Showing posts with label novation-of-contract-ots. Show all posts
Showing posts with label novation-of-contract-ots. Show all posts

Friday, 31 July 2026

Omkara Assets Reconstruction Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Ritu Jankiprasad Shah - It is evident from these stipulations that the promise to pay was conditional and not having been accepted by the Petitioner with these conditions cannot constitute a clear and unconditional promise to pay. Hence, the said letters do not give rise fresh cause of action in terms of Section 25(3) of the Contract Act.

  NCLT Mumbai (2026.07.13) in  Omkara Assets Reconstruction Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Ritu Jankiprasad Shah [(2026) ibclaw.in 2738 NCLT, CP (IB) No. 1117/(MB)/2025] held that;

  • There is a distinction between acknowledgment under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and a promise within the meaning of Section 25 of the Contract Act. Both promise and acknowledgment in writing, signed by a party or its agent authorised in that behalf, have the effect of creating a fresh starting of limitation.

  • The difference is that an acknowledgment under Section 18 of the Limitation Act has to be made within the period of limitation and need not be accompanied by any promise to pay. If an acknowledgment shows existence of jural relationship, it may extend limitation even though there may be a denial to pay.

  • On the other hand, Section 25(3) is only attracted when there is an express promise to pay a debt that is time barred or any part thereof. Promise to pay can be inferred on scrutinising the document. Only the promise should be clear and unconditional”.

  • It is evident from these stipulations that the promise to pay was conditional and not having been accepted by the Petitioner with these conditions cannot constitute a clear and unconditional promise to pay. Hence, the said letters do not give rise fresh cause of action in terms of Section 25(3) of the Contract Act.

Excerpts of the Order; 

1) The present Company Petition is filed u/s. 95 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as “IBC, 2016/Code”) r/w Rule 7(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Insolvency Resolution Process for Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors) Rules, 2019 by Omkara Assets Reconstruction Private Limited (“hereinafter referred to as Petitioner/Financial Creditor”) for initiating Insolvency Resolution Process against Ritu Jankiprasad Shah (“hereinafter referred to as Personal Guarantor/Respondent”) of the Corporate Debtor/ M/s Maharashtra Steel Pvt. Ltd. for having committed default in repayment of the Loan Amount Guaranteed by the Personal Guarantor even after invocation of Guarantee and Demand.


2) The brief facts leading to the filing of the present Company Petition are as follows:

i. State Bank of India (SBI) through its Sterling Branch, sanctioned and disbursed various Credit Facilities aggregating to Rs. 45 Crores in favour of the Borrower vide Sanctioned Letter dt. 19.11.2009. Having executed various documents by the Corporate Debtor to secure the above said Credit facilities, the Personal Guarantee was also executed by Janki Prasad Shah and Ritu Janki Shah and the Corporate Guarantee by Maharashtra Steel Rolling Mills Pvt. Ltd. and Maharashtra Steels Investments Pvt. Ltd.

ii. The Corporate Debtor failed to make payments towards various Financial Facilities availed by them and as a result account of the Corporate Debtor was classified as the Non-Performing-Asset (NPA) on 31.01.2014. SBI initiated action against the provision of Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest (SARFAESI) Act, 2002 and issued Notice under Section 13(2) of the said Act for the default Amount of Rs. 41,43,72,431/- on 02.07.2014.

iii. SBI took physical possession of the factory property at Wada on 22.11.2014 Corporate Debtor. Subsequently, vide Assignment Agreement dated 28.11.2019, · the account has been assigned to ASREC (India) Limited by SBI and further ASREC (India) Limited assigned the debt to Omkara Assets Reconstruction Pvt Ltd as on 17.03.2022. Vide SARFAESI Notice dt. 02.07.2014, to the Corporate Debtor, the Personal Guarantee vide the same Letter was also invoked and the demand was made to the Personal Guarantor to make the repayment of the Loan. In spite of that, no repayment was made.

iv. It is the case of the Applicant that the Corporate Debtor after availing the Loan has duly acknowledged the Debt from time to time and the debt was also acknowledged in the Financial Statement for the Year 2016-17. It is contended that no further Financial Statements were prepared and uploaded by the Corporate Debtor or else debt would have been further acknowledged by the Corporate Debtor. Meanwhile, the Company Petition No. 1187 of 2015 was filed before the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay and the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay admitted the said Petition and appointed Official Liquidator on 03.05.2018.

v. Due to pandemic Covid -19, the Limitation Period from 15.03.202 to 28.02.2022 was excluded and 90 days thereafter was available to file the Petition, till 31.05.2022. Thereafter, the Personal Guarantor Ms. Ritu Shah, addressed various Letters acknowledging debt due and payable to the Petitioner on 27.05.2024, 08.07.2024 and 16.01.2025. The Borrower through ex-Directors and Guarantor have acknowledged the Debt. The last Letter from the Personal Guarantor to the Corporate Debtor was received on 16.01.2025, though there is a break in chain of continuous acknowledgement of debt by the Corporate Debtor/Personal Guarantor. It is contended that the acknowledgement of liability even after expiry of original period of Limitation constitutes a fresh promise and gives rise to renewed cause of action, accordingly, any acknowledgement of debt made after the expiry of prescribed three years of Limitation rendering the claim maintainable from the date of such acknowledgement. Reliance is placed on the judgment in the case of Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited….vs….Kew Precision Parts Private Limited and Others (2022) 9 Supreme Court Cases 364, in Civil Appeal No. 2176 of 2020.

vi. It is submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court contemplates the Criteria required to be fulfilled i.e. a promise to pay whole or part of the Debtor in writing and signed by the respective party and such debt is of nature which Creditor will enforce but for the reasons of Limitation is unable to enforce the Payment. Thus, the promise to pay essentially must be treated as a contract and does not require an explicit acceptance of the same. Section 25(3) of the Contract attracted in the present case extending the Limitation.

vii. It is therefore submitted that the Petition is within Limitation and there is debt and default established by the Petitioner and therefore Personal Insolvency Resolution Process against the Personal Guarantor is required to be initiated.


3) The Respondent Personal Guarantor, pursuant to the Report under Section 99 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 filed by the Resolution Professional, appeared and filed their Reply and contended that the Petition is barred by Limitation and without going into the merits of the Case, the Petition is required to be dismissed. The account of the Corporate Debtor, M/s Maharashtra Steel Pvt. Ltd., was classified as Non-Performing-Asset (NPA) on 31.01.2014, thereafter, the Personal Guarantee was invoked vide Notice dt. 02.07.2014, consequently, the cause of action for filing the Petition against the Respondent herein crystalised at the latest on 02.07.2014. Accordingly, the Limitation for initiating proceedings against Respondent expires on 02.07.2017. Reliance of Financial Statements of the Corporate Debtor for the Financial Year 2016-17 is an attempt to contend that the debt stood acknowledged and consequently, the Limitation period stood extended.


4) Even if it is assumed to constitute the valid acknowledgement of debt by the Personal Guarantor, Petition would still remain barred by Limitation. The fresh period of Limitation would be commenced from the date of such acknowledgement i.e. 31.03.2017 and the period of 3 years would expire on 01.04.2020. Even if the exclusion of Limitation during Covid-19 Pandemic is taken and also 90 days period from 01.03.2022 is taken into consideration, the period of Limitation would still expire on 29.05.2022. The present Petition is filed admittedly on 15.10.2025, i.e. more than 3 years after the outer most period of Limitation available to the Petitioner, which is expired. It is therefore contended that the Petition is ex-facie barred by Limitation.


Submissions of Respondent/Personal Guarantor

5) It is submitted that the Petition is ex-facie barred by Limitation even after excluding Covid-19 Pandemic period and period of further 90 days as per the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of IL&FS Financial Services Ltd…vs…Adhunik Meghalaya Steels Pvt. Ltd., (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1567 is considered.


6) The reliance on Directors’ Report 03.09.2018 is wholly misconceived. Firstly, the document is neither signed nor stamped and its authenticity is therefore seriously disputed. Secondly, the said document does not pertain either to the Corporate Debtor or to the Respondent herein. It is a document of an altogether different entity and cannot constitute an acknowledgement on behalf of either the Corporate Debtor or the Respondent. Thirdly, the report does not contain any acknowledgement whatsoever of the alleged outstanding amounts claimed by the Petitioner. The Independent Auditors’ Reports for the Financial Years 2017-18 to 2020-21 are not the Reports of the Corporate Debtor or of the Respondent. They pertain to Maharashtra Steels Investment Pvt. Ltd., which is a separate Legal entity. The acknowledgement capable of extending Limitation must be clear, unambiguous and made by the person against whom the right is sought to be enforced. Documents of a third-party entity cannot operate as an acknowledgment on behalf of the Respondent.


7) The reliance on One Time Settlement (OTS) Proposals dt. 27.05.2024, 08.07.2024 and 16.01.2025 cannot revive a debt that had already become time-barred. It is a settled principle under Section 18 of the Limitation Act that an acknowledgement extends Limitation only if it is made before expiry of the prescribed period of Limitation. Once Limitation has expired, a subsequent acknowledgement cannot revive a barred claim. Reliance is placed on the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Laxmi Pat Surana…vs…Union Bank of India (2021) 8 SCC 481 and also in the case of Small Industries Development Bank of India…vs…Sh. Krishnakant Bagree, (2025) ibclaw.in 2314 NCLT, wherein it was held that an acknowledgement made after expiry of Limitation does not revive a time-barred debt.


8) It is further submitted that OTS proposal relied upon by the Petitioner were merely proposals made in the course of settlement discussions and never culminated into a concluded contract between the Parties. The said OTS proposals were in the nature of conditional offers made by the Respondent with a view to explore an amicable resolution of disputes. The proposals were at all times subject to acceptance by the Petitioner. The Petitioner has neither pleaded nor produced any document evidencing its unequivocal acceptance of the said OTS proposals. In the absence of acceptance, the essential requirements for formation of a binding and enforceable contract are not satisfied. In other words, the said OTS proposals cannot be construed as forming any contract between the Parties which can be regarded as enforceable in law. Hence, the reliance of Section 25(3) of the Contract Act is also misconceived and erroneous. The OTS proposal was conditional upon it being accepted by the Applicant in full and final settlement, and there is no express promise to make any payment in any of the OTS Proposals without the acceptance of OTS proposals by the Applicant. Therefore, the Section 25(3) of the Contract Act is not applicable in the present case.


9) The only question falls for consideration in the present case is whether the Petition is filed within the Limitation and whether the OTS proposal by the Respondent amounts to acknowledgment of time barred debt and whether the Petition as filed on the basis of Notice of invocation dt. 02.07.2014 would survive, in view of Section 25(3) of the Contract Act.


Findings:

10) It is trite Law that provisions of Limitation Act are applicable to the proceedings under Section 238A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. Therefore, the Petition is required to be filed within a period of Three Years from the date of accrual of cause of action as contemplated under Section 137 of the Limitation Act. In the present case, undisputedly, the invocation of the Personal Guarantee was vide Notice dt. 02.07.2014, therefore, the cause of Action would first accrued on the expiry of the period stipulated under the Notice dt. 02.07.2014 (i.e. on 31.08.2014).


11) Therefore, the period of Limitation would expire on 31.08.2017. Admittedly, the present Petition is filed on 15.10.2025, therefore, the Petition would be barred by Limitation. However, it is the case of the Petitioner that there were acknowledgements of debt from time to time from the Corporate Debtor. The Corporate Debtor in its Financial Statements for the Year 2016-17 has acknowledged the Debt; therefore, the period of Limitation would stand extended till 31.03.2020. Now, since this period has fallen under the Covid-19 Pandemic period which taken from 15.03.2020 and ended on 28.02.2022, the Limitation after 15.03.2020 stands suspended and it would starts running after 28.02.2022 as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of IL&FS Financial Services Ltd…vs…Adhunik Meghalaya Steels Pvt. Ltd., (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1567, further, period of 90 days would be available. Even excluding that period of 90 days, the Petition ought to have been filed on or before 29.05.2022 and the Petition is filed on 15.10.2025. Therefore, even on basis of acknowledgements of debt by the Corporate Debtor in its Financial Statement for the year 2016-17, the Petition would still fail on count of Limitation.


12) The submission of the Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner that there would have been further acknowledgment, had the Corporate Debtor filed its Financial Statements for the subsequent periods after 2017 does not holds any merit as they are admittedly not filed, which does not amount to acknowledgment of any debt thereafter.


13) As regards reliance on audited Financial Statements of Maharashtra Steels Investment Private Limited, the Corporate Guarantor to the facilities guaranteed by the Respondent, is concerned, it is noted that the said Financial Statements has neither acknowledged any liability towards the Petitioner Creditor in any of the year(s) in the said Financial Statements, nor any liability towards Petitioner Creditor is disclosed even as Contingent Liability therein. Accordingly, it can not be said that the debt, in question, has been acknowledged by such corporate guarantor binding the respondent herein in terms of clause 14 of the Guarantee Agreement, which provides that “14. If the Guarantors be more than one Individual or entity, each one or any of them is hereby authorised by the others of them to admit and acknowledge their liability to the Bank by any payment Into the account or by way of writing or in any manner otherwise and any such acknowledgement of liability or part payment by any or more of them shall in addition to this / their personal capacity be deemed to have been made on behalf of each of them for the purposes of Sections 18 and 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963.” Accordingly, we do not find merit in the reliance of these financial statements of corporate guarantor namely Maharashtra Steels Investment Private Limited. Nonetheless, the submission of the Ld. Counsel for the Respondent that the Financial Statements are prepared by some Third-Party and Independent Auditor and therefore it has no evidentiary value so far as the Corporate Debtor is concerned also does not have any substantial force and merits in view of clause 14 of Guarantee Agreement binding each of guarantor by the acknowledgement of other guarantor.


14) Only question that remains now is whether Section 25(3) of the Contract Act comes to the rescue of the Petitioner. It is the case of the Petitioner that the Personal Guarantor vide its Letter dt. 27.05.2024, which was received by the Petitioner on 16.01.2025, submitted an One Time Settlement proposal (OTS) offering to pay amounts due from the Principal borrower and such letter(s) are signed by the Respondent as “ex-director and guarantor” of Principal Borrower. Accordingly, it is submitted by the Petitioner that though there is break in chain of continuous acknowledgement of Debt by the Personal Guarantor/Corporate Debtor, the acknowledgement of liability even after expiry of Original Period of Limitation constitutes fresh promise and give rise to renewed cause of action. As against this contention, it is submitted by the Respondent that the OTS proposal was just a proposal and it was not accepted and therefore, it cannot be considered to be a valid contract between the Parties and it cannot give any extension of Limitation.


15) It is further submitted that it is settled principal under Section 18 of the Limitation Act that an acknowledgement extends limitation only if it is made before expiry of the prescribed period of Limitation. Once Limitation has expired, a subsequent acknowledgement cannot revive a barred claim. Reliance is placed on the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Laxmi Pat Surana…vs…Union Bank of India (2021) 8 SCC 481 and also in the case of Small Industries Development Bank of India…vs…Sh. Krishnakant Bagree, (2025) ibclaw.in 2314 NCLT. It is therefore, submitted that the Petition is thus, barred by Limitation and the acknowledgment after the expiry of period of limitation would not revive the cause of action.


16) The Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited vs Kew Precision Parts Private Limited and Others (2022) 9 Supreme Court Cases 364, in Civil Appeal No. 2176 of 2020, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:

  • “31. Under Section 25(3), a debtor can enter into an agreement in writing, to pay the whole or part of a debt, which the creditor might have enforced, but for the limitation of a suit in law. A written promise to pay the barred debt is a valid contract. Such a promise constitutes novation and can form the basis of a suit independent of the original debt, for it is well settled that the debt is not extinguished, the remedy gets barred by passage of time as held by this Court in Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Company Limited vs. State of Bombay1.

  • 32. Section 25(3) applies only where the debt is one which would be enforceable against the defendants, but for the law of limitation. Where a debt is not binding on the defendant for other reasons, and consequentially not enforceable against him, there is no question of applicability of Section 25(3).

  • 33. There is a distinction between acknowledgment under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and a promise within the meaning of Section 25 of the Contract Act. Both promise and acknowledgment in writing, signed by a party or its agent authorised in that behalf, have the effect of creating a fresh starting of limitation. The difference is that an acknowledgment under Section 18 of the Limitation Act has to be made within the period of limitation and need not be accompanied by any promise to pay. If an acknowledgment shows existence of jural relationship, it may extend limitation even though there may be a denial to pay. On the other hand, Section 25(3) is only attracted when there is an express promise to pay a debt that is time barred or any part thereof. Promise to pay can be inferred on scrutinising the document. Only the promise should be clear and unconditional”.


17) The above Authority clearly lays down the difference between the provisions of Section 18 of the Limitation Act and Section 25(3) of the Contract Act. It is a trite Law that any acknowledgement of debt within the period of Limitation would attract Section 18 of the Limitation Act and the Limitation would stand extended for the further period as contemplated under the Law. However, Section 25 deals with the acknowledgement of time barred debt.


18) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above said Authorities has held that there is distinction between acknowledgement of Section 18 of the Limitation Act and a promise within the meaning of Section 25 of the Contract Act. Both Promise and acknowledgement in writing signed by a party or its agent authorised in their behalf, have the effect of creating fresh starting of Limitation. The difference is that the acknowledgment under Section 18 of the Limitation Act has to be made within the period of limitation and need not be accompanied by a promise to pay, and if an acknowledgement shows existence of jural relationship, it may extend limitation even though there may be a denial to pay. On the other hand, Section 25(3) is only attracted when there is an express promise to pay a debt that is time barred or any part thereof. Promise to pay can be inferred on scrutinising the document. Only the promise should be clear and unconditional. In the present case, the acknowledgement at exhibit “H” would show that there is a proposal sent by the Personal Guarantor for One-Time-Settlement of the debt, wherein willingness to Pay an amount towards the full and final settlement of the outstanding debt was made. Therefore, there is a promise to pay which is unequivocally made in writing with the signature of the Personal Guarantor; and this Letter is not disputed. However, such promise has to be clear and unconditional.


19) Therefore, what is required under Section 25(3) is only a promise to pay time barred debt in clear terms. Acceptance of the promise is not contemplated and therefore, acknowledgement of time barred debt would attract Section 25(3) of the Contract Act and it would give a fresh cause of action for initiating the recovery.


20) It is noted that the said letter(s) contemplates that, On payment of upfront amount, we shall be granted approval for sale of Wada land – 6, acres, and any offer received from party will be accepted to conclude the sale”; “payment arranged from our sources and sale proceeds of the secured assets appropriated to you should be considered towards the payment of the settlement amount”; and “on the acceptance of the above proposal, all the recovery proceedings/actions taken by you shall be kept in abeyance”. It is evident from these stipulations that the promise to pay was conditional and not having been accepted by the Petitioner with these conditions cannot constitute a clear and unconditional promise to pay. Hence, the said letters do not give rise fresh cause of action in terms of Section 25(3) of the Contract Act. Needless to say, as against the provisions of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, the acknowledgement of time barred debt would gives fresh cause of action for which the Petitioner would have a fresh remedy available.


21) Therefore, since, the invocation of Guarantee and the demand thereunder was made sometimes in the Year, 2014 and admittedly, the Petition was not filed within the period of 3 years. The Original Cause of Action would stand extinguished after the period of Limitation. Hence, the present Petition filed on the Original cause of action on the contention that the acknowledgement of time barred debt subsequently by the Personal Guarantor would continue the same cause of action does not hold merits, therefore, the Petition would not survive.


22) In view of the above, we are of the Considered view that the present Petition as filed is barred by Limitation.


23) Accordingly, the Company Petition bearing CP (IB) No. 1117 of 2025, is disposed of as dismissed.

---------------------------------------------------------


Wednesday, 31 July 2024

Ms. Mausumi Bhattacharjee vs. Jumbo Chemicals and Allied Industries Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. - The question whether a subsequent agreement is an additional to the main agreement or not; as well as the fact whether new contract supercede old contract would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.

 NCLAT (2024.07.02) in Ms. Mausumi Bhattacharjee vs. Jumbo Chemicals and Allied Industries Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. [(2024) ibclaw.in 422 NCLAT, Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 886 of 2024 & I.A. No. 3196 of 2024] held that; 

  • That the requisites of a novation may include elements like an agreement of all the parties to a new contract, the extinguishment of the old obligations, and the validity in supersession of old contract by the new contract,

  • That if the contract is altered in material particulars to change its essential character, the modified contract must be read as doing away with the original contract but if the modified contract has no independent contractual force, no new contract comes into play.

  • The question whether a subsequent agreement is an additional to the main agreement or not; as well as the fact whether new contract supercede old contract would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.


Excerpts of the order;

# 1. The present Appeal has been filed by Ms. Mausumi Bhattacharjee the Promoter of Arjun Industries Limited (in short Appellant) Ms. Mausumi Bhattacharjee who is the Shareholder and Suspended Board of Director of Arjun Industries Limited (in short Corporate Debtor) under Section 61(1) of the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (in short ‘Code’) in Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 886 of 2024 against the Impugned Order dated 22.02.2024 passed by the National Company Law Tribunal, New Delhi Bench (Court – II) (in short ‘Adjudicating Authority’) in IB-79/ND/2022, whereby an application was filed under Section 7 of the Code by the Respondent No. 1 was considered and Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (in short CIRP) of the Corporate Debtor was initiated. Jumbo Chemicals and Allied Industries Private Limited is the Respondent No. 1 here who is Financial Creditor of the Corporate Debtor.


# 2. Heard the Counsel for the Parties and perused the records made available including the cited judgements.


# 3. It has been brought out that the Corporate Debtor availed a loan from Industrial Development Bank of India (in short IDBI) of Rs. 3.67 Crores and further entered into agreement for foreign currency loan for Rs. 1.83 Crores. It has been alleged by the Appellant that the entire problem of the Corporate Debtor began since the IDBI release only Rs. 3.29 Crores against sanction loan of Rs. 3.67 Crores and similarly release only Rs. 1.25 Crores (Foreign Currency Loan) against Rs. 1.83 Crores.


# 4. The Appellant could not service the debt and repay the loan and IDBI issued legal notice on 10.06.1998. The IDBI also filed OA No. 445/1998 before Debt Recovery Tribunal (in short DRT) for recovery of outstanding amount of Rs. 6,19,87,815/- and the Corporate Debtor, during pendency of such proceedings before DRT, approached IDBI for One Time Settlement (in short OTS) and agreed to settle the outstanding at Rs. 2.50 Crores.


# 5. It has been submitted that the Appellant could not pay even the OTS amount and thus OTS failed. The IDBI assigned its outstanding debts to Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. on 31.06.2006 and Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. further assigned the debt to the Respondent No. 1 on 16.04.2008 by registered deed ofassignment. Thus, the Respondent No. 1 became the Financial Creditor of the Corporate Debtor.


# 6. It was brought out that the Corporate Debtor filed a Writ Petition before the Hon’ble Delhi High Court for restraining the assignment of loan which was dismissed.


# 7. We note that the Respondent No. 1 filed a petition before the Hon’ble Delhi High Court for winding up of the Corporate Debtor under Section 433 (e) and 433 (f) and Section 434 r/w Section 439 of Companies Act, 1956 before Single Judge Bench. From the judgement delivered by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court dated 22.05.2014, it is observed that at one time the Delhi High Court asked the Appellant to deposit Rs. 2.5 Crores with the Registry, however, while dismissing the petition for winding up of the Corporate Debtor, the said amount of Rs. 2.5 Crores was ordered to be refunded. The Respondent No. 1 challenged Single Bench Judgement before the Division Bench of Delhi High Court for winding up of the Corporate Debtor which was also dismissed on 02.03.2016.

At this stage, it would be worth noting that these proceedings happened prior to Code came into force.


# 8. It has been brought out that a meeting was held between the Appellant and the Respondent No. 1 on 12.10.2018 for agreement on disinvestment of mortgaged properties of the Corporate Debtor and based on this meeting, the Appellant and the Respondent No. 1 entered into a settlement agreement on 27.08.2019, whereby it was agreed between the parties to sale the mortgaged properties and divide the proceed of the sale between them.


# 9. At this stage, we would like to take into account the settlement deed dated 27.08.2019 which reads as under :- . .  . 


# 10. From above settlement agreement, it is seen that parties accepted that the Appellant defaulted repayment of both rupee as well as foreign currency loan. The settlement agreement also note that the original loan of IDBI was assigned through Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. vide assignment deed dated 31.03.2006 who in turn further assigned the loan to the Respondent No. 1 vide assignment deed dated 16.04.2008.


# 11. The Settlement Agreement dated 27.08.2019 also stated that the parties have seen several rounds of litigations at different fora and substantial period has elapsed and therefore in order to settle the issues and disputes, it was agreed to sell the property bearing No. SP3-11(B) 1 & 2, Khuskhera Industrial Area, Khuskhera, District Alwar, Rajasthan by executing proposed tripartite agreement with proposed buyers at mutually decided price and subsequently distribute the sale proceeds into equal proportion between the Appellant of the Respondent No. 1.


# 12. It has been alleged that the Appellant sent an e-mail on 26.07.2021 cancelling the settlement agreement which was replied by the Respondent No. 1 on 04.08.2021 alleging that the Appellant is trying to escape his liabilities to repay the loan to the Respondent No. 1 by way of unilateral suo-moto cancellation of the settlement agreement dated 27.08.2019 which was not permissible.


# 13. The Respondent No. 1 filed an application under Section 7 of the Code before the Adjudicating Authority, which was allowed and the Corporate Debtor came into CIRP w.e.f. 22.02.2024.


# 14. The Appellant submitted that Section 62 of the Contract Act, 1872 provides that if parties to a contract agree to substitute a new contract for it, the original contract need not be performed. The Appellant stated that there was novation of contract and the old contract, therefore, ceased to exist between the Corporate Debtor and the Respondent No. 1. The Appellant also argued that in the present case, the Settlement Agreement dated 27.08.2019 did not mention any ‘financial debt’, which the Corporate Debtor allegedly ‘defaulted’ and remained payable and therefore at best the settlement agreement dated 27.08.2019 was a simpliciter agreement to sell the mortgaged properties. It is the case of the Appellant that reciprocal promises, alleged breach thereof, on account of its cancellation cannot constitute default under section 3(12) of the Code and therefore no application under Section 7 of the Code could have been filed for enforcement/ specific performance of such agreement to sell.


# 15. It is the case of the Appellant that in absence of any agreement or contract, there is no question of any debt or default on the part of the Corporate Debtor. It is further the case of the Appellant that the Impugned Order is perverse and need to be set aside.


# 16. The Appellant alleged that the Respondent No. 1 fraudulently concealed from Corporate Debtor that Respondent No. 1 was not an existing company as it’s name had been struck off from the Register of Companies under Section 248 (5), Companies Act, 2013 by Notification dated 08.08.2018. The Appellant further alleged that the Respondent No. 1 preferred Section 7 of the Code application without being in existence and therefore the whole exercise is abuse of process of law.


# 17. The Appellant submitted that the Adjudicating Authority erred in passing the Impugned Order since the Respondent No. 1 did not have any legal existence.


# 18. The Appellant elaborated that the Respondent No. 1 i.e., Jumbo Chemicals and Allied Industries Private Limited’s name got struck off on 08.08.2018 by the Ministry of Corporate Affair. The Appellant submitted that subsequently an alleged agreement was executed between the Corporate Debtor and the Respondent No. 1 on 27.08.2019 which was void. The Appellant stated that the Corporate Debtor vide email dated 26.07.2021 cancelled the said agreement on account of the non existence of legal entity of the Respondent No. 1, being struck off its name and not remaining as a legal entity in the eyes of law at the time of execution of agreement


# 19. The Respondent No. 1 submitted that on 18.09.2023, this Appellate Tribunal in the earlier round of litigation between the parties had held that the acknowledgment of debt in the balance sheets from 1998-99 is continuous and dismissed the argument of the Corporate Debtor based on the judgment rendered by the single judge of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court dated 22.05.2015 wherein it was held that the Financial Creditor has confined its claim only to a sum of Rs. 250 Lacs and interest thereon. The relevant part of this Appellate Tribunal’s earlier order dated 18.09.2023 reads as follows:

“21. When the Company Petition was dismissed with the observation as observed, we fail to see that how the Respondent can contend that claim of the Appellant is limited to only Rs. 250 Lakhs.”


# 20. It is the case of the Respondent No. 1 that this Appellate Tribunal while allowing the Appeal filed by the Respondent No. 1 had held that the Adjudicating Authority committed error in rejecting Section 7 Application filed by the Respondent No. 1 as barred by time.


# 21. The Respondent No. 1 alleged that the Appellant failed to bring out all relevant facts including the balance sheets relevant for the disposal of the Appeal and is trying to mislead this Appellate Tribunal in the present appeal.


# 22. The Respondent No. 1 refuted the plea of the Appellant about novation of contract and also refuted the plea of the Appellant that the Settlement Agreement dated 27.08.2019 modified the earlier contracts between the parties and was in supersession to all earlier contracts. The Respondent No. 1 submitted that the Settlement Agreement dated 27.08.2019 is not any modification or a novation of earlier Agreements i.e. Rupee Term Loan and Foreign Currency Loan. The Respondent No. 1 clarified that the Settlement Agreement was arrived at between the parties after long pending multiple cases filed by the Financial Creditor for realization of the loan amount and it was agreed that the mortgaged properties of the Corporate Debtor would be sold to settle the loan amount in full. The Respondent No. 1 also stated that the Settlement Agreement nowhere stated that the Settlement Agreement shall supersede or modify the loan agreements.


# 23. The Respondent No. 1 pleaded that the original loan/ assignment deed remain valid and continues and the Settlement Agreement dated 27.08.2019 is merely a mechanism to find a way to settle outstanding dues of the Respondent No. 1 and therefore it is not novation of existing legal contracts.


# 24. The Respondent No. 1 argued that the Section 62 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 relied by the Appellant is not relevant here as the pre-requisite is substitution of the earlier contract which is not reflected in the contents of the Settlement Agreement. The Respondent No. 1 further stated that no intention on the part of the Appellant and the Respondent No. 1 for any novation resulting into modification/substitution of earlier loan agreement or assignment deed can be seen in the settlement agreement dated 27.08.2019.


# 25. We note that the requisites of a novation may include elements like an agreement of all the parties to a new contract, the extinguishment of the old obligations, and the validity in supersession of old contract by the new contract, however, in the present case no such specific clauses exist. We also note that the Settlement Agreement dated 27.08.2019 was only with regard to disposal of the mortgaged properties of the Corporate Debtor.


# 26. We will examine the pleading of the Appellant that since name of the Respondent No. 1 was struck off on the relevant date of signing of settlement agreement dated 27.08.2019, therefore there was no valid settlement agreement. We note that the name of Respondent no. 1 was struck off since the Respondent No. 1 could not furnish the financial statements to relevant authority on time, however, the same was restored by the National Company Law Tribunal, Bench-IV, New Delhi (in short ‘Tribunal’) vide its order dated 24.03.2021 passed in Appeal No. 533/252/ND/2019. The relevant portion of the order is reproduced as under :-

  • “10. ***The name of the petitioner company shall then stand restored in the Register of the Registrar of Companies (RoC) as if its name of the company had not been struck off.” (Emphasis Supplied)


# 27. It is significant to note that the Tribunal specifically mentioned the name of the Respondent No. 1 is restored as if its name had not been struck off. We note that the legal implication of this would be that all action taken by the Respondent No. 1 would remain valid including signing of the settlement agreement dated 27.08.2019 and therefore the pleadings of the Appellant on this ground stand rejected.


# 28. We understand that if the contract is altered in material particulars to change its essential character, the modified contract must be read as doing away with the original contract but if the modified contract has no independent contractual force, no new contract comes into play. We do not find any such wording in settlement agreement dated 27.08.2019


# 29. The question whether a subsequent agreement is an additional to the main agreement or not; as well as the fact whether new contract supercede old contract would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. In the present case based on fact and circumstances brought out on record before us, we do not find that old loan agreements or assignment deeds ceased to exist by signing settlement agreement dated 27.08.2019 and therefore we are unable to accept the pleadings of the Appellant that Section 62 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 will come into play in the present appeal.


# 30. We find that in case of Manohur Koyal vs. Thakur Das Naskar [(1888) 15 Cal 319], the plaintiff sued the defendant to recover Rs. 1100 due on a bond and after the due date of the bond, the plaintiff agreed to accept from the defendant, in satisfaction of the bond, Rs. 400/- in cash and a fresh bond for Rs. 700/-. The defendant failed to pay the Rs. 400 and to give the fresh bond of Rs. 700/-. In a suit by the plaintiff to recover the amount of original bond, the defendant contended that the subsequent agreement was a novation. It was held that Section 62 did not apply, as the subsequent agreement was made after the breach of the original contract, and that the defendant having failed to perform satisfactorily which he had promised to give, remained liable on the original, contract. This case is similar to facts of the present appeal and is found to be applicable.


# 31. We find that the existing rupee term loan as well as foreign currency loan assigned by registered assignment deeds remain valid which are relevant documents to establish debt and default. We also note that the amount of default was more than Rs. 1 Crore, thus it fulfils, all the criteria laid down by the Code as well as covered under several judgments of this Appellate Tribunal as well as the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. The argument of the Appellant that there is no debt and default, is found not sustainable. We also note that this Appellate Tribunal in its earlier order dated 24.03.2021 has already noted the fact that there has been continuous acknowledgements of the debt by the Corporate Debtor in its various balance sheets.


# 32. As regard, the subject regarding the settlement agreement stand valid or not in view of the issue raised by the Appellant regarding struck off name of the Respondent No. 1 on the relevant date, we reiterate that since the Tribunal gave clear specific verdict that the restoration would have effect as if the name was never struck off would enable the Respondent No. 1 to enforce the agreements.


# 33. The pleadings of the Appellant that the original term loan/ foreign currency loan agreement which was later assigned by the registered deed in favour of the Respondent No. 1 ceased to exist after signing the settlement agreement dated 27.08.2019 and which the Appellant choose to unilaterally terminate on 26.07.2021, by sending an e-mail to Respondent No. 1 on the plea that the name of the Respondent No 1 was struck off by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs and therefore there is no debt and default and the application filed under Section 7 of the Code could not have been allowed. We wonder, if such types of pleadings of the Appellant are to be accepted then whether any agreement would ever be honoured. Such submissions are legally not tenable and stand rejected.


# 34. Incidentally we note that the loan was sanctioned by the IDBI somewhere in 1996 and even OTS was approved by the IDBI way back in the year 2006. We also note that IDBI assigned its outstanding debts to Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited on 31.06.2006 and Kotak Mahindra further assigned the debts to Respondent No. 1 on 16.04.2008 by registered assignment deeds.


Thus, we find that the loans were sanctioned somewhere in 1996 i.e., almost 28 years back and the last assignment deed was signed in favour of the Respondent No. 1 on 16.04.2008 i.e., 16 years back and even after decades, the litigation has been continuing and no recovery could be affected by the original financial creditors or the present Respondent No. 1 in whose favour the assignment deed was signed almost 16 years back. This state of affair is found to be unusual and alarming.


# 35. In view of above detailed discussions, we find no merit in the appeal. The appeal deserved to be dismissed and stand dismissed. No Costs. Interlocutory Application(s), if any, are Closed.

---------------------------------------------


Disclaimer:

The sole purpose of this post is to create awareness on the "IBC - Case Law" and to provide synopsis of the concerned case law, must not be used as a guide for taking or recommending any action or decision. A reader must refer to the full citation of the order & do one's own research and seek professional advice if he intends to take any action or decision in the matters covered in this post.