Showing posts with label continuing-guarantee-invocation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label continuing-guarantee-invocation. Show all posts

Wednesday, 27 May 2026

Jagi Mangat Panda Vs SREI Equipment Finance Limited & Anr. - In view of the foregoing discussions, we are of the view that the Financial Creditors having not invoked the guarantee prior to issuing demand notice in Form B, the application under Section 95 could not have been filed by Financial Creditor before invoking the guarantee.

  NCLAT (2026.03.20)  in Jagi Mangat Panda Vs SREI Equipment Finance Limited & Anr. [Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1530 of 2024] held that;-

  • The Notice, thus, contemplate demanding payment of the amount of default. The above Rule clearly indicate that Demand Notice has to be issued, demanding payment of the amount in default. Thus, the default by Guarantor has to exist on the date when Notice in Form-B is being issued.

  • Thus, for a default, debt has to be due and Debtor shall be only that person, to whom debt is due. A Personal Guarantor becomes a Debtor only when guarantee is invoked, making him liable to make the payment to the Lender

  • In view of the foregoing discussions, we are of the view that the Financial Creditors having not invoked the guarantee prior to issuing demand notice in Form B, the application under Section 95 could not have been filed by Financial Creditor before invoking the guarantee.

  • Rule 3 (e) of the Personal Guarantor Rules defines “guarantor” as “a debtor who is a personal guarantor to a corporate debtor and in respect of whom guarantee has been invoked by the creditor and remains unpaid in full or part”.

  • The judgment of this Tribunal in State Bank of India vs. Deepak Kumar Singhania is a judgment declaring law and it shall be treated that law as declared by this Tribunal in the above judgment was law on the all times on Rule 7(1) of 2019 Rules. We, thus, do not find any substance in this submission of the Respondent.

Excerpts of the Order;

This appeal by a Personal Guarantor has been filed challenging the order dated 22.07.2024 passed by the Adjudicating Authority (National Company Law Tribunal) New Delhi, Court – III admitting Section 95 application filed by the Financial Creditor – SREI Equipment Finance Ltd. Brief facts of the case necessary to be noticed for deciding this appeal are:

(i) Various loan agreements were executed between M/ s. Ortel Communications Ltd. and M/s SREI Equipment Finance Ltd. – Respondent No.1 herein on 01.07.2018. Deed of Guarantee was executed by the Appellant on 01.07.2018 giving guarantee for repayment of money received by the Corporate Debtor from the Financial Creditor. Default was committed by the Corporate Debtor and CIRP against the Corporate Debtor commenced on 27.11.2018.

(ii) On 15.02.2022, the Financial Creditor issued a demand notice in Form B under Rule 7(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Insolvency Resolution Process for Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors) Rules, 2019 demanding an amount of Rs.113,38,41,436/-.

(iii) The Personal Guarantor issued a response by letter dated 05.04.2022 to the notice.

(iv) The Financial Creditor filed an application under Section 95 in May, 2022 in which the Resolution Professional was appointed by the Adjudicating Authority. The Resolution Professional submitted a report under Section 99 recommending for admission of Section 95 application. The Personal Guarantor filed an objection pleading that guarantee has not been invoked in terms of Clause 3(a) of the guarantee. There being non-compliance of Rule 3(e) of 2019 Rules, the issuance of notice dated 15.02.2022 in Form B does not substantively amount to invocation.

(v) Before the Adjudicating Authority an application was filed by the Financial Creditor being I.A. No.816 of 2024 seeking to bring the alleged loan recall notice dated 11.06.2019 on record. The application came to be heard by the Adjudicating Authority on 03.05.2024, on which date both learned counsel for the Resolution Professional and Financial Creditor submitted that they will not rely on the notice dated 11.06.2019. After noticing the said statement, the Adjudicating Authority directed the parties to file written submissions and by order dated 22.07.2024 has admitted Section 95 application. Aggrieved by which order this appeal has been filed.

(vi) In this appeal, the Respondent No.1 has filed an I.A. No.910 of 2026 praying to take on record notice dated 11.06.2019 invoking the personal guarantee and the affidavit dated 09.04.2024 filed by the Resolution Professional, which application has been objected by the Appellant by filing a reply.


# 2. We have heard Mr. Anuj Shah, learned counsel for the Appellant, Mr. Sanjiv Sen, learned senior counsel appearing for Respondent No.1 and Mr. Sajjan Kumar Dokania, Resolution Professional – Respondent No.2.


# 3. Learned counsel for the Appellant challenging the order submits that the Financial Creditor having never invoked the personal guarantee given by the Appellant, the application filed under Section 95 was not maintainable. It is submitted that notice under Rule 7(1) in Form B can only be issued when guarantee has been invoked. The notice received by the Appellant under Rule 7(1) dated 15.02.2022 cannot be accepted as notice for invocation of guarantee. Law is well settled by this Tribunal in “State Bank of India vs. Deepak Kumar Singhania [(2025) ibclaw.in 153 NCLAT], Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No.191 of 2025” where it was held that notice under Rule 7(1) is not notice for invocation of bank guarantee and without invocation of bank guarantee Section 95 application is not maintainable. Learned counsel for the Appellant submits that the notice dated 11.06.2019, which is sought to be introduced by IA No.910 of 2026 cannot be accepted. It is submitted that attempt was made by the Respondent No.1 before the Adjudicating Authority for placing the notice dated 11.06.2019, which notice was not permitted to be taken on record and both the Financial Creditor and the Resolution Professional has made statement that they will not rely on the said document i.e. notice dated 11.06.2019. When the Respondents clearly stated that they are not relying on the notice dated 11.06.2019, they cannot be permitted to rely on said notice in this appeal.


# 4. Shri Sanjiv Sen, learned counsel for the Respondent submits that by notice dated 11.06.2019, the personal guarantee was invoked which is filed along with I.A. No.910 of 2026. It is submitted that by said notice the Bank had already invoked the personal guarantee, hence, bank was fully entitled to issue notice under Rule 7(1) of 2019 Rules and the application has rightly been admitted by the Adjudicating Authority under Section 95. It is submitted that law which is laid down by this Tribunal in State Bank of India vs. Deepak Kumar Singhania dated 28.05.2025 was not law on the date when order was passed by the Adjudicating Authority on 22.07.2024, hence, application was filed by the Financial Creditor relying on the existing law which did not require separate invocation of guarantee apart from issuance of notice under Rule 7.


# 5. We have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.


# 6. We need to first notice the copy of the application filed by the Financial Creditor under Section 95(1) under Rule 7(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Insolvency Resolution Process for Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors) Rules, 2019. Copy of the said application is brought on the record as Annexure 2 to the appeal. Application is based on Deed of Guarantee dated 01.07.2018 and in the application the Financial Creditor has relied on demand notice dated 15.02.2022, which was annexed as Annexure 5 to the application. In Paras 10 and 11 of the synopsis of the application following was pleaded:

  • “10. That having failed to yet recover its dues under the loan facilities availed by the Corporate Debtor, the Applicant/Financial Creditor issued a Demand Notice dated 15.02.2022 to the Respondent/Personal Guarantor in Form-B as provided under Rule 7 ( 1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Insolvency Resolution Process for Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors) Rules, 2019 for the outstanding dues of Rs, 1,13,38,41,436/- (Rupees One Hundred Thirteen Crores Thirty Eight Lakhs Forty One Thousand Four Hundred and Thirty Six Only) due to be payable to the Applicant/Financial Creditor by the Corporate Debtor, A copy of the Demand Notice dated 15,02.2022 issued in Form-B as provided under Rule 7 (1) of the by the Applicant/Financial Creditor Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Insolvency Resolution Process for Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors) Rules, 2019 is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure – 4.

  • 11. That vide letter dated 05.04.2022, the Respondent/Personal Guarantor issued her response to the Form- B Demand Notice dated 15.02.2022 stating therein that in the Resolution Plan for Ortel Communications Ltd., it had been stated that the rights of the Financial Creditor to proceed against any third party shall be deemed to be assigned. The Respondent/Personal Guarantor further stated that the claim of the Applicant/Financial Creditor had not been accepted in totality in the Resolution Plan and that the Demand Notice was premature, unsustainable and illegal and thus, requested the Applicant/Personal Guarantor to withdraw the Demand Notice dated 15.02.2022.

  • A copy of the reply of the Respondent/Personal Guarantor dated 05.04.2022 in response to the Form – B Demand Notice dated 15.02.2022 is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure – 5.”


# 7. When we look into the Part-III of the application, according to the Financial Creditor the date on which default occurred was 27.11.2018 and on 15.02.2022 when notice under Rule 7 was issued. 27.11.2018 is the date when default was committed by the Principal Borrower. In the list of documents referred to in the Part-III apart from loan agreement, personal guarantees only notice annexed was notice under Rule 7 in Form B dated 15.02.2022. Column 15 of Part-III of the Section 95 application is as follows:


15.

List of documents attached to this application in order to prove the existence of debt and the amount in default

1. Loan Agreements bearing nos. 1725751 172573, 172530, 171853, 172577, 172576 and 172529 dated 01.07.2018 are annexed herewith and marked as Annexure – 8 (Colly).


2. Personal Guarantees bearing nos. 172575! 172573, 172530, 171853, 172577, 172576 and 172529 dated 01.07.2018 are annexed herewith and marked as Annexure – 9 (Colly).3. Notice under Form – B dated 15.02.2022 is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure – 4.


4. A copy of the reply of the Respondent/ Personal Guarantor dated 05.04.2022 in response to the Form – B Demand Notice dated 25.02.2022 is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-5.


5. Statement of Account is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure – 7.


6. Master Data of the Corporate Debtor is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure – 10


# 8. The Adjudicating Authority while admitting the Section 95 application has held that the notice under Rule 7 issued in Form B is notice invoking guarantee and it would be unreasonable to interpret the Personal Guarantor Rules as requiring a separate invocation notice in addition to the mandatory demand notice issued per Form-B. In Para 17 of the order following was held:

  • “17. A reading of the clause of the Deed of Guarantee and the above definition makes it clear that, notwithstanding the fact that the deed of guarantee contains an invocation clause or not, the Rules have made the invocation of personal guarantee mandatory in all cases. We are of considered view that it would be unreasonable to interpret the Personal Guarantor Rules as requiring a separate invocation notice in addition to the mandatory demand notice issued per Form-B. Both notices serve the same purpose: enforcing the Personal Guarantor’s obligations under the Personal Guarantee by demanding payment of the Corporate Debtor’s unpaid debt. Therefore, issuing a Demand Notice dated 15.02.2022 as per Form-B effectively constitutes the ‘invocation’ of a personal guarantee.”


# 9. The Adjudicating Authority then proceeded on premise that notice under Rule 7 in Form B is itself invocation of guarantee. The law on the subject is laid down by this Tribunal in “State Bank of India vs. Deepak Kumar Singhania [(2025) ibclaw.in 153 NCLAT], Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No.191 of 2025” where this Tribunal after considering the Rule 7 of the 2019 Rules has laid down that before issuance of demand notice under Rule 7(1) in Form B there has to be invocation of guarantee. The argument raised in the above case was that notice under Rule 7(1) in Form B is itself invocation of guarantee, which was specifically dealt with and rejected. In Para 14 to 17 following was laid down:

  • “14. Sub-section (4) of Section 95 provides that an application under sub-section (1) shall be accompanied with details and documents as referred to therein. Sub-section (7) provides that details and documents required to be submitted under sub-section (4) shall be such as may be specified. Rule 2 of 2019 Rules provides that these rules shall apply to insolvency resolution process for personal guarantors to Corporate Debtors. The application under Section 95 has been filed against the Respondent – Personal Guarantor of the Corporate Debtor – LML Ltd. Hence, the application under Section 95 has to be as per 2019 Rules. Rule 3, sub-section (1) (e) defines ‘guarantor’, which is as follows:

  • “3(e) “guarantor” means a debtor who is a personal guarantor to a corporate debtor and in respect of whom guarantee has been invoked by the creditor and remains unpaid in full or part;”

  • 15. The ‘Guarantor’ within the meaning of 2019 Rules, means a Debtor who is a Personal Guarantor to a Corporate Debtor and in respect of whom guarantee has been invoked by the Creditor and remains unpaid in full or part. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has relied on definition of ‘Personal Guarantor’ as contained in Section 5, sub-section (22) of the IBC. Section 5, sub-section (22) of the IBC is in Part-II, whereas Section 95 of the IBC is in Part-III. Hence, the definition of ‘Personal Guarantor’ under Rule 5(22) may not be applicable with regard to initiation of insolvency resolution process against the Personal Guarantor and the definition given in Rule 3, sub-rule (1) (e) of 2019 Rules has to be looked into for the purpose of initiating insolvency resolution process against the Personal Guarantor. Rule 7, deals with ‘Application by creditor’. Rule 7 of 2019 Rules is as follows:

  • 7. Application by creditor.― (1) A demand notice under clause (b) of sub-section (4) of section 95 shall be served on the guarantor demanding payment of the amount of default, in Form B.

  • (2) The application under sub-section (1) of section 95 shall be submitted in Form C, along with a fee of two thousand rupees.

  • (3) The creditor shall serve forthwith a copy of the application referred to in sub-rule (2) to the guarantor and the corporate debtor for whom the guarantor is a personal guarantor.

  • (4) In case of a joint application, the creditors may nominate one amongst themselves to act on behalf of all the creditors.”

  • 16. Rule 7, sub-rule (1) provides that Demand Notice under Clause (b) of sub-section (4) of Section 95 shall be served on the Guarantor demanding payment of the amount of default, in Form B. Sub-section (4) of Section 95 refers to documents relating to debts owed by the Debtor to the Creditor. Rule 7, sub-rule (1) contemplate service of Demand Notice under Clause (b) of sub-section (4) on the Guarantor, demanding payment of the amount of default in Form B.

  • 17. The Notice, thus, contemplate demanding payment of the amount of default. The above Rule clearly indicate that Demand Notice has to be issued, demanding payment of the amount in default. Thus, the default by Guarantor has to exist on the date when Notice in Form-B is being issued. When we read Section 95, sub-section (4) and Rule 7 of 2019 Rules, the above is the only intendment of the legislative scheme, i.e. default on the part of Guarantor should exist on the date when Notice in Form-B has to be issued. We have noticed the definitions of ‘debt’ and ‘default’ in Section 3 (11) and (12) of the IBC. Default shall arise on account of non-payment of debt, when whole or part of it become due. ‘Debt’ means a liability or obligation in respect of a claim which is due from any person. Thus, for a default, debt has to be due and Debtor shall be only that person, to whom debt is due. A Personal Guarantor becomes a Debtor only when guarantee is invoked, making him liable to make the payment to the Lender. We have noticed Clause 2 and Clause 21 of the Deed of Guarantee in the foregoing paragraphs of this judgment, which clearly contemplate that liability on Guarantor shall arise only when demand is made by the Lender, in event Principal Borrower fails to repay the amount. In the present case, there is no case setup by the Appellant that at any point of time guarantee was invoked, except issuance of Notice in Form-B, which is claimed by the Appellant to be treated as Notice for invocation of guarantee. Further, we have noticed the definition of ‘Guarantor’ under Rule 3(1)(e), which while defining a ‘Guarantor’ contain two conditions, i.e. (i) who is a Personal Guarantor to a Corporate Debtor; and (ii) in respect of whom, guarantee has been invoked by the Creditor and remains unpaid in full or part. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has contended that expression ‘and’ used in Rule 3 (1)(e) needs to be read as ‘or’ to make the provision workable and to avoid producing an unintelligible and absurd result. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has relied on two judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in support of the above submission, i.e. AIR 1968 SC 1450 – Ishwar Singh Bindra and Ors. vs. State of U.P. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above case had occasion to consider the definition of ‘drug’ contained in Section 3(b)(i) of Drugs Act 1940. Expression ‘and’ used in Section 3(b)(1) of the Drugs Act was considered in the said case and in paragraph 11 of the judgment, following was laid down:

  • “11. Now if the expression “substances” is to be taken to mean something other than “medicine” as has been held in our previous decision it becomes difficult to understand how the word “and” as used in the definition of drug in Section 3(b)(i) between “medicines” and “substances” could have been intended to have been used conjunctively. It would be much more appropriate in the context to read it disconjunctively. In Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edn. it is stated at p. 135 that “and” has generally a cumulative sense, requiring the fulfilment of all the conditions that it joins together, and herein it is the antithesis of or. Sometimes, however, even in such a connection, it is, by force of a contexts, read as “or”. Similarly in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn., it has been accepted that “to carry out the intention of the legislature it is occasionally found necessary to read the conjunctions ‘or’ and ‘and’ one for the other”.”


# 10. This Tribunal in recent judgment of this Tribunal in “Mukul Somany vs. DBS Bank Ltd. & Anr. [(2026) ibclaw.in 91 NCLAT], Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No.999 of 2024 and other appeals”, decided on 04.02.2026 has again reiterated the proposition laid down by this Tribunal in State Bank of India vs. Deepak Kumar Singhania. In Para 17 and 18 of the judgment following was held:

  • “17. In view of the foregoing discussions, we are of the view that the Financial Creditors having not invoked the guarantee prior to issuing demand notice in Form B, the application under Section 95 could not have been filed by Financial Creditor before invoking the guarantee.

  • 18. In result, both the Appeals are allowed and order impugned dated 03.05.2024 admitting Section 95 application is set aside. Dismissal of Section 95 application shall not preclude the Financial Creditor to take such proceeding as permissible in law.”


# 11. In view of the law laid down by this Tribunal, as noted above, view taken by the Adjudicating Authority in Para 17 that notice under Rule 7 is the notice invoking the guarantee cannot be said to be in accordance with correct proposition of law.


# 12. A copy of the Deed of Guarantee is on record. In Para 16 of the order, Col. 3(a) of the Deed of Guarantee has been extracted, which is to the following effect:

  • “16. Clause 3 (a) of the Deed of Guarantee provides as under:

  • “In the event of any default on the part of the Customer in payment/ repayment of any of the moneys referred to in Clause 2 above, or in the event of any default on the part of the Customer to comply with or perform any of the terms, conditions and covenants contained in the Facility Documents, the Guarantor (s) shall, upon demand, forthwith pay to SEFL without demur all the amounts payable by the Customer under the Facility Documents. Any such demand made by SEFL on the Guarantor(s) shall be final, conclusive and binding notwithstanding any difference or any dispute between SEFL and the Customer/ arbitration or any other legal proceedings, pending before any court, tribunal, arbitrator or any other authority.

  • Rule 3 (e) of the Personal Guarantor Rules defines “guarantor” as “a debtor who is a personal guarantor to a corporate debtor and in respect of whom guarantee has been invoked by the creditor and remains unpaid in full or part”.


# 13. The Deed of Guarantee required issuance of notice of payment of default. Thus, the guarantee clearly contemplated demand from the Financial Creditor and invocation of guarantee was mandatory.


# 14. Now we look into the submission of the Respondent – Financial Creditor relying on notice dated 11.06.2019 which according to the Respondent can be treated to be notice demanding from personal guarantor. There are two reasons due to which the above submission cannot be accepted. Firstly, in the application which was filed under Section 95, the Financial Creditor has not come with any case that apart from notice under Form B dated 15.02.2022 there is any other notice invoking guarantee. As noticed above, in Part-III of the application only document referred to is notice in Form B dated 15.02.2022. Financial Creditor has not come up with any case that prior to notice under Form B dated 15.02.2022, any earlier notice was issued. Secondly, the Financial Creditor sought to bring on record notice dated 11.06.2018 by filing I.A. No.816 of 2024 before the Adjudicating Authority. The Resolution Professional has also filed an affidavit bringing on record recall notice dated 11.06.2019. When the IA No.816 of 2024 along with IB-337(ND)/2022 came for consideration, both learned counsel for the Financial Creditor and Resolution Professional submitted that they will not rely on notice dated 11.06.2019. The order passed by the Adjudicating Authority dated 03.05.2024 is as follows:

  • HYBRID HEARING (PHYSICAL & VC)
    ORDER

  • ΙΑ-816/2024:-

  • The Resolution Professional had filed an affidavit on 09.04.2024 seeking to bring on record a document alleged to be a loan recall notice issued on 11.06.2019 Mr. Gaurav Mitra, Learned Counsel appearing for the Personal Quarantor strongly objected to take the said document on record. Mr. Bhattacharya, Learned Counsel appearing for the Applicant/Financial Creditor has submitted that he will be advancing his arguments without relying upon the said document. Mr. Vinod Chaursia, Learned Counsel appearing for the Resolution Professional has also submitted that he will not be relying upon on the said affidavit filed on 09.04.2024 and the document in question.

  • We have heard the submissions made by Mr. Anirban Bhattacharya, Learned Counsel appearing for the Applicant.

  • Arguments heard. The parties are at liberty to file written submissions along with case laws, if any, within one week.

  • List the matter on 17.05.2024 for compliance.”


# 15. We, thus, are unable to accept the prayer of the Respondent No.1 by I.A. No.910 of 2026 taking notice dated 11.06.2019 on record. When the Respondent – Financial Creditor and Resolution Professional both made submission before the Adjudicating Authority that they will not rely on the notice dated 11.06.2019, they cannot be allowed to rely on said notice in this appeal.


# 16. One more submission made by the Respondent needs to be noticed. It is submitted by the Respondent that at the time when order was passed by the Adjudicating Authority, the judgment of this Tribunal in State Bank of India vs. Deepak Kumar Singhania was not delivered, which was only delivered on 28.02.2025, hence, there was no requirement of bringing notice dated 11.06.2019 on record.


# 17. When the application is filed under Section 95 by a Financial Creditor, all relevant materials including the demand notice and notice for invocation of the bank guarantee are required to be pleaded. When there is no pleading of the notice dated 11.06.2019 in Section 95 application, it is not open for the Respondent to contend that the judgment of this Tribunal in State Bank of India vs. Deepak Kumar Singhania was not delivered at that relevant time hence there was no requirement. The judgment of this Tribunal in State Bank of India vs. Deepak Kumar Singhania is a judgment declaring law and it shall be treated that law as declared by this Tribunal in the above judgment was law on the all times on Rule 7(1) of 2019 Rules. We, thus, do not find any substance in this submission of the Respondent.


# 18. Learned counsel for the Respondent has also relied on judgment of this Tribunal in “Paresh Rastogi vs. Omkara Assets Reconstruction Private Limited [(2025) ibclaw.in 194 NCLAT], (Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 2053 of 2024” decided on 18.03.2025. The question which has come up for consideration in the present case was not considered and answered in the above judgment, hence, this judgment cannot help the Respondent in the present case.


# 19. In result of the foregoing discussion and our conclusions, order passed by the Adjudicating Authority dated 22.07.2024 cannot be sustained. Appeal is allowed. Order dated 22.07.2024 is set aside. Company Petition IB-337(ND)/2022 is dismissed. We make it clear that dismissal of Company Petition IB-337(ND)/2022 shall not preclude the Financial Creditor to take such other measures as permissible in law.

” 

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Friday, 6 March 2026

Ujwal Gupta Vs. Union Bank of India & Anr. - We have already observed herein before that notice dated 29.02.2016, given by the financial creditor under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act has sufficiently indicated the Appellant to discharge his liability for the amount mentioned in the notice of which the credit facilities were extended to the CD.

  NCLAT (2026.01.07) in Ujwal Gupta Vs. Union Bank of India & Anr. (Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 2001 of 2024) held that;

  • The invocation of personal guarantee has to be in accordance with the terms of the Guarantee Agreement which is a settled law. Clause 7 of the Guarantee Agreement does not require any particular mode and manner of the demand notice. When demand notice is issued against the personal guarantor asking the personal guarantor to discharge its liabilities, the guarantee stands invoked. Whether notice under Section 13(2) in a particular case invoked the guarantee or not depends on the words and intent of the notice.

  • We have already observed herein before that notice dated 29.02.2016, given by the financial creditor under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act has sufficiently indicated the Appellant to discharge his liability for the amount mentioned in the notice of which the credit facilities were extended to the CD.

  • therefore, in our considered opinion, the personal guarantee has been rightly considered by the Tribunal to have been invoked by issuance of this notice given under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act and we do not find any illegality therein.

Blogger’s Comments;

Generic notice under section 13(2) of Sarfaesi is for enforcement of security interest. It cannot be a substitute of recall notice on borrower or notice of invocation of the guarantee deed unless the same is properly worded in accordance with the terms of guarantee deed.


I am of the opinion that invocation of guarantee cannot be equated with enforcement of security interest. Section 13(2) notice under Sarfaesi specifically states that "in case of non payment of dues the lender will enforce the security interest". Section 13(2) notice is not the precursor to filing of the recovery suit. Non compliance of section 13(2) notice has Statutorily defined specific consequences under section 13(4) of Sarfaesi only. The entire legal framework under Sarfaesi revolves around enforcement of security interests only. How it can be deemed as an invocation of guarantee unless properly drafted in accordance with terms of guarantee deed.


Excerpts of the Order;

Instant appeal has been preferred by the Appellant (Personal Guarantor) under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (in short ‘Code’) assailing the order dated 10.09.2024 (impugned order) passed by the NCLT, New Delhi, Bench –III (Adjudicating Authority) whereby I.A No. 2253 of 2024 filed by the RP/Respondent No. 2 was disposed of and CP (IB) No. 26 of 2024 filed by the Union Bank of India (Financial Creditor) under Section 95 of the Code was admitted and personal insolvency was initiated against the Appellant/Personal Guarantor.


# 2. It is to be recalled that the Financial Creditor, namely, Union Bank of India, during the pendency of this appeal, vide assignment agreement dated 07.10.2024 assigned its debt due from the Corporate Debtor along with the guarantors including the Appellant to the Respondent No. 1 i.e M/s CFM Asset Reconstruction Pvt. Ltd. and in this regard an application bearing I.A No. 259 of 2025 was filed by M/s CFM Asset Reconstruction Pvt. Ltd. seeking replacement of it with the financial creditor and vide order dated 15.01.2025 of this Appellate Tribunal the erstwhile financial creditor, namely, Union Bank of India was replaced with M/s CFM Asset Reconstruction Pvt. Ltd./R1.


# 3. The brief factual matrix giving rise to the instant appeal is in terms that the CD i.e M/s Green World International Pvt. Ltd. availed credit facilities from the erstwhile Financial Creditor – Union Bank of India vide sanction letter dated 19.02.2013 and subsequently the loan facility was restructured as per the restructuring sanction letter dated 13.03.2015.


# 4. It is further reflected that on 01.03.2013 a deed of guarantee was executed by the Appellant, namely, Mr. Ujwal Gupta jointly and severally, in favour of the Union Bank of India for the aforesaid credit facilities availed by the CD. The CD failed to fulfil the terms and conditions of the loan restructuring sanction letter dated 13.03.2015 and consequently on 30.01.2016 the loan account of the CD was classified as Non-Performing Asset (NPA).


# 5. It is also reflected from the record that on 29.02.2016 the loan was recalled by the financial creditor by issuing notice under Section 13(2) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) to the CD and all the guarantors to the CD and in addition to it a notice under Rule 7(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Insolvency Resolution Process of Personal Guarantors to the CD) Rules, 2019 (in short ‘Insolvency Resolution Process of Personal Guarantors to the CD Rules, 2019’) was given to the guarantor to the CD on 14.06.2021.


# 6. It is also reflected that the CD had also proposed onetime settlement offer (OTS) to the financial creditor many times for its approval. Ultimately, the financial creditor issued a demand notice in Form B dated 14.06.2021 to the Appellant – Personal Guarantor under the Insolvency Resolution Process of Personal Guarantors to the CD Rules, 2019 for discharge in full the outstanding liabilities towards the financial creditor.


# 7. On a petition moved by the financial creditor under Section 95 of the Code, the Adjudicating Authority appointed the RP/Respondent No. 2 under Section 97 of the Code to submit its report under Section 99 of the Code and in compliance of the same, the RP submitted its report with an application bearing I.A No. 2253 of 2024. The objection to this report was filed by the Appellant, however, by passing the impugned order dated 10.09.2024 the petition filed by the financial creditor was admitted and the insolvency process was initiated against the Appellant and being aggrieved by the same the instant appeal has been preferred by the Appellant/Personal Guarantor.


# 8. Ld. Counsel for the Appellant submits that the Adjudicating Authority without appreciating the fact that the Personal Guarantee issued by the Appellant was payable on demand and no demand has been made to the Appellant, as a guarantor, has passed the impugned order which could not be sustained.


# 9. It is further submitted that the issue of invocation of personal guarantee through notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act though was not pleaded specifically before the Adjudicating Authority, however, the same being a legal issue is being raised before this Appellate Tribunal and perusal of the notice given under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act to the Appellant would clearly reveal that the notice has been addressed to the CD and its directors and mortgagers whereby the CD has been called upon to make the payment and in the same notice the Appellant has been addressed as ‘Director’ of the CD and not as a ‘personal guarantor’, therefore, there is no invocation of guarantee and consequently the same could not be enforced.


# 10. It is also submitted that the said demand notice dated 29.02.2016 does not even mention about the personal guarantee of the Appellant and therefore, the same could not be treated to have invoked the personal guarantee and in this regard, the relevant clause of the guarantee deed executed by the Appellant may be looked into wherein a specific procedure has been provided for giving of such notice to the guarantor.


# 11. It is further submitted that the demand notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act cannot be construed as invocation notice having regard to the law laid down by this Appellate Tribunal in Amanjyot Singh Vs. Navneet Kumar Jain & Ors. passed in CA (AT) (Ins) No. 961 of 2022.


# 12. While referring to the law laid down by this Appellate Tribunal in Asha Basantilal Surana Vs. State Bank of India & Ors., CA (AT) (Ins) No. 84 of 2025, in paras no. 7 to 12, it is submitted that a notice issued under Section 13(2) SARFAESI Act can only be treated as notice invoking personal guarantee if it is specifically addressed to the guarantors in their capacity as such and a demand has been specifically made from the guarantors.


# 13. Ld. Counsel for the Appellant has also relied on Shantanu Jagdish Prakash Vs. State Bank of India & Anr., 2025 SCC OnLine NCLAT 117 as well as on Mavjibhai Nagarbhai Patel Vs. State Bank of India & Anr. (2024) SCC OnLine NCLAT 2014 in order to show that the contents of the notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act should be explicitly addressed to the guarantor for the demand and in absence of the same the said cannot be termed as invocation.


# 14. It is also submitted that the notice given under Rule 7(1) of the Insolvency Resolution Process for Personal Guarantors to the CD Rules, 2019 could never be treated as a notice for invocation of guarantee. In this regard, reliance has been placed on State Bank of India Vs. Mr. Deepak Kumar Singhania, CA (AT) (Ins) No. 191 of 2025.


# 15. Ld. Counsel for the Appellant further submits that the petition filed by the Appellant under Section 95 of the Code was itself defective as the same was suffering from incurable defects and procedural irregularities and the same was filed by the Union Bank of India without any valid authorisation and in absence of the same the petition could not be entertained and therefore the Tribunal has also committed a illegality in this regard and thus for the defects and illegality aforesaid the impugned order may not sustain and is liable to be set aside.


# 16. Ld. Counsel for the Respondent No. 1 i.e. financial creditor submits that there is no illegality or to say any irregularity in the impugned order passed by the Adjudicating Authority as the Appellant had executed a letter of guarantee in favour of the financial creditor on 01.03.2013 wherein the Appellant had specifically agreed to discharge jointly and severally any liability of the CD and it was specifically mentioned therein that any notice by way of request, demand or otherwise may be given by the Bank to the guarantor or any of them personally or may be left in the manner as shown in the guarantee deed, therefore, the notice given by the financial creditor on 29.02.2016 under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act is perfectly in terms of the stipulations made in the guarantee deed dated 01.03.2013 and through the said demand notice the Appellant has been called upon to pay the outstanding liability within 60 days from the receipt of the notice and therefore, the same is sufficient invocation of personal guarantee.


# 17. It is also submitted that the said demand notice was also served on the co-guarantors of the CD and Mr. Radha Raman Gupta, father of the Appellant/Co-guarantor, had also filed a petition under Section 94 of the Code seeking commencement of insolvency resolution process upon the personal guarantor on the basis of this demand notice dated 29.02.2016 claiming it to be an invocation of guarantee by the creditor and therefore the same admission is binding on other co-guarantors including appellant.


# 18. It is further highlighted that the Adjudicating Authority vide order dated 17.10.2025 passed in CP (IB) No. 631 of 2023 admitted the petition and initiated the insolvency resolution process against Mr. Radha Raman Gupta on the basis of demand notice dated 29.02.2016 as a valid invocation of guarantee.


# 19. Ld. Counsel for the Respondent No. 1 also highlighted the law laid down by this Appellate Tribunal in Asha Basantilal Surana (Supra) and Mavjibhai Nagarbhai Patel (Supra) in order to show that giving of a demand notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act is a valid notice of demand/invocation of guarantee. Reference is also given of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Kotak Mahindra Bank Vs. A Balakrishnan & Anr. 2022 (9) SCC 186.


# 20. It is further submitted that so far as the defect in giving authority to the petitioner in filing the petition before the Tribunal is concerned, a hyper technical objection was taken by the Appellant which has been rightly negated by the Adjudicating Authority and it is a law settled that a litigant cannot be denied justice on the basis of hyper technical grounds which are easily rectifiable. In this regard, the law laid down by the Hon’ble Madras High Court in Spicejet Ltd. Vs. Credit Sussie AG, MANU/TN/0539/2022 and K. Santhanam Vs. S. Kavith, 2010 SCC Online Mad 6009 and law laid down by the Hon’ble Kerela High Court in Deepu Vs. Abdul Rasheed, 2012 SCC OnLine Ker 6554 and Gopinath Vs. K.N. Ravichandran, 2011 SCC OnLine Ker 4129 has been relied.


# 21. It is submitted that there is no error in invocation of the guarantee and since there is no dispute with respect to debt or default, no illegality has been committed by the Adjudicating Authority.


# 22. We have heard Ld. Counsel for the parties and perused the record. The question which has arisen for consideration in this Appeal is as to whether notice dated 29.02.2016 issued under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 which was addressed to the Appellant is sufficient to invoke guarantee and gives any cause of action to the financial creditor to file application under Section 95 of the Code.


# 23. At this juncture, it would be fruitful to have a glance on some of the cases relied on by Ld. Counsel for the appellant.

In CA (AT) (Ins) No. 961 of 2022, Amanjyot Singh vs. Navneet Kumar Jain, Resolution Professional & Ors. in paragraph no. 11 and 12 this appellate tribunal held as under:

  • “11. In its reply, the Bank has submitted that although after sale of the mortgaged asset, part of the facility was realized, but no steps have been taken by the Bank against the Appellant for recovery of any dues. The notice, which is the basis of the Application, was issued on 04.10.2013. Nine years have been passed from issuance of the notice and no steps have been taken by the Bank so far for recovery of any amount from the Appellant. Default, which is claimed by the Appellant, at best can be said to be a technical default and when substantially, no steps have been taken by the Bank and the Bank’s categorical case is that guarantee of the Appellant has not been invoked, it is the Bank, who after invoking the guarantee shall proceed against the Appellant.

  • 12. We, thus, are satisfied that foundation which was laid down by the Appellant for initiating the CIRP against the Appellant, was not sufficient to admit Section 94 Application and initiate the CIRP against the Appellant. We may further notice that Section 10 Application against the Corporate Debtor has already been admitted and CIRP against the Corporate Debtor had been initiated. The case taken up by the Bank being categorical and clear that no steps have been taken by the Bank against the Appellant, there is no cause for the Appellant to pray for initiation of CIRP against the Appellant – the Personal Guarantor. We, thus, do not find any good ground to interfere with the impugned order in this Appeal. The Appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs”.


In CA (AT) (Ins) Nos. 1702 of 2024, 1711 of 2024, 1712 of 2024, Mavjibhai Nagarbhai Patel vs. State Bank of India and Anr., Jayantibhai Nagarbhai Patel vs. State Bank of India and Anr., Narayanbhai N. Patel vs. State Bank of India and Anr. in paragraph nos. 16,17,18,20 this appellate tribunal opined are as under:

  • “16. The liability of the guarantor has to be read from the Deed of Guarantee. Further, the terms of the Deed of Guarantee are extremely material as the invocation of the guarantee was to be purely in accordance with the terms of guarantee. Having looked at the relevant clauses of the Deed of Guarantee in the preceding paragraph, we are of the considered view that the Deed of Guarantee entered between the Respondent No.1 Bank and Personal Guarantor is an independent, distinct and a special contract which has to be construed on its own terms. It is clear from the reading of the clauses in the Deed of Guarantee that guarantee was given by the Personal Guarantor in unequivocal terms and the guarantee amount was to be paid by the guarantor once the guarantee was invoked.

  • 17. When we look at the specific Clauses of the Deed of Guarantee, it clearly states that the guarantee was in the nature of a continuing guarantee. The Guarantor had agreed that any admission on acknowledgement in writing signed by the Borrower shall also be binding on the Guarantor. Further, the Guarantor had agreed that the amount due under or in respect of the credit facilities to be payable to the creditor bank will be payable by the guarantor on a notice requiring payment of the amount.

  • 18. In the present case, after the Corporate Debtor was admitted into CIRP on 21.01.2020 and the Personal Guarantee was invoked by the Respondent No.1 Bank through Demand Notice dated 04.06.2021 under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act which called upon both the Borrowers and the Guarantors to make payment of the amount of Rs 32.60 Cr. as on 30.04.2021 within 60 days. The Section 13(2) Notice which was sent to the Corporate Debtor was also forwarded to the Guarantor with the specific demand to make payment of the amount mentioned in the notice in terms of the guarantee. This Section 13(2) Notice was indisputably also sent to the Personal Guarantors separately and independently. When we see the Section 13(2) notice under SARFAESI Act as placed at pages 549 to 551 of Appeal Paper Book (“APB” in short) we find that there is clear indication of the names of all the Personal Guarantors therein which includes the present Appellant (and also the other two Appellants whose appeals are also under consideration before us). Para 11 of the Section 13(2) SARFAESI addressed to the Corporate Debtor notice which was also forwarded to the personal guarantors including the Appellant is relevant to be noticed which is as extracted below:

  • “11. Further we are also forwarding the copy of this notice to personal guarantor who are liable to pay the aforesaid outstanding amount. This notice is without prejudice to the Bank’s right to initiate such other actions or legal proceedings as it deems necessary under any other applicable provisions of Law. This notice is in supersession of our earlier notices sent to you vide our letter no. SAMB/GRJ/2018-19/2002 dated 16.02.2019 which stands withdrawn.

  • Copy forwarded to:

  • You are requested to make the payment of the amount mentioned in the notice in terms of the guarantees executed by you.” (emphasis supplied)

  • 20. Since the guarantee deed specifically mentioned that the guarantee was in the nature of an on-demand guarantee, the default was to arise on the part of the Guarantor only when the Demand Notice was issued as contemplated in the Deed of Guarantee. Thus, the period of limitation of the Personal Guarantor was to commence once the demand was made on the Guarantor by the Respondent No.1 Bank. Hence, the Notice dated 04.06.2021 issued by the Respondent No.1 Bank to the Personal Guarantor has to be treated to be Notice on Demand as contemplated in the Deed of Guarantee. The Rule 7(1) Notice dated 28.06.2021 had therefore rightly recorded that the debt was due on 04.06.2021 being the date of Demand Notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act and that the date of default occurred on 04.08.2021 on the expiry of 60 days from 04.06.2021”.


In CA (AT) (Ins) No. 1609 of 2024, Shantanu Prakash vs. State Bank of India and Anr. this appellate tribunal in paragraph nos. 31 and 46 are as under:

  • 31. The Respondent No.1 submitted that on 22.06.2018, Respondent No. 1 issued a demand notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act to the Appellant, invoking the Personal Guarantee and requesting repayment of the outstanding amount. The Appellant failed to discharge the outstanding dues within the stipulated 60 days, constituting a default. Subsequently, on 05.11.2020, Respondent No. 1 issued another demand notice under Rule 7(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Rules, 2019, demanding payment of Rs. 532,99,88,089.76 as of 28.02.2021. In response, the Appellant admitted the execution of the Personal Guarantee and its failure to pay the debt due in its reply to Respondent No. 1’s demand notice dated 18.11.2020. Despite this admission, neither the Corporate Debtor nor the Appellant has cleared the outstanding dues or accrued interest. As a result, Respondent No. 1 filed the Company Petition on 01.04.2021.

  • 46. We shall also deal some other points which have been raised by the Appellant. The Appellant contended that the notice of demand dated 22.06.2018 under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act is not an invocation of personal guarantee and therefore present petition cannot be invoked in absence of proper invocation of property. On this point we note that the Respondent No. 1 has issued notice to the Appellant specifically mentioning the personal guarantee dated 03.06.2018 which clearly stipulated that “The said financial assistance is also secured by the personal guarantee of Sh. Shantanu Prakash & Sh.Jagdish Prakash & corporate guarantee of Edu Smart Services Pvt limited for consortium advance.” It has further brought to our notice that while notice was issued under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, which has also specifically called upon the Appellant to discharge in full the borrower liability stated therein within 60 days of the notice. Thus, the notice fulfils all the condition stipulated under personal guarantee and can be treated as valid invocation. On this issue, the Adjudicating Authority has also held that the demand notice issued by the Respondent No. 1 under Rule 7(1) of the I&B (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Insolvency Resolution Process for Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors) Rules, 2019 as valid. Thus, we do not find any error in the Impugned Order on this account”.


In CA (AT) (Ins) No. 191 of 2025, State Bank of India vs. Mr. Deepak Kumar Singhania, in paragraph nos. 23, 24, 27 this tribunal held as under:

  • “23. Learned Counsel for the Respondent has relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Syndicate Bank vs. Channaveerappa Beleri and Ors. – (2006) 11 SCC 506, where Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph 9 had held that Guarantor’s liability depends upon the terms of his contract. In paragraph 9, following has been held:

  • “9. A guarantor’s liability depends upon the terms of his contract. A “continuing guarantee” is different from an ordinary guarantee. There is also a difference between a guarantee which stipulates that the guarantor is liable to pay only on a demand by the creditor, and a guarantee which does not contain such a condition. Further, depending on the terms of guarantee, the liability of a guarantor may be limited to a particular sum, instead of the liability being to the same extent as that of the principal debtor. The liability to pay may arise, on the principal debtor and guarantor, at the same time or at different points of time. A claim may even be time-barred against the principal debtor, but still enforceable against the guarantor. The parties may agree that the liability of a guarantor shall arise at a later point of time than that of the principal debtor. We have referred to these aspects only to underline the fact that the extent of liability under a guarantee as also the question as to when the liability of a guarantor will arise, would depend purely on the terms of the contract.”

  • 24. This Tribunal in Archana Deepak Wani vs. Indian Bank – Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No.301 of 2023 has also held that liability of the Guarantor must be determined strictly in terms of the Deed of Guarantee. In paragraph 26, following has been laid down:

  • “26. The scheme of I&B Code clearly indicate that both the Principal Borrower and the Guarantor become liable to pay the amount when the default is committed. When default is committed by the Principal Borrower the amount becomes due not only against the Principal Borrower but also against the Corporate Guarantor, which is the scheme of the I&B Code. When we read with as is delineated by Section 3(11) of the Code, debt becomes due both on Principal Borrower and the Guarantor, as noted above. The definition of default under Section 3(12) in addition to expression ‘due’ occurring in Section 3(11) uses two additional expressions i.e “payable” and “is not paid by the debtor or corporate debtor”. The expression ‘is not paid by the debtor’ has to be given some meaning. As laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Syndicate Bank vs. Channaveerappa Beleri & Ors.” (supra), a guarantor’s liability depends on terms of his contract. There can be default by the Principal Borrower and the Guarantor on the same date or date of default for both may be different depending on the terms of contract of guarantee. It is well settled that the loan agreement with the Principal Borrower and the Bank as well as Deed of Guarantee between the Bank and the Guarantor are two different transactions and the Guarantor’s liability has to be read from the Deed of Guarantee.”

  • 27. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are not persuaded to accept the submission of the Appellant that Notice under Rule 7 (1) issued in Form-B to the Guarantor, demanding repayment of the default amount, has to be treated as Notice for invoking guarantee. Default before issuance of Notice under Rule 7(1), must exist on the part of the Guarantor. Hence, we reject the submission of the Appellant that Notice under Rule 7, sub-rule (1) is a Notice, invoking the guarantee.


The factual matrix of this case however is different than the facts of the instant case as in this case notice was issued under Rule 7(1) in Form-B and it was being impressed to be taken as the notice of invocation of guarantee, which is not a case in the case at hand.


# 24. We find that the financial creditor is claiming to have invoked the personal guarantee given by the Appellant on the basis of a notice given under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act on 29.02.2016. A copy of the said notice has been made available at Pg. No. 144 of the appeal paper book and perusal of the same would reveal that name of the Appellant is emerging therein at serial no. 2 as Mr. Ujwal Gupta (Director) Property, South City, Phase – I, Gurgaon along with other director and mortgagors /directors.


# 25. Perusal of this notice would further reveal that in this notice clear averments have been made with regard to the credit facilities given by the financial creditor to CD and also statement that despite several demands the outstanding amount has not been paid and liability has not been discharged. It is also stated therein that by giving this notice the addressees have been called upon to pay sum of Rs. 9,85,41,628.10 together with interest @ BR+5.50% p.a. in case of cash credit account and BR+ 6% in case of Term loan account with monthly rest / as per the terms and conditions of loan documents and further to discharge the liabilities in full within 60 days from the date of receipt of this notice, failing which the sender would be constrained to enforce the securities created by addressees in favour of the Bank by exercising any or all of the rights given under this act.


# 26. The language and phraseology used in this notice would clearly demonstrate that it has been clearly communicated by the financial creditor, by this notice, that the addressees will have to discharge their liability in connection with CD within 60 days of receipt of this notice, pertaining to the credit facilities extended to the CD for the amount which has been mentioned in the notice.


# 27. Thus, in our considered opinion, it was a crystal clear communication not only to the Appellant but to all the addressees to discharge their liability with regard to the credit facilities extended to CD by the financial creditor and there appears no ambiguity in this. Since the appellant has extended guarantee by executing a deed and the principal borrower/ CD failed to pay the amount of credit facilities extended by the Financial Creditor and the liability of the principal borrower and guarantor is coextensive, this demand notice was sufficient communication to the appellant to discharge his liability under the guarantee deed towards the credit facility extended by the creditor to the CD and is sufficient invocation of guarantee.


# 28. Keeping in view the submissions made by Ld. Counsel for the Appellant that notice has not been served as per the terms and conditions of the guarantee, we perused the guarantee given by the Appellant, a copy of which has been placed at pg. 135 of the appeal paper book and the relevant extract of the same is reproduced as under: –

  • “IN CONSIDERATION OF Union Bank of India (hereafter the bank which expression shall include its successors and assigns) giving credit or accommodation of granting facilities by making or continuing advances or otherwise at my/our request to M/s Green World International Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter called the Principal)? We jointly and guarantee to the Bank due payment and discharge two days after demand of all present and future advances, liabilities, bills and promissory notes whether made, incurred or before or after the date for the principal either alone or jointly with any other person or persons and also of bills, promissory notes of guarantees held by the Bank from time to time in any manner together with all relative interest commission and other banking charges including legal charges and expenses.

  • *****

  • It is also agreed that any admission or acknowledgement in writing by the principal debtor of the amount of indebtedness of the principal debtor or otherwise as in relation of the subject matter of this guarantee, shall be binding on me/us and I/We accept the correctness of any statement of account served on the principal debtor which is duty certified by any manager or officer of the bank and the same shall be binding and conclusive as against me / us also, and I /We further agree that in making an acknowledgement or

  • *******

  • Any notice by way of request, demand or otherwise hereunder may be given by the Bank to me/us or any of us personally or may be left at then or last known place of business or residence in India of me / us or any of us addressed as aforesaid to me/us or may be sent by post to me/us any of us addressed as aforesaid and if sent by post it shall be deemed to have been given at the time when it would be delivered in due course of post and shall be sufficient to prove that the envelope containing the notice was posted if by reason of absence from India or otherwise, I/ We or any of us cannot be given any such notice the same if Inserted once as an advertisement in a newspaper circulating in the town mentioned at the commencement of this Guarantee, shall be deemed to have been effectively given and received on the day which such advertisement appears”


# 29. A careful reading of above clauses would demonstrate that it was agreed by the Appellant that any notice by way of request, demand or otherwise hereunder may be given by the Bank to him/us or any of us personally or may be left at the last known place of business or residence in India of guarantor or may also be sent by post.


# 30. Thus, the requirement of only sending a notice was contemplated in the guarantee deed and no specific or particular process or the format of notice or formality was stipulated therein. To our understanding if nothing special or specific has been given under the terms of the guarantee, the sending of notice to the guarantor specifically demanding outstanding payment within specific time frame, would be sufficient, in so far as invocation of guarantee is concerned, if it sufficiently demonstrate the liability of the guarantor and also having a clause for discharge of its liability for the credit facilities extended to the CD.


# 31. This Appellate Tribunal in Asha Basantilal Surana (Supra), which is a three member’s decision, after considering Amanjyot Singh (Supra) and Mavjibhai Nagarbhai Patel (Supra) clearly holds that in a case where notice under Section 13(2) makes a demand as per the guarantee agreement between the parties, the notice has to be treated as a notice for invocation of bank guarantee. This appellate Tribunal in the above case has also distinguished the law laid down by this Appellate Tribunal earlier in Amanjyot Singh (Supra), to be a case confined to its own facts, by observing in para 12 of the judgment, that the dismissal of the appeal in Amanjyot Singh case was on the facts of the said case and has no application in the facts of the case under scrutiny and also that the invocation of personal guarantee has to be in accordance with the terms of the guarantee agreement. We reproduce the para no. 12 of the aforesaid judgment (Asha Basantilal Surana) (Supra) for convenience herein below:-

  • “12. Thus, the dismissal of the Appeal in the Amanjyot Singh’s case was on the facts of the said case and has no application in the facts of the present case. The invocation of personal guarantee has to be in accordance with the terms of the Guarantee Agreement which is a settled law. Clause 7 of the Guarantee Agreement does not require any particular mode and manner of the demand notice. When demand notice is issued against the personal guarantor asking the personal guarantor to discharge its liabilities, the guarantee stands invoked. Whether notice under Section 13(2) in a particular case invoked the guarantee or not depends on the words and intent of the notice. For finding out as to whether Notice under Section 13(2) invoked the personal guarantee, the letters and words of the Notice has to be looked into to come to any conclusion that whether personal guarantor has been asked to discharge its liabilities or not. In the facts of the present case, we are of the considered opinion that the Notice under Section 13(2) issued by the State Bank of India is a clear demand notice from the Appellant to pay the amount of Rs.28,56,64,336.06/-.”  (Emphasis Supplied)


# 32. Thus, what has been highlighted by the aforesaid judgment is that it would be the terms and conditions of the agreement executed between the parties with regard to the guarantee which would be relevant to assess as to whether the guarantee has been sufficiently invoked or not. Therefore, whether a guarantee may be invoked by giving notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act depends on the terms of the guarantee and the content of the notice. If the notice clearly demands payment from the personal guarantor in terms of the guarantee, it can be treated as an invocation of the guarantee. The facts and the wording of the notice are crucial in this determination.


# 33. We have already observed herein before that notice dated 29.02.2016, given by the financial creditor under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act has sufficiently indicated the Appellant to discharge his liability for the amount mentioned in the notice of which the credit facilities were extended to the CD and simply by the fact that word ‘director’ has been suffixed after the name of the Appellant/Personal Guarantor, the same will not be sufficient to change the character of the Appellant from the guarantor of the CD and therefore, in our considered opinion, the personal guarantee has been rightly considered by the Tribunal to have been invoked by issuance of this notice given under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act and we do not find any illegality therein.


# 34. So far as the submissions of the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant, with regard to some defects arisen in not filing any authorisation letter or the affidavit before the Tribunal, is concerned, we are of the firm view that hyper technicalities so far as the procedure is concerned, should not come in the way of imparting substantial justice between the parties, more so when there is no conflict between the financial creditor and his agent, who has filed the petition before the Tribunal, the petition could not be rejected/ dismissed only on this hyper technical ground. Therefore, we also do not find any illegality in the approach of the Tribunal in dealing with this objection of the Appellant.


# 35. Keeping in view all the facts and circumstances of the case and for the reasons given above, we are of the considered opinion that there is no good ground exists on the basis of which any interference may be made in the impugned judgment and resultantly, the appeal lacks merit and is dismissed as such. No order as to costs.


# 36. Pending I.A.s, if any are also closed.

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The sole purpose of this post is to create awareness on the "IBC - Case Law" and to provide synopsis of the concerned case law, must not be used as a guide for taking or recommending any action or decision. A reader must refer to the full citation of the order & do one's own research and seek professional advice if he intends to take any action or decision in the matters covered in this post.