan of GSC as an after-thought. Prior to the approval of the resolution plan of the SRA, the Appellants never raised any objections to the constitution of the CoC and had in fact participated in the voting process without any protest or demur. That the Appellants-1 in IA 1777 of 2021 had also prayed for approval of the resolution plan of GSC manifests their motive which was to revive the rejected resolution plan of GSC though it had failed to secure the requisite majority votes in favour. This shows that their motives are not bona fide in that they aimed only to derail the CIRP process and to somehow manage approval of the resolution plan of GSC.


# 6. It was also contended that the grounds of non-joinder of necessary parties cited by the Adjudicating Authority in rejecting IA 1777 of 2021 was also right as the alleged suspect/fraudulent homebuyers whose removal from the CoC was sought had not been impleaded by the Appellants-1. Even the RP had been kept away from the list of parties. Even the Appellant-2 in IA1609/2021 had sought the removal of certain alleged fraudulent home buyers from the CoC but failed to implead them as parties to its application. It had only arrayed the RP and the Authorized Representative as parties before the Adjudicating Authority. It was also argued that the alleged suspect home buyers have been impleaded only at the appeal stage without seeking leave of this Tribunal to implead additional parties who were not parties in the application before the Adjudicating Authority.


# 7. In support of their contention, the Learned Counsel for the SRA has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Moreshar Yadaorao Mahajan v. Vyankatesh Sitaram Bhedy LR & Ors. (2022) SCC OnLine SC 1307 wherein it has been held that in the absence of a necessary party, in whose absence no effective decree could be passed by the Court, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed.


# 8. It was also contended that in terms of Section 25(2)(j) of the IBC, it is the duty of the RP to file applications for avoidance of transactions. The Appellants-1 being homebuyers of the Corporate Debtor and Appellant-2 being an unsuccessful resolution applicant are not entitled to file such avoidance applications. Hence on this count itself the IA 1777 was not maintainable. Further even if the issue of avoidance application merits consideration, in terms of Section 26 of IBC, there was no requirement to put the process of approval of the resolution plan into abeyance.


# 9. It has also been contended that the Appellants being individual home buyers who by themselves constitute only a minority of the entire financial creditor in class cannot object to the resolution plan of SRA once it has been approved by the requisite majority of the homebuyers. It is also submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jaypee Kensington Boulevard Apartments Welfare Association and Ors. Vs. NBCC (India) Ltd. and Ors. (2022)1 SCC 401 (‘Jaypee’ in short) has categorically held that individual home buyers constituting the financial creditors cannot object to the resolution plan once such resolution plan has been approved by the requisite majority of the homebuyers.


# 10. We have duly considered the arguments advanced by the Learned Counsel for the parties and perused the records carefully.


# 11. We propose to start with the tenability of the first impugned order of the Adjudicating Authority in IA 1777/2021. It is the contention of the Appellants-1 that they are legitimate owners of Holiday Homes developed by the Corporate Debtor and that they are part of CoC with 16.53% vote share. The Appellants-1 claim that they have reasonable grounds to feel aggrieved as the RP had admitted the claims of certain illegitimate home owners who had committed irregularities which amounted to fraudulent transactions and made them part of the CoC. It was asserted that in IA No. 1430 of 2020, the Adjudicating Authority was convinced of dubious transactions undertaken by the suspended directors of the Corporate Debtor with the illegitimate home owners which had led to ordering of forensic audit of the books of account of the Corporate Debtor. The FAR had clearly set out the fact that fraudulent and circuitous transactions were actually carried out by some home owners and suspended directors.


# 12. It is also the case of the Appellants that in view of the clear findings of the FAR, the RP had filed IA No. 107/2021 for fraudulent transactions under Section 66 of the IBC and IA No. 149 of 2021 for preferential transactions under Section 43-45 of IBC and prayed that the illegitimate home owners be removed from the CoC and their voting rights cancelled. Submitting that the IA 107/2021 was still pending, the Adjudicating Authority without deciding on the said IA should not have dismissed IA No. 1777 of 2021 filed by them praying for removal of alleged illegitimate home owners from the CoC and to disregard the votes cast by them during CoC meetings as well as to reconstitute the CoC with genuine home buyers. Under such circumstances, where 17 out of 53 home buyers had irregularly and illegally gained access to the CoC, it has been the contention of the Appellants-1 that the constitution of CoC was clearly rendered illegal and decisions taken by the said CoC is invalid.


# 13. Before we delve into the sustainability of the first impugned order of the Adjudicating Authority in IA 1777/2021, it would be constructive to note the status of IA 107/2021 as filed by the RP seeking reconstitution of the CoC. It is the claim of the Appellants-1 that the Adjudicating Authority in its order dated 17.11.2021 in IA 107/2021 had removed the alleged fraudulent home buyers from the CoC. On the other hand, it is the counter claim of the Respondents that the said order was challenged by the expelled home buyers before this Tribunal in CA(AT)(Ins)No 26 of 2022 and was set aside by this Tribunal on 08.03.2022 and the matter remanded back for reconsideration by the Adjudicating Authority. Perusal of the said order of this Tribunal clearly shows that in para 8 it has held that the Adjudicating Authority had passed the orders on 17.11.2021 under the wrong impression that the entire money invested by the suspect home buyers was routed back, which obviously not being the position, the same ought to have been cleared by the Resolution Professional before the Adjudicating Authority. This Tribunal had accordingly set aside the order of the Adjudicating Authority without expressing any opinion on merits and remitted the matter for reconsideration of the Adjudicating Authority after hearing the parties afresh. Thus, we hold that the earlier order of the Adjudicating Authority on IA 107/2021 removing certain home buyers from the CoC having been set aside does not hold good.


# 14. Coming to the tenability of the first impugned order, it is the contention of the Appellants-1 that the impugned order in IA 1777/2021 reflects non-application of mind by the Adjudicating Authority. Though grave allegations were raised by them on the constitution of the CoC, and IA 107 was still pending, these facts were disregarded by the Adjudicating Authority without examining the merits of the same or providing reasons for negating the same. The CoC was illegally constituted with illegitimate home buyers who had entered into collusive arrangements with the suspended directors of the Corporate Debtor and voting undertaken for approval of the resolution plan with a CoC comprising of such illegitimate home buyers. If the votes of the illegitimate home owners were excluded, which should have been the right course of action on the part of the RP, the results of the voting on the resolution plan of SRA would have been different. Relying on the judgments of this Tribunal in Jayanta and Hindalco supra, it was contended that the RP by allowing related parties of the Corporate Debtor to become members of the CoC made the constitution of CoC illegal and rendered decisions undertaken by such an irregularly constituted CoC to be null and void.


# 15. It may be useful at this stage to notice the first impugned order and would like to extract hereinunder the relevant observations and conclusions arrived therein:

  • “14. It has further been observed by this Bench that the Resolution Professional, who has admitted the claims of the homebuyers under challenge has not been made a party in the present Interlocutory Application. Further, the allottees, whose claims have been challenged in the present IA, are also not made a party in this IA. In the given situation no order can be passed at the back of such allottees without providing them an opportunity of being heard.

  • 15. This bench has further observed that the present application is filed by the owners of holiday homes/villas in the Project collectively having 25.55% voting share in the COC out of which 2 applicants namely Applicant nos. 3 & 4 having 2.85% and 3.17% voting share have already sought removal of their names form the present application which had been allowed by this Bench vide daily order dated 04.05.2023. Furthermore, the individual homebuyers who have been sought to be removed from the list of home buyer/ Committee of Creditors constitute just about 12% voting share in the COC. Therefore, assuming if their names are excluded, even that would not alter the final outcome and the plan of Mrs. Asha Sanap would still fetch more than 66% of voting share. Even otherwise, the applicants as the Home Buyers do not have any locus to agitate as to which plan should be approved especially when the Home buyers as a class having 79.60% voting share have voted in favour of the Resolution Plan submitted by Mrs. Asha Sanap.

  • 16. Even otherwise, the Applicants being the individual home buyers, as per the terms of Section 25-A(3-A) of IBC, can vote only through the Authorised Representative who is required to cast the vote on behalf of the Creditors in class after taking into account majority percentage of the Homebuyers against or in favour of a particular Resolution Plan. The relevant extract of Section 25-A(3-A) of IBC is as under:

  • 25A. (1) The authorised representative under sub-section (6) or sub-section (6A) of sect 21 or sub-section (5) of section 24 shall have the right to participate and vote in meetings of the committee of creditors on behalf of the financial creditor he represents in accordance with the prior voting instructions of such creditors obtained through physical or electronic means.

  • (3A) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in sub-section (3), the authorised representative under sub section (6A) of section 21 shall cast his vote on behalf of all the financial creditors he represents in accordance with the decision taken by a vote of more than fifty per cent of the voting share of the financial creditors he represents, who have cast their vote:

  • 17. In the instant case, the class of creditors (i.e. Home Buyers) have voted in favour of Resolution Plan of Mrs. Asha Snap with 42.03% voting which represents more than 50% of the total voting strength of their class i.e.79.60%. Therefore, the entire vote (i.e. 79.60%) would be considered to have been cast in favour of the plan submitted by Mrs. Asha Sanap, as required in terms of provisions of the Code.

  • 18. In view of the above, the objections raised by the Applicants in an individual capacity as a home buyer are inconsequential as they represent homebuyers in minority and are thus bound by the decision taken by the majority within the class of homebuyers. In this regard, reliance can be placed as the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jaypee Kensington Boulevard Apartments Welfare Association and Ors. Vs. NBCC(India) Ltd. and Ors.(2022)1 SCC 401 wherein it was held that when Homebuyers as a class have voted in favour of the Resolution Plan, any particular constituent of that class cannot be heard in opposition to the Resolution Plan by way of objection as there is no concept of dissenting homebuyers within Creditors in class. The relevant extracts of this judgement are reproduced below:-

  • “164.4 Having regard to the scheme of IBC, and the law declared by this Court, it is more than clear that once a decision is taken, either to reject or to approve a particular plan, by a vote of more than 50% of the voting share of the financial creditors within a class, the minority of those who vote, as also all others within that class, are bound by that decision. There is absolutely no scope for any particular person standing within that class to suggest any dissention as regards the vote over the resolution plan. It is obvious that if this finality and binding force is not provided to the vote cast by the authorize representative over the resolution plan in accordance with the majority decision of the class he is authorized to represent, a plan or resolution involving large decision of the class he is authorized to represent, a plan or resolution involving large number of parties (like an excessively large number of homebuyers herein) may never fructify and the only result would be liquidation, which is not the prime target of the Code. In the larger benefit and common good, the democratic principles of the determinative role of the opinion of majority have been duly incorporated in the scheme of the Code, particularly in the provisions relating to voting on the resolution plan and binding nature of the vote of authorized representative on the entire class of the financial creditor/s he represents.

  • 170. To sum up this part. of discussion, in our view, after approval of the resolution plan of NBCC by CoC, where homebuyers as a class assented to the plan, any individual homebuyer or association cannot maintain any challenge to the resolution plan nor could be treated as carrying any legal grievance.

  • 171. Once we have held that these dissatisfied homebuyers and associations are not entitled to put up any challenge to the resolution plan contrary to the decision of the requisite majority of their class, all their objections are required to be rejected outright….”

  • 19. In the light of what has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the afore-cited judgment it becomes abundantly clear that Home Buyers can vote for or against the Plan only as a class and if there are some Home Buyers pitted against the Resolution Plan, who are otherwise in minority, they have absolutely no locus to oppose the Plan in the capacity of dissatisfied or dissenting Home Buyers. It is also abundantly clear that such dissenting minority segment within the class of Home Buyers cannot arrogate themselves to be dissenting Financial Creditors.


# 16. It is an undisputed fact that the Appellants-1 had only impleaded the suspended directors of the Corporate Debtor as parties in IA 1777/2021 and not included the suspect home buyers or even the RP. We therefore find sound logic in the dismissal of IA 1777/2021 by the Adjudicating Authority on the ground that the alleged illegitimate home buyers had not been impleaded in the said IA at a time when their ouster from the CoC was being agitated. Any decision by the Adjudicating Authority to remove these home buyers from the CoC without hearing them would have caused deep prejudice to their interests and been unfair, unequitable, unjust besides running contra to the principles of natural justice. That apart we notice that no objections were ever raised earlier by the Appellants-1 to the constitution of the CoC or on the participation of the suspect home buyers in the voting process until the 7th CoC meeting. Even the Appellants never raised any objections to the appointment of the Authorised Representative or in the latter’s participation in the voting process in CoC. It was only after the resolution plan of the SRA was approved that the Appellants approached the Adjudicating Authority by way of filing an IA 1777/2021 and challenging the constitution of the CoC. If the Appellants were genuinely aggrieved with the constitution of the CoC, we fail to comprehend as to what prevented them from objecting to the constitution of the CoC and participation in the CoC meetings at any stage prior to the 8th CoC meeting. This clearly shows that the Appellants sprang into action only after the resolution plan of GSC was not approved.


# 17. During the course of making oral arguments, the Learned Senior Counsel of the Appellants-1 handed over a chart containing revised calculations of the shares of the home buyers post the removal of the suspect/fraudulent homebuyers. We also notice that the FAR observations with respect to related party transactions have been placed by Appellants-1 at pages 134-136 of Appeal Paper Book (‘APB’ in short), preferential transactions at page 137 of APB, undervalued transactions at pages 138-139 of APB, besides other suspicious transactions at pages 140-144 of APB. Be that as it may, it would be misplaced to place any reliance on the list of fraudulent home buyers as furnished by the Appellants in the absence of unequivocal findings of fraud against these parties.


# 18. It is also noticed that while the RP in IA 107 of 2021 had impleaded only 4 home buyers, the Appellants-1 have included other parties as suspect home buyers than those named in IA 107 of 2021. We now proceed to examine whether the Appellants-1 being a set of home buyers falling in a class of creditors can decide on other home buyers falling in the same class of creditors as suspect/fraudulent/illegitimate home buyers.


# 19. The statutory construct of IBC clearly puts the onerous responsibility of pursuing avoidance applications on the RP. In terms of Section 25(2)(j) of the IBC, it is the duty of the RP to file appropriate applications for avoidance of transactions which fall under the ambit of preferential, fraudulent, undervalued or extortionate transactions. When the statutory scheme clearly states that it is the duty of Resolution Professional to determine the nature of such transactions and file an appropriate application before the Adjudicating Authority, neither the Appellants-1 being home buyers themselves nor the GSC as unsuccessful resolution applicant are entitled on their own to file applications seeking avoidance of transactions. The ratio of the Jayanta case also cannot come to the aid of the Appellant-1 since in that case the RP without verifying the claims submitted by the Financial Creditors had allotted voting share. Further, the RP had not prepared the Information Memorandum and the CIRP proceedings were conducted without any valuation of the Corporate Debtor. Neither was there any publication of Form G inviting Expression of Interest. Moreover, in that case the CoC had rushed into liquidation of the Corporate Debtor. We therefore cannot commend such unilateral addition of names in the list of suspect home buyers by the Appellants-1.


# 20. This brings us to the second impugned order passed by the Adjudicating Authority in IA No. 1150/2023 approving the resolution plan of the SRA. This order has been assailed by both Appellants-1 and Appellant-2 on more or less similar grounds that the Adjudicating Authority failed to take cognizance of the fact that the decision of the CoC to approve the resolution plan stood vitiated since the constitution of the CoC itself was a nullity. The question before us is whether the CoC in the facts of the present case could lawfully consider approval of the resolution plan when the constitution of the CoC is claimed by both the Appellants to be tainted.


# 21. It is the contention of the Appellants-1 and 2 that the CoC was illegally constituted with illegitimate home buyers who had entered into collusive arrangements with the suspended directors of the Corporate Debtor. 16 out of 17 such suspect home buyers had voted in favour of the resolution plan of the SRA. Such a resolution plan approved by related parties is therefore liable to be set aside. It is therefore their case that the decision of CoC in the present set of facts cannot be validated on the pretext of exercise of commercial wisdom as the commercial wisdom of CoC cannot condone material irregularities in the conduct of CIRP.


# 22. We find that the Adjudicating Authority while considering at length the IA 1150 filed by the RP for approval of the resolution plan, held in the second impugned order, that the plan meets the requirements of Section 30(2) of the IBC and Regulations 37, 38, 38(1A) and 39(4) of the CIRP Regulations. It also held that the resolution plan was feasible and viable which balances the interests of the all the stake-holders and is in accordance with law and does not contravene any of the provisions of Section 29(A) of the IBC. Further when we see paras 15 to 18 of the first impugned order as extracted at Para 15 above, we find that the Adjudicating Authority has clearly held that the home buyers as class of creditors have cast their votes in favour of the resolution plan submitted by the SRA. The Adjudicating authority has also spelt out in para 15 of the impugned order the vote share of the Appellants-1 and that of the alleged suspect home buyers and that even if the names of the suspect home buyers are excluded, the plan of the SRA had fetched more than the requisite percent of votes. Thereafter the Adjudicating Authority has relied on law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jaypee supra and held that objections raised by a set of home buyers as a minority constituent of the same class of creditors does not hold ground.


# 23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Jaypee matter has emphasized that the democratic principles of a determinative role of majority opinion have been enshrined in the statutory construct of the IBC and hence the minority homebuyers have to necessarily sail with the majority within the class. Once the CoC has approved the resolution plan by requisite majority and the same is in consonance with applicable provisions of law, the same cannot be a subject matter of judicial review and modification. We are therefore not convinced with the plea raised by the Appellants that the Adjudicating Authority had committed an error in approving the resolution plan.


# 24. This brings us to the third impugned order passed by the Adjudicating Authority dated 11.08.2023 in I.A. 1609 of 2021 and IA No. 1150/2021 in CP(IB) No. 2995/MB/2019 which has been challenged by Appellant-2/GSC who is an unsuccessful resolution applicant.


# 25. In IA 1609 of 2021, the Adjudicating Authority has dismissed the prayers of GSC to quash and set aside the CoC of the Corporate Debtor under CIRP. The prayers are similar to those raised by Appellants-1 in IA 1777/2021. In the present IA 1609/2021 too, the prayers of the Appellant-2 have been rejected and the grounds are amplified by the Adjudicating Authority at paras 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 of the third impugned order which is as reproduced below:

“5.3 This Bench is of the opinion that, once the majority of CoC decide on one of the Resolution Plan, the decision of the CoC attains finality. It is observed by the Bench that, in the present case, since the CoC comprising of SIDBI and the home buyers approved the Resolution Plan presented by Mrs. Asha Sanap, the Unsuccessful Resolution Applicant has no locus to challenge the commercial decision of the CoC. Further, the prayer of the Applicant recalling the order dated August 18, 2020 passed by this Tribunal appointing Respondent No. 2 i.e. Mr. Jitender Kothari as the Authorised Representative of the Home Buyers of the Corporate Debtor on the ground that the same is vitiated by fraud perpetrated by the Fraudulent Home Buyers, has no merit in view of the above discussion by this Bench.

5.4 It is observed by the Bench that, the Applicant who himself was Prospective Resolution Applicant had submitted its Resolution Plan. At no stage, the Applicant challenged the constitution of the CoC. The Applicant is seeking relief to set aside and quash the CoC only after his plan not approved with the requisite voting of the CoC. Moreover, no concrete evidence has been given by the Applicant that transactions of some Home Buyers (i.e. 14 Home Buyers) are fraudulent in nature. The question of some of the Home Buyers as fraudulent was also raised by the Applicant after the Plan of the Applicant was not approved with the requisite voting of CoC.

5.5 This Bench has further observed that, the Proprietor of the Applicant i.e. Mr. Sushil Uttarwar, was an ex Director of the Corporate Debtor and in an Application being IA No 1148 of 2020 in CP 2995 of 2019, filed by M/s G S Constor & Infra Pvt. Ltd. for making M/s GS Constor & Infra Pvt. Ltd. part of CoC was rejected by this Tribunal on the ground of being a Related Party and the said decision was also confirmed by the Hon’ble NCLAT in Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 587 of 2021. Hence, the Applicant has no locus to challenge the CoC at this when the CoC has already approved the Plan submitted by Mrs. Asha Sanap.”

Since we have already recorded our reasonings in the preceding paragraphs affirming the dismissal of IA 1777/2021, we have no reasons to take a different stand and therefore uphold the third impugned order of the Adjudicating Authority dismissing IA 1609/2021.


# 26. In IA No. 1150/2021, the Adjudicating Authority has approved the resolution plan of the Corporate Debtor. The issues challenged by the Appellant-2 in IA 1150/2021 being the same as those challenged in the first and second impugned orders by the Appellants-1 we do not propose to discuss them again as they have already been dealt in the foregoing paragraphs. We would only like to touch upon the argument proffered by Appellant-2 that the resolution plan could not have been approved by the Adjudicating Authority since applications under Sections 43, 44 and 66 of IBC as contained in IA 149 were still pending before the Adjudicating Authority.


# 27. We are not inclined to agree with this contention of the Appellant-2 in view of the statutory construct of IBC. The IBC stipulates the conclusion of CIRP in 330 days. Within this prescribed timeline, often the RP is unable to identify avoidable transactions and apply to the Adjudicating Authority to reverse them. We also notice that the avoidance applications are not statutorily bound by time as is the resolution process. Section 26 of IBC further provides that application for avoidance of transactions is not to affect CIRP proceedings and therefore such applications can continue even after completion of the CIRP. Section 26 of the IBC clearly stipulates that the pendency of any avoidance application shall not come in the way of the approval of the resolution plan. CIRP and avoidance applications are, thus by their very nature, a separate set of proceedings. The former is time bound whereas the latter requires a proper discovery of suspect transactions that are time consuming. The scheme of the IBC reinforces this difference and thus adjudication of an avoidance application is independent of the resolution of the corporate debtor and can survive CIRP. Recently, a division bench of the Delhi High Court in Tata Steel BSL Limited v. Venus Recruiter Private Limited and Others [(2023) SCC OnLine Del 155] has held that avoidance applications which are initiated by the RP shall continue irrespective of the finalisation of the Resolution Plan and the conclusion of the CIRP. In view of the above reasons, we are of the considered opinion that simply because the Appellants have raised the issue of avoidance application, it does not stand to reason that the approval of the resolution plan needs to be put on hold or kept in abeyance. We also find that the present resolution plan also provides that recovery under Section 43, 45, 50 and 66 of the IBC would be the exclusive rights of the CoC of the Corporate Debtor. We therefore affirm the approval of the resolution plan by the Adjudicating Authority.


# 28. In view of the foregoing discussions, we are satisfied that no cogent grounds have been raised in either of the two appeals which would warrant any interference with the impugned orders passed by the Adjudicating Authority. In result, both the appeals are dismissed. No costs.

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Saturday, 28 October 2023

Mr.Ankur Narang & Ors. Vs. Mr. Nilesh Sharma Resolution Professional of Today Homes and Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.- It has been clearly held in the Jaypee matter that when the Home Buyers as a class have voted in favour of a resolution plan, a particular constituent of that class and that too in a minority cannot be heard in opposition to the resolution plan by way of objection as there is no concept of dissenting homebuyers within Creditors in class.

NCLAT (20.10.2023) in Mr.Ankur Narang & Ors. Vs. Mr. Nilesh Sharma Resolution Professional of Today Homes and Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. [Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No.1240 of 2023] held that;

  • There is no scope for any homebuyer suggesting himself to be a dissenting financial creditor merely because he was not with majority within the class. His dissatisfaction does not partake the legal character of a dissenting financial creditor.

  • The minority homebuyers have to necessarily sail with the majority within the class. In the present facts of the case, when the majority has approved the resolution plan, the objections raised by the Appellants are inconsequential in so far as they represent the homebuyers in minority.

  • It has been clearly held in the Jaypee matter that when the Home Buyers as a class have voted in favour of a resolution plan, a particular constituent of that class and that too in a minority cannot be heard in opposition to the resolution plan by way of objection as there is no concept of dissenting homebuyers within Creditors in class.


Blogger’s Comments; Hon’ble Appellate Authority has observed that;

  • “ . . .that when the Home Buyers as a class have voted in favour of a resolution plan, a particular constituent of that class and that too in a minority cannot be heard in opposition to the resolution plan by way of objection as there is no concept of dissenting home buyers within Creditors in class.” (Emphasis supplied).


Now the question arises whether different treatment can be accorded  amongst creditors in a class, in a resolution plan. Equal treatment has to be accorded to creditors in a class. Here the applicants have been treated as part of “Creditors in a class - Homebuyers” but a differential/discriminatory treatment has been provided for them in the resolution plan.


Excerpts of the Order;    

The present appeal filed under Section 61 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC” in short) by the Appellants Arises out of the Order dated 01.08.2023(hereinafter referred to as “Impugned Order”) passed by the Adjudicating Authority (National Company Law Tribunal, New DelhiCourt-III) in IA No. 4171/2021 in CP (IB) No.2130(ND)2019.


2.For better appreciation of the matter at hand, we begin by setting out the factual matrix as brought out before us. The present Appellants constitute a clutch of 25 applicants,each being allottees of residential flats in a project, namely, Canary Greens, Gurugram(hereinafter referred to as “Project”).  The said project was being developed by Today Homes and Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. –Corporate Debtor. Since the possession of the flats wasn't offered by the Corporate Debtor within the prescribed time, the Appellants raised complaint before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (“NCDRC” in short) following which the NCDRC ordered on 31.01.2017 that the Corporate Debtor shall refund the entire amount received from each of the complainants including Service Tax and VAT along with compensation in the form of simple interest @ 10% p.a.besidesRs.10,000/-as the litigation cost,which payments were to be made within three months from the date of the order.  With these orders, NCDRC had disposed of all the complaints.  The Appellants filed the execution petition in pursuance of the NCDRC order and received compensation until 31.10.2019 on which date the Corporate Debtor was admitted into Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (“CIRP” in short). The principal amount however was not received by them from the Corporate Debtor.

 

3.Since the Corporate Debtor had been admitted into CIRP, the applicants filed their claim.The Resolution Professional (“RP” in short) had raised certain concerns regarding calculation of the claims filed by them and asked them to revise their claims aggrieved by which the Appellant Filed A No. 4059/2020 and 4914/2020 before the Adjudicating Authority.  Since the RP later admitted their claims in full,both the IAs were rendered infructuous.  The claim submitted to the RP pertained purportedly only to the principal amount which was yet to be recovered from the Corporate Debtor.

 

4.Taking the process of CIRP forward,the RP had invited resolution plans.  The RP had presented the plans so received from the Resolution Applicants before the Committee of Creditors (“CoC” in short) and the resolution plan was approved by the CoC with 96.93% vote share.  Notably, the resolution plan is pending approval of the Adjudicating Authority. In the interim, the Appellants aggrieved with the resolution plan filed IA No. 4171/2021 before the Adjudicating Authority challenging the resolution plan as approved by the CoC.The Adjudicating Authority dismissed the said IA vide impugned order dated 01.08.2023 against which the present appeal has been preferred.

 

5.The Learned Counsel for the Appellants submitted that the Adjudicating Authority wrongly dismissed their IA No.4171/2021 without considering the resolution plan which plan is not in consonance with Section 30(2) of the IBC and Regulation 38 of the IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016 (“CIRP Regulations” in short). Elaborating further it has been submitted that Clause 9.2.2B(iii) of the resolution plan (hereinafter referred to as “Clause 9”) by treating the entire compensation amount received by the Appellants in terms of the NCDRC order as refund towards the principal sum was discriminatory and therefore contrary to Section 30(2)(e) of the IBC.  The flats of the Appellants who have order of refund has been treated as cancelled without payment of refund amount as against home-buyers who continue to hold allotments.  Thus though the Appellants fall in the same class as other home-buyers but have been treated differently. Further, the Adjudicating Authority committed an error in overlooking the fact that as dissenting financial creditors, the Appellants are required to be paid in priority over the financial creditors who voted in favour of the resolution plan as contemplated in Regulation 38 of the CIRP Regulations. By providing partial payment and that too after sale of the respective flats of the Appellants, the resolution plan is contingent in nature and therefore contrary to the IBC. It has also been contended that the Appellants being secured Financial Creditors,will rank at the top in terms of the waterfall mechanism under Section 53 of the IBCalong with dues of the workman after CIRP costs and are entitled for their full claims.

 

6.Refuting the above submissions, the Learned Counsel for the Respondent No.1 submitted that the Appellants being a minority group of Home Buyers have no locus to challenge the resolution plan especially when the Home Buyers as a class have voted in favour of the resolution plan. It was also submitted that the Appellants cannot claim that their objections were not given due cognizance since the RP had given them the liberty to raise their objections before the Authorized Representative of the Home Buyers and the Authorized Representative in turn had sent a communication to the Appellants to get in touch with the Resolution Applicants for redressal of their objections and make necessary negotiations.Having already availed this opportunity, it was contended that the Appellants have no legitimate reasons to feel aggrieved. It was further contended that in Clause 9 of the resolution plan, the concerns and interests of the Appellants have been duly taken care of but by making selective and deliberate omissions while referring to Clause 9, they have intentionally distorted the facts. It was emphatically asserted that the resolution plan having been approved by the CoC in their commercial wisdom, the scope of interference in he resolution plan in the exercise of jurisdiction of judicial review by the Adjudicating Authority is extremely limited.Hence, the Adjudicating Authority had rightly dismissed the IA 4171/2021.

 

7.We have duly considered the arguments advanced by the Learned Counsel for the parties and perused the records carefully.

 

8.It is the case of the Appellants that they had raised their objections before the Authorized Representative with respect to certain clauses contained in the resolution plan, particularly clause 9. Submission was pressed that the resolution plan invalidly deducts payment of compensation/interest from their principal amount which is unjust. Moreover, they have been treated differently from other homebuyers to whom possession is being given as they will have a benefit of 65% more than them.  The resolution plan is also conditional as it provides that the payment shall be made to the Appellants only after the housing units are completed and sold thereafter. Thus the plan being contingent when it relates to payments to the Appellants, and thereby these clauses in the resolution plan being prejudicial and discriminatory to their interests, the CoC in approving such resolution plan acted contrary to Section 30(2)(e) of the IBC.

 

9.At this stage it would be helpful to also note the prayers of the present Appellants as made in IA 4171/2021. It has been prayed that the CoC and the RP be directed by the Adjudicating Authority to consider their objections in the said I.A. and to obtain revised/amended resolution plan from the Resolution Applicant including amendment of Clause 9 so as to secure the interests of the Appellants in compliance with the NCDRC orders.

 

10.The Learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 1 asserted that the Appellants were given adequate chance to raise their objections before the RP as well as the Authorized Representative of the Home Buyers. There is no merit in the objections raised by the Appellants being a group of individual homebuyers in minority,particularly so,when the plan has been assented to by the Home Buyers as a class. In support of their contention reliance was placed on the judgement of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the Jaypee Kensington Boulevard Apartments Welfare Association & Ors v NBCC(India) Ltd in Civil Appeal No. 3395 of 2020 (“Jaypee”in short).

 

11.This makes it necessary for us to see at this stage whether the Adjudicating Authority had taken note of Clause 9 of the resolution plan while passing the impugned order which is the main pillar of objection raised by the Appellants. Perusal of the impugned order clearly shows that the Adjudicating Authority had duly considered the objections raised by the Appellants with respect to Clause 9 of the resolution plan and held as follows: -

  • “10. …… The said clause was part of the plan, and the plan was duly approved by members of CoC with a whopping majority of 96.93%. A resolution plan providing a lesser amount than admitted does not make it illegal.  Hence, there is no reason for this Tribunal to direct the Resolution Applicant to amend clause 9.2.2 (B) (iii) of the Resolution Plan.

  • 11. We agree with the submissions made by the Learned Counsel for the Resolution Professional and we are of the considered view that the commercial wisdom of the CoC as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in various judgments cannot be called in question. Moreover, the Resolution Plan makes adequate provisions for consideration of the claims of the Applicants. Therefore, we are not inclined to entertain the present application.”    (Emphasis supplied)


12.In the present facts of the case, we find that the Appellants were given a chance to raise their objections before the RP as well as the Authorized Representative of the Home Buyers. The RP did not falter in accepting their claims in spite of expressing some reservations initially. The RP had also facilitated the Appellants in routing their objections to the Authorized Representative and the latter had provided them the window of opportunity of taking up their issues with the resolution applicants. We are of the considered opinion that the RP and the Authorized Representative did not fail in the discharge of their responsibilities and no cause of action survives on this count.

 

13.We also notice that it is an undisputed fact that the Appellants constitute a total of 25 home buyers with admitted claims of about Rs.14 crore as against a total of approximately 1500 home buyers in the said project with a claim totalling to Rs. 1110.20 crores. The resolution plan has been admittedly approved by the CoC with 96.93% vote share. In the instant case where the resolution plan has been admittedly approved by the CoC with 96.93% vote share, the issue before us is whether objections raised by a wafer-thin, miniscule minority amongst the homebuyers against the collective business decision taken by the Home Buyers can survive and be amenable to judicial intervention.

 

14.The Learned Counsel of the Appellant pointed out that in the recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vishal Chelani & Ors v. Debashish Nanda in Civil Appeal No. 3806 of 2023 it has been held that resolution plan which treats homebuyers having decrees from RERA differently from others forming part of the same class is bad in law.  We have no quarrel with the proposition of law laid down in the above judgment.  However, we find the facts in that case to be distinguishable from the present matter.  During the insolvency proceedings in that case, a resolution plan was presented, making a distinction between home buyers who had sought relief under RERA and those who had not. Those homebuyers who enjoyed RERA relief were made to file their claims in Form-C while other homebuyers were allowed to file claim in Form-CA thus putting the latter set of homebuyers to some advantage.  However, no such distinction is made in the present case between home buyers who invoked NCDRC remedies and those who did not. All home buyers, irrespective of their foray into the realms of NCDRC or not have been treated as financial creditors and allowed to file their claims in Form-CA and to participate as creditors in a class in the CoC in the present insolvency proceedings. Hence the facts of the two cases being different,the ratio is not applicable.

 

15.It is the case of the Respondent No. 1 that in the given statutory framework of IBC there is only limited judicial review which can be exercised by the Adjudicating Authority and that the supremacy of the commercial wisdom of CoC has been reaffirmed repeatedly and consistently by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It was also submitted that dissenting minority amongst Creditors in class have to be treated at par with other Home Buyers in terms of the Jaypee judgment.

 

16.It will be useful to extract the relevant portions of the Jaypee judgment supra as hereunder:


  • “163. Taking up other aspects of the rival submissions and having examined the scheme of the Code in relation to a plan of insolvency resolution, we are clearly of the view that the propositions of some of the associations and individual homebuyers to claim themselves as ‘dissenting homebuyers’ and thereby, ‘dissenting financial creditors’ do not stand in conformity with the scheme of the Code and the manner of voting on a plan of resolution by the Committee of Creditors.

  • ************

  • 164.3. In the face of clear language of sub-section (3A) of Section 25A of the Code, read with the law declared by this Court in Pioneer Urban(supra), the suggestion on behalf of the dissatisfied homebuyers that the said provision was only intended to iron out the logistical issues and technical difficulties is required to be rejected altogether.The said provision, as held by this Court, is to iron out the creases that might have been felt in the proper working of Section 25A; and it is made explicit that the allottees, even if not a homogeneous group, they could vote only either to approve the resolution plan or to disapprove the same. Divergence of the views within their own class may exist but, when coming to the vote in the Committee of Creditors, their vote would be that of a class.

  • 164.4. Having regard to the scheme of IBC and the law declared by this Court, it is more than clear that once a decision is taken, either to reject or to approve a particular plan, by a vote of more than 50% of the voting share of the financial creditors within a class, the minority of those who vote, as also all others within that class, are bound by that decision. There is absolutely no scope for any particular person standing within that class to suggest any dissention as regards the vote over the resolution plan. It is obvious that if this finality and binding force is not provided to the vote cast by the authorised representative over the resolution plan in accordance with the majority decision of the class he is authorised to represent, a plan of resolution involving large number of parties (like an excessively large number of homebuyers herein) may never fructify and the only result would be liquidation, which is not the prime target of the Code. In the larger benefit and for common good, the democratic principles of the determinative role of the opinion of majority have been duly incorporated in the scheme of the Code, particularly in the provisions relating to voting on the resolution plan and binding nature of the vote of authorised representative on the entire class of the financial creditor/s he represents.

  • ****** ******

  • 165. In the present case, on one hand, it has consistently been submitted by the stakeholders, particularly the homebuyers, that liquidation of JIL should be eschewed, but on the other hand, some of the associations and homebuyers have attempted to find faults with the resolution plan to which their majority, who voted, took the decision for approval. There is no scope for any homebuyer suggesting himself to be a dissenting financial creditor merely because he was not with majority within the class. His dissatisfaction does not partake the legal character of a dissenting financial creditor.

  • 166. For what has been discussed hereinabove, the suggestions that there was no cent percent approval of the resolution plan, or that there was no consensus amongst homebuyers, or that the plan of Suraksha Realty was considered better, are required to be rejected. It is not the case that the AR of homebuyers has not voted in accordance with the decision taken by a vote of more than 50% of the voting share of homebuyers who did cast their vote. In the given set of facts, we have no hesitation in thoroughly disapproving the unnecessary imputations made by one set of homebuyers against the AR that he made any incorrect statement before the CoC. That being the position, and the authorised representative having voted in accordance with the instructions given to him from the class of financial creditors i.e., homebuyers, every individual falling in this class remains bound by his vote and any association or homebuyer of JIL cannot be acceded the locus to stand differently and to project its/his own viewpoint or grievance by way of objections or by way of appeal. All such objections and appeals are required to be rejected on this ground alone.

  • *** *********

  • 170. To sum up this part of discussion, in our view, after approval of the resolution plan of NBCC by CoC, where homebuyers as a class assented to the plan, any individual homebuyer or association cannot maintain any challenge to the resolution plan nor could be treated as carrying any legal grievance.

  • 171. Once we have held that these dissatisfied homebuyers and associations are not entitled to put up any challenge to the resolution plan contrary to the decision of the requisite majority of their class, all their objections are required to be rejected outright……

  • ************

  • 175. For what has been discussed above, we hold that the homebuyers as a class having assented to the resolution plan of NBCC, any individual homebuyer or any association of homebuyers cannot maintain a challenge to the resolution plan and cannot be treated as a dissenting financial creditor or an aggrieved person;the question of violation of the provisions of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 does not arise; the resolution plan in question is not violative of the mandatory requirements of the CIRP Regulations; and when the resolution plan comprehensively deals with all the assets and liabilities of the corporate debtor, no housing project could be segregated merely for the reason that the same has been completed or is nearing completion.”      (Emphasis supplied)


17.The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Jaypee Matter has emphasized that the democratic principles of a determinative role of majority opinion have been enshrined in the statutory construct of the IBC and hence the minority homebuyers have to necessarily sail with the majority within the class. In the present facts of the case, when the majority has approved the resolution plan, the objections raised by the Appellants are inconsequential in so far as they represent the homebuyers in minority. It has been clearly held in the Jaypee matter that when the Home Buyers as a class have voted in favour of a resolution plan, a particular constituent of that class and that too in a minority cannot be heard in opposition to the resolution plan by way of objection as there is no concept of dissenting homebuyers within Creditors in class. Once the CoC has approved the resolution plan by requisite majority and the same is in consonance with applicable provisions of law the same cannot be a subject matter of judicial review and modification. We are therefore not impressed with the plea raised by the Appellants that the Adjudicating Authority had committed an error in rejecting their IA without having considered the main petition seeking approval of the resolution plan.

 

18.On the contention raised by the Appellants that their interests have been prejudiced since the resolution plan is contingent and conditional, it has been countered by the Respondent No. 1 that it is a misconceived argument. It was contended that clause 9 deals with the compensation amounts received by the Appellants as ordered by NCDRC including legal costs incurred by them. The Resolution Plan has made adequate provisions for consideration of the claims of the Appellants.It was submitted that the resolution plan clearly provides for treatment that would be provided to the Appellants in case the units are not resold.  We find that the Adjudicating Authority has taken due note of these provisions in clause 9 of the resolution plan which take care of the concerns of the Appellants and find place in Para 10 of the impugned order as extracted hereunder: -

  • “To compensate such allottees towards additional cost including legal cost incurred by them, Resolution applicant propose to pay 35% of the additional amount realized by the resolution applicant on sale of units booked by such allottee.  The additional amount realized will be the difference between the value received by the RA on sale of such units and the value of the unit as per BBA Agreement.

  • ************

  • To further compensate allottee in this category, in case of allotment of units, the total amount already refunded to such allottee on effective date will be received back in 6 equal monthly installments without any interest.  The allottee need to pay due installments if pending and further dues installments based on completion stage within 15 days of demand notice.”


Merely because there is a reduction in the claim of any creditor does not make the resolution plan fall foul of law. We quite agree with the Adjudicating Authority that “resolution plan providing a lesser amount than admitted does not make it illegal”.Any clause in the resolution plan which requires creditors to take a hair-cut cannot be construed as being violative of Section 30(2)(e) of the IBC.


19.Under such circumstances there is nothing to show that there has been transgression of the bounds of rules and regulations which have caused any serious miscarriage of justice to the Appellants. We are of the considered opinion that the Adjudicating Authority did not commit any error in dismissing IA 4171/2021.

 

20.We do not find any good groundsto entertain this appeal.  Appeal is dismissed. No costs.

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Disclaimer:

The sole purpose of this post is to create awareness on the "IBC - Case Law" and to provide synopsis of the concerned case law, must not be used as a guide for taking or recommending any action or decision. A reader must refer to the full citation of the order & do one's own research and seek professional advice if he intends to take any action or decision in the matters covered in this post.