Friday, 30 September 2022

Rahul Khilnani Vs. Sh. Atul Kumar Jain Resolution Professional - In fact, the confidentiality is to be maintained regarding the Fair Value and Liquidation Value lest it should cause any undue claim to itself or any third party. This Tribunal is of the earnest view that as per the provisions of the Code, the Appellants (Operational Creditors) are not required to know the Liquidation Value.

NCLAT (23.09.2022) in Rahul Khilnani Vs. Sh. Atul Kumar Jain Resolution Professional [Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 586 of 2021] held that;

  • In fact, the confidentiality is to be maintained regarding the Fair Value and Liquidation Value lest it should cause any undue claim to itself or any third party. This Tribunal is of the earnest view that as per the provisions of the Code, the Appellants (Operational Creditors) are not required to know the Liquidation Value.


Excerpts of the order; 

# 1. Challenge in this Appeal is to the Impugned Order dated 08.04.2021 passed by the Learned Adjudicating Authority (National Company Law Tribunal New Delhi Bench, Court – V), in IA 641/2021 in IB 2413(ND)/2019, dismissing the Application preferred by the Appellants herein objecting to the Resolution Plan as only 2% of their ‘Claims’ has been admitted, while the workman and other statutory dues have been paid 100%.


# 2. Facts in brief, are that the Adjudicating Authority admitted the Petition and CIRP was initiated on 18.02.2020 and the Appellant/‘Operational Creditors’ filed their ‘Claims’ before the IRP for an amount of Rs.11,05,850/- on 14.03.2020. On 07.01.2021, the Resolution Applicant was directed to give details regarding whether the interest of the ‘Operational Creditors’ was in adherence to Section 30(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, (hereinafter referred to as ‘The Code’). The ‘Operational Creditors’ issued a Notice dated 20.01.2021 to the RP and the COC Members claiming that their dues of Rs.51,91,935/- is payable. Another Notice was issued on 22.01.2021 seeking all the documents which the RP had relied upon for assessing the Liquidation Value of the ‘Corporate Debtor’, but there was no response. It is averred that the Appellant received an email dated 23.01.2021 from the Respondent/‘Financial Creditor’ requesting the RP to fix a CoC Meeting in view of the objection raised by the ‘Operational Creditors’ and observations made by the Adjudicating Authority in the Order dated 15.01.2021. The Adjudicating Authority while addressing to the issue whether Section 24(3) of the Code was complied with, held that there was no compliance of Section 24(3) of the Code and that the Notice was not issued upon the ‘Operational Creditor’, but in view of Section 24(4) of the Code, the proceedings shall not be invalidated.


# 3. Addressing to the issue of distribution of the assets, the Adjudicating Authority while dismissing the Application observed as follows:

  • “87. Therefore, at this juncture, we would like to refer the Resolution which is at page 31 of the revised Resolution Plan and we notice that at page 32, the CoC has discussed the Section 30(2)(b) of the IBC and Regulation 38 Sub Regulation 3(a) and (b) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016:

  • Explanation I.- For removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that a distribution in accordance with the provisions of this clause shall be fair and equitable to such creditors.

  • The Chairman informed the Board that the RA has made a submission that Rs. 655.21 lacs is the amount offered under Resolution plan against the liquidation value of Rs. 308.14 lacs of Corporate Debtor. Section 30(2)(b) would demonstrate that the amount to be paid to the Operational Creditors has to be higher of either the amount to be paid to such Operational Creditors under Section 53 of the Code in the event of liquidation of the Corporate Debtor.

  • [“Situation 1”| or the amount under the Resolution plan when distributed in accordance with the order of priority in sub-section (1) of Section 53 [“Situation 2”]. In the instant case under Situation 1, the amount payable to the Operational Creditors is NIL and in Situation 2, the amount payable to the Operational Creditors is also NIL. Nonetheless, as far as the debt owed to the other Operational Creditors are concerned, the Resolution Plan as approved, proposes a payment of 2% of their claim thereby increasing the plan value to Rs. 655.21 Lacs from earlier approved plan of Rs 650.70 Lacs. Now the financial summary of the plan is as follows.

  • 88. On the basis of that Resolution, we are of the view that provision of Section 30(2) of the IBC and Regulation 38 have been discussed in the meeting of the Co and it was observed that liquidation value of the Resolution Plan was Rs. 308.14 lakhs whereas the resolution applicant has offered value of Rs. 655.21 lakhs, which is more than the liquidation value and it is further observed that there are two situations under Section 53, under situation 1, the amount payable to the operational creditors in the event of liquidation is NIL and in situation 2, the amount payable to the operational creditor is also NIL. Therefore, in our considered view that the provision regarding the payment of Operational Creditor to the extent of 2% is in accordance with the provision of Section 30(2) (b) of the IBC and Regulation 38 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016.

  • 89. For the reasons discussed above, we are of the considered view that the contention of the applicant, in the event of liquidation, the Operational Creditor is entitled to get more than the amount, which is proposed to paid to the Operational Creditor, in our considered view is not liable to accepted………………………

  • 93. In view of the aforesaid decision, we are of the considered view that since the power of adjudicating authority while considering the Resolution Plan which was duly approved by the CoC is very limited and we have already discussed that the Resolution Plan has made the provision for payment of Insolvency Resolution Process Costs, the repayment of debt of Operational Creditor, the management of the affairs of the Corporate Debtor, the implementation and management of the Resolution Plan and the plan does not contravened any provision of the law. Therefore, we have no option but to reject the prayer of the applicant of IA/641/2021. We find, no force in the contention raised on behalf of the applicant/Operational Creditor, in our considered view the objections raised by the Operational Creditor is not sustainable. Therefore, the prayer of the Operational Creditor/ Applicant to direct the Resolution Professional to induct the applicant in the Co© and also direct the Resolution Professional to convene a CoC meeting and to pay 100% of the dues of the applicant/ Operational Creditor are hereby rejected.

  • 94. Accordingly, the present application i.e., IA/641/2021 filed on behalf of the Operational Creditor stands dismissed.”


# 4. It is submitted by the Learned Counsel for the Appellant that the Adjudicating Authority ought to have allowed the CoC to reconsider their Plan in the interest of justice, but the Adjudicating Authority approved the Plan even when 82% of the Voting Right Members moved an Application under Regulation 18 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016, (hereinafter referred to as ‘IBBI Regulations, 2016’), for convening a Meeting. But the RP issued an email to the Members of CoC stating that CIRP came to an end on 21.01.2021 and that he cannot hold the CoC Meeting, but the CIRP period has expired only on 22.03.2021. It is argued that the Information Memorandum demonstrates the supply of contracts that were pending with the ‘Corporate Debtor’ which substantiates the assertion that the CIRP was initiated only to usurp the monies of the Creditors. The fact is that the Order dated 15.01.2021 was not available before the CoC when the Meeting was convened on 17.01.2021 and the Resolution Plan was approved. The Plan in the present form is giving only 2% to the ‘Operational Creditors’ as opposed to 100% to all other stakeholders, which is unfair and discriminatory. The entire process is fraudulent as a Resolution Applicant is also a ‘Financial Creditor’ and is part of the CoC. The ‘Operational Creditor’ was never given any Notice of the CoC nor were they shared the Resolution Plan or their comments taken. Learned Counsel placed reliance on Section 24(3)(c) of the Code and Regulation 35(2) of the IBBI Regulations, 2016, in support of his case.


# 5. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has placed reliance on the Judgements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Vijay Kumar Jain’ Vs. ‘Standard Chatered Bank & Ors., AIR 2019 SC 2377, ‘ANG Industries Ltd.’ Vs. ‘Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.’, Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 109 of 2018 and ‘Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.’ Vs. ‘Union of India (UOI) & Ors.’, (2019) 4 SCC 17.


# 6. It is the case of the first Respondent that the RP Mr. Atul Jain has only assumed charge on 15.07.2020; that there is no discrimination against the ‘Operational Creditor’ and the revised Resolution Plan was approved with 100% Voting Shares in the CoC Meeting held on 17.01.2021 providing for payment of dues to the employees; neither the RP nor any Creditor can question the Commercial Wisdom of the Members of the CoC; that the true purport of the Order dated 15.01.2021 passed by the Adjudicating Authority was duly communicated and in fact was one of the items of Agenda of the Meeting that took place on 17.01.2021; that this Meeting was attended by Mr. Maheswari himself.


# 7. It is also submitted by the first Respondent that the CIRP period was increased by 90 days from 23.10.2020 to 23.01.2021. The said Mr. Maheshwari, representing the entire CoC with 82% Voting Right power, approved the Resolution Plan on both the occasions fully aware of the purport of the Order dated 15.01.2021. It is submitted that during the CIRP, 9 number of Meetings of the ‘Operational Creditor’ took place and all the payments during CIRP were made under the signature of Mr. Dhruv Maheshwari, son of Mr. Sharad Maheshwari who is the Promoter/Director of SM Finlease. It is submitted that the Respondent had carried out the CIRP of the ‘Corporate Debtor’ in a fair and transparent manner and disclosed all the Contracts/Purchase Order existing on the date of issue of Information Memorandum. As regarding the objection to Section 24(3)(c) not being adhered to, it is submitted that none of the ‘Operational Creditors’ informed the first Respondent during the CIRP, the name of the representative of the ‘Operational Creditor’ who should be sent Notice and who should attend the Meetings, but without any Voting Rights. It is also contended that it is nobody’s case that any prejudice has been caused to the ‘Operational Creditor’. The ‘Operational Creditor’ has no Voting Power and could not have altered any of the decisions of the CoC. No discrimination has been caused to the ‘Operational Creditors’ as under Section 53 of the Code, whereunder there are 8 levels of priority and the employees fall under the 3rd level, whereas the Appellant falls in the 6th level i.e., Section 53(1)(f). Hence, there is no deficiency of service on behalf of the first Respondent.


# 8. Despite service of Notice, no one appeared for Respondent-2. Learned Counsel for the third Respondent/Successful Resolution Applicant (‘SRA’) submitted that the Minutes of Meeting dated 17.01.2021 clearly shows that the Order dated 15.01.2021 was discussed and the Meeting was attended by Mr. Maheshwari, the lead Member of the CoC with more than 82% Voting Rights and only after being satisfied about the compliance, the Plan was approved. It is submitted that the Appellants misguiding the Tribunal while acting in cahoots with the ‘Financial Creditor’ who had 82% Voting Rights and was the de facto Committee of Creditors who initially filed their ‘Claims’ as a ‘Secured Financial Creditor’ and got it verified by the then IRP. The Resolution Plan was approved by the CoC with 100% voting and the said Mr. Maheshwari represented the entire CoC on both the occasions. The value which Mr. Maheshwari has offered was less than half of what the current SRA has paid. It is submitted that in the present Appeal, the averments are verbatim to the averments in the Interlocutory Application No. 641/2021 and the Application filed by SM Finlease who are hand in glove and making an attempt to derail the proceedings. The Information Memorandum contains all the details of the ‘Corporate Debtor’ including the Contracts and Purchase Orders receipt. It is argued that the Appellant are not entitled to know the Liquidation Value of the ‘Corporate Debtor’ or question the Liquidation Value arrived at by the valuers registered by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India. Reliance in this regard is placed upon Regulation 35 of the IBBI Regulations, 2016, whereby only the Members of CoC are entitled to know the Fair Value and the Liquidation Value after the receipt of the Resolution Plan. It is incumbent upon the Members of the CoC to maintain confidentiality about the Fair Value and the Liquidation Value to avoid undue claim or undue laws. It is common knowledge that the Resolution Plan submitted by the SRA is subject to negotiation, but none question the Commercial Wisdom of the Members of the COC in approving the Resolution Plan. With respect to non-compliance of Section 24(3)(c) it is argued that the Adjudicating Authority has rightly place reliance on Section 24(4) of the Code as the ‘Operational Creditors’ do not have any Voting Rights and no prejudice was caused by not issuing the Notice to them. Further, the details of the representative representing them was never forwarded to the RP. The distribution to the ‘Operational Creditors’ has been done in accordance with the provisions of Section 30(2)(b) of the Code and hence the Plan is fair and equitable.


Assessment:

9. At the outset, we address to the contention of the Appellant that the Order dated 15.01.2021 passed by the Adjudicating Authority seeking explanation with respect to whether the interest of all stakeholders have been adhered to, was not complied with as the said Order was never placed before the CoC Meeting which took place on 17.01.2021. It is the case of the RP and the SRA that the Order dated 15.01.2021 was indeed placed before the CoC and was discussed in totallity. Further, the contention of the Appellant is that the 82% Voting Right Member Mr. Maheshwari also pointed out that there was a discrepancy and despite the fact that the said Mr. Maheshwari filed an Application before the Adjudicating Authority for convening a Meeting, the same was ignored and the Resolution Plan approved. It is also the case of the Appellant that Section 24(3)(c) of the Code was not adhered to. Section 24 of the Code reads as follows:

  • “24. Meeting of committee of creditors.—

  • (1) The members of the committee of creditors may meet in person or by such electronic means as may be specified.

  • (2) All meetings of the committee of creditors shall be conducted by the resolution professional.

  • (3) The resolution professional shall give notice of each meeting of the committee of creditors to

  • (a) members of [committee of creditors, including the authorised representatives referred to in sub-sections (6) and (6A) of section 21 and sub-section (5)];

  • (b) members of the suspended Board of Directors or the partners of the corporate persons, as the case may be;

  • (c) operational creditors or their representatives if the amount of their aggregate dues is not less than ten per cent. of the debt.

  • (4) The directors, partners and one representative of operational creditors, as referred to in sub-section (3), may attend the meetings of committee of creditors, but shall not have any right to vote in such meetings:

  • Provided that the absence of any such director, partner or representative of operational creditors, as the case may be, shall not invalidate proceedings of such meeting.

  • (5) Any Creditor Subject to sub-sections (6), (6A) and (6B) of section 21, any creditor] who is a member of the committee of creditors may appoint an insolvency professional other than the resolution professional to represent such creditor in a meeting of the committee of creditors:

  • Provided that the fees payable to such insolvency professional representing any individual creditor will be borne by such creditor.

  • (6) Each creditor shall vote in accordance with the voting share assigned to him based on the financial debts owed to such creditor.

  • (7) The resolution professional shall determine the voting share to be assigned to each creditor in the manner specified by the Board.

  • (8) The meetings of the committee of creditors shall be conducted in such manner as may be specified.”    (Emphasis Supplied)


3 10. Section 24(3)(c) specifies that ‘Operational Creditors’ or their representatives if the amount of their aggregate dues is not less than 10% of the dues are to be given Notice of each CoC Meeting, Section 24(4) of the Code specifies that the representative of the ‘Operational Creditors’, may attend the Meeting of CoC but shall not have any right to vote in these Meetings. The word shell mentioned in Section 24(4) of the Code makes it clear that none of the ‘Operational Creditors’ or their representatives have any right to vote even if they attend the Meeting of the CoC. We also take into consideration that the Liquidation Value of the Resolution Plan was Rs.308.14Lakhs/- whereas the Resolution Applicant/Respondent 3 offered a value of Rs.655.21Lakhs/- which is much more than the Liquidation Value. However, it is significant to mention that the amount payable to the ‘Operational Creditors’, as provided for under Section 53 of the Code was ‘NIL’ in both the situations. Therefore, it cannot be stated that there was any ‘prejudice’ caused to the Appellants herein in terms of Section 24(3) not having been complied with. We are also conscious of the fact that there is no documentary evidence on record to establish that a name of a representative of the ‘Operational Creditors’ was indeed given to the RP and the RP had chosen to ignore the same, as it is the specific case of the RP that no such information was ever tendered to him.


# 11. The RP has also submitted that the 82% Voting Right Member, whom the Appellant submits had raised objections about the Plan, is none other than the same ‘Mr. Maheshwari’ who had submitted the Resolution Plan twice and withdrew the same on both the occasions and had given a Plan for less than half of what the Resolution Applicant has paid. A perusal of the Minutes of the Meeting dated 17.01.2021 clearly shows that the directions given by the Adjudicating Authority on 15.01.2021 were discussed in totality and were duly addressed to by the SRA. It is pertinent to mention that the 82% shareholder whom the Appellant states had raised objections which were not adhered to, had also attended the Meeting and approved the Plan.


# 12. Now we address to the contention of the Appellant that a copy of the Plan was never given to them and they did not know the Liquidation Value of the ‘Corporate Debtor’. Regulation 35 of IBBI Regulations, 2016, read as follows:

  • “35. Fair value and Liquidation value –

  • (1) Fair value and liquidation value shall be determined in the following manner:-

  • (a) the two registered valuers appointed under regulation 27 shall submit to the resolution professional an estimate of the fair value and of the liquidation value computed in accordance with internationally accepted valuation standards, after physical verification of the inventory and fixed assets of the corporate debtor;

  • (b) if in the opinion of the resolution professional, the two estimates of a value are significantly different, he may appoint another registered valuer who shall submit an estimate of the value computed in the same manner; and

  • (c) the average of the two closest estimates of a value shall be considered the fair value or the liquidation value, as the case may be.

  • (2) After the receipt of resolution plans in accordance with the Code and these regulations, the resolution professional shall provide the fair value and the liquidation value to every member of the committee in electronic form, on receiving an undertaking from the member to the effect that such member shall maintain confidentiality of the fair value and the liquidation value and shall not use such values to cause an undue gain or undue loss to itself or any other person and comply with the requirements under sub-section (2) of section 29.

  • (3) The resolution professional and registered valuers shall maintain confidentiality of the fair value and the liquidation value.]”  (Emphasis Supplied)


# 13. The aforenoted Regulation specifies that only the Members of the CoC are entitled to know the Fair Value and the Liquidation Value after the receipt of the Resolution Plan in accordance with the provisions of the Code. In fact, the confidentiality is to be maintained regarding the Fair Value and Liquidation Value lest it should cause any undue claim to itself or any third party. This Tribunal is of the earnest view that as per the provisions of the Code, the Appellants are not required to know the Liquidation Value.


# 14. At this juncture, we find it a fit case to place reliance on the Judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Kalparaj Dharamshi & Ors.’ Vs. ‘Kotak Investment Advisors Ltd. & Ors.’, [2021] 166 SCL 583 (SC), in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down that the Commercial Wisdom of the CoC is non-justiciable:

  • “150. The position is clarified by the following observations in paragraph 59 of the judgment in the case of K. Sashidhar (supra), which reads thus:

  • “59. In our view, neither the adjudicating authority (NCLT) nor the appellate authority (NCLAT) has been endowed with the jurisdiction to reverse the commercial wisdom of the dissenting financial creditors and that too on the specious ground that it is only an opinion of the minority financial creditors…..”

  • 151. This Court in Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited through Authorised Signatory (supra) after reproducing certain paragraphs in K. Sashidhar (supra) observed thus:

  • “Thus, it is clear that the limited judicial review available, which can in no circumstance trespass upon a business decision of the majority of the Committee of Creditors, has to be within the four corners of Section 30(2) of the Code, insofar as the Adjudicating Authority is concerned, and Section 32 read with Section 61(3) of the Code, insofar as the Appellate Tribunal is concerned, the parameters of such review having been clearly laid down in K. Sashidhar”

  • 152. It can thus be seen, that this Court has clarified, that the limited judicial review, which is available, can in no circumstance trespass upon a business decision arrived at by the majority of CoC.

  • 153. In the case of Maharashtra Seamless Limited (supra), NCLT had approved the plan of appellant therein with regard to CIRP of United Seamless Tubulaar (P) Ltd. In appeal, NCLAT directed, that the appellant therein should increase upfront payment to Rs.597.54 crore to the “financial creditors”, “operational creditors” and other creditors by paying an additional amount of Rs.120.54 crore. NCLAT further directed, that in the event the “resolution applicant” failed to undertake the payment of additional amount of Rs.120.54 crore in addition to Rs.477 crore and deposit the said amount in escrow account within 30 days, the order of approval of the ‘resolution plan’ was to be treated to be set aside. While allowing the appeal and setting aside the directions of NCLAT, this Court observed thus:

  • “30. The appellate authority has, in our opinion, proceeded on equitable perception rather than commercial wisdom. On the face of it, release of assets at a value 20% below its liquidation value arrived at by the valuers seems inequitable. Here, we feel the Court ought to cede ground to the commercial wisdom of the creditors rather than assess the resolution plan on the basis of quantitative analysis. Such is the scheme of the Code. Section 31(1) of the Code lays down in clear terms that for final approval of a resolution plan, the adjudicating authority has to be satisfied that the requirement of sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the Code has been com- plied with. The proviso to Section 31(1) of the Code stipulates the other point on which an adjudicating authority has to be satisfied. That factor is that the resolution plan has provisions for its implementation. The scope of interference by the adjudicating authority in limited judicial review has been laid down in Essar Steel [Essar Steel India Ltd. Commit- tee of Creditors v. Satish Kumar Gupta, (2020) 8 SCC 531], the relevant passage (para 54) of which we have reproduced in earlier part of this judgment. The case of MSL in their appeal is that they want to run the company and infuse more funds. In such circumstances, we do not think the appellate authority ought to have interfered with the order of the adjudicating authority in directing the successful resolution applicant to en- hance their fund inflow upfront.”

  • 154. This Court observed, that the Court ought to cede ground to the commercial wisdom of the creditors rather than assess the resolution plan on the basis of quantitative analysis. This Court clearly held, that the appellate authority ought not to have interfered with the order of the adjudicating authority by directing the successful resolution applicant to enhance their fund inflow upfront.

  • 155. It would thus be clear, that the legislative scheme, as interpreted by various decisions of this Court, is unambiguous. The commercial wisdom of CoC is not to be interfered with, excepting the limited scope as provided under Sections 30 and 31 of the I&B Code.”

  • 156. No doubt, it is sought to be urged, that since there has been a material irregularity in exercise of the powers by RP, NCLAT was justified in view of the provisions of clause (ii) of sub-section (3) of Section 61 of the I&B Code to interfere with the exercise of power by RP. However, it could be seen, that all actions of RP have the seal of approval of CoC. No doubt, it was possible for RP to have issued another Form ‘G’, in the event he found, that the proposals received by it prior to the date specified in last Form ‘G’ could not be accepted. However, it has been the consistent stand of RP as well as CoC, that all actions of RP, including acceptance of resolution plans of Kalpraj after the due date, albeit before the expiry of timeline specified by the I&B Code for completion of the process, have been consciously approved by CoC. It is to be noted, that the decision of CoC is taken by a thumping majority of 84.36%. The only creditor voted in favour of KIAL is Kotak Bank, which is a holding company of KIAL, having voting rights of 0.97%. We are of the considered view, that in view of the paramount importance given to the decision of CoC, which is to be taken on the basis of ‘commercial wisdom’, NCLAT was not correct in law in interfering with the commercial decision taken by CoC by a thumping majority of 84.36%.

  • 157. It is further to be noted, that after the resolution plan of Kalpraj was approved by NCLT on 28.11.2019, Kalpraj had begun implementing the resolution plan. NCLAT had heard the appeals on 27.2.2020 and reserved the same for orders. It is not in dispute, that there was no stay granted by NCLAT, while reserving the matters for orders. After a gap of five months and eight days, NCLAT passed the final order on 5.8.2020. It could thus be seen, that for a long period, there was no restraint on implementation of the resolution plan of Kalpraj, which was duly approved by NCLT. It is the case of Kalpraj, RP, CoC and Deutsche Bank, that during the said period, various steps have been taken by Kalpraj by spending a huge amount for implementation of the plan. No doubt, this is sought to be disputed by KIAL. However, we do not find it necessary to go into that aspect of the matter in light of our conclusion, that NCLAT acted in excess of jurisdiction in interfering with the conscious commercial decision of CoC.

  • 158. It is also pointed out, that in pursuance of the order dated 5.8.2020 passed by NCLAT, CoC has approved the resolution plan of KIAL on 13.8.2020. However, since we have already held, that the decision of NCLAT dated 5.8.2020 does not stand the scrutiny of law, it must follow, that the subsequent approval of the resolution plan of KIAL by CoC becomes non-est in law. For, it was only to abide by the directions of NCLAT. We are of the view that nothing would turn on it. The decision of CoC dated 13/14.2.2019 is a decision, which has been taken in exercise of its ‘commercial wisdom’. As such, we hold, that the decision taken by CoC dated 13/14.2.2019, which is taken in accordance with its ‘commercial wisdom’ and which is duly approved by NCLT, will prevail. Further, NCLAT was not justified in interfering with the stated decision taken by CoC.

  • 159. In that view of the matter, we find, that Civil Appeal Nos. 2943-2944 of 2020 filed by Kalpraj; Civil Appeal Nos. 2949-2950 of 2020 filed by RP and Civil Appeal Nos. 3138-3139 of 2020 filed by Deutsche Bank deserve to be allowed. It is ordered accordingly. The order passed by NCLAT dated 5.8.2020 is quashed and set aside and the orders passed by NCLT dated 28.11.2019 are restored and maintained.

  • (Emphasis Supplied)


# 15. We are of the considered view that there is no material irregularity warranting any interference as it is compliant with Section 30(2) of the Code. Having regard to the fact that the Resolution Plan was approved on 17.01.2021 by the CoC and subsequently by the Adjudicating Authority on 08.04.2021 and more than a year has lapsed, and also keeping in view that the ‘Operational Creditors’ do not have any Voting Right in the CoC and that the Commercial Wisdom of the CoC is nonjusticiable and when there is no material irregularity on the face of the record, we do not see any illegality or infirmity in the Order of the Adjudicating Authority.


16. For all the aforenoted reasons, this Appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. No Order as to costs.


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Gaurav Agarwal Vs. CA Devang P Sampat Liquidator of Maa Mahamaya Steels Pvt. Ltd. - When judgment is delivered by the Adjudicating Authority in open court, period of limitation starts running and could not be prevented and Appellant can neither wait for free of cost certified copy and nor he is prevented from applying for certified copy of the order sought to be challenged in appeal.

 NCLAT (28.09.2022) in Gaurav Agarwal  Vs. CA Devang P Sampat Liquidator of Maa Mahamaya Steels Pvt. Ltd. [Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 916 of 2022] held that;

  • When judgment is delivered by the Adjudicating Authority in open court, period of limitation starts running and could not be prevented and Appellant can neither wait for free of cost certified copy and nor he is prevented from applying for certified copy of the order sought to be challenged in appeal.


Excerpts of the order; 

This is an application under proviso to Section 61(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as ‘I&B Code’) praying for condonation of delay in filing the Appeal. The Appeal has been filed against the order dated 06.05.2022 in I.A. No. 1253 of 2021 in C.P. (IB) No. 2521(MB)/2018 filed by the Appellant. By the impugned order the application filed by the Appellant has been rejected. Challenging the order dated 06.05.2022 this Appeal has been filed on 06.07.2022.


# 2. The case of the Appellant under Delay Condonation Application is that the order was passed by the Adjudicating Authority on 06.05.2022, thereafter, the Appellant approached the Registry of the Adjudicating Authority to apply for certified copy of the order. The Appellant’s case is that the Registry informed that the order is not uploaded, hence the application cannot be taken. The Appellant pleaded that on 15.06.2022, as neither the free copy nor the certified copy was received, the Appellant sent an email and application for certified copy. Appellant’s case is that the impugned order was uploaded on 30.06.2022 and the Appellant downloaded the order on 30.06.2022 and thereafter took steps to file the Appeal. Certified copy of the order was received on 04.07.2022. The Appellant is entitled for exclusion of the period from 15.06.2022 to 04.07.2022 (date on which the certified copy was received) needs to be excluded. Hence, there is at worse, a delay of only 9 days.


# 3. The Respondent has filed a reply to Delay Condonation Application.  It is submitted that the Appellant applied for the certified copy of the order on 15.06.2022 i.e. after expiry of 30 days period of limitation. Respondent’s case is that he received an email from his counsel with copy of the order on 28.06.2022. Appellant has failed to show due diligence in filing the Appeal. Appellant failed to apply for certified copy within 30 days period. To the best of knowledge of the Respondent, the impugned order was uploaded on 28.06.2022. It is denied that the order was not available on the NCLT Website and the certified copy could not have been applied. The Appeal is barred by time as filed beyond extended time of limitation prescribed under Section 61(2) of the Code. Respondent submits that there is delay of more than 15 days beyond 30 days period in filing the Appeal.


# 4. We have perused the application filed by the Appellant for condonation of delay as well as the reply filed by the Respondent.


# 5. The order impugned was passed on 06.05.2022. Appellant’s case is that order of the NCLT was uploaded on 30.06.2022. His further case is that he applied for the certified copy on 15.06.2022. Under Section 12(2) of Limitation Act, 1963, the requisite period for obtaining certified copy of the order for filing an appeal is to be excluded for computing the limitation of appeal. Section 12(1) and (2) are as follows:-

  • “12. Exclusion of time in legal proceedings.—

  • (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded.

  • (2) In computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be excluded.”


# 6. The present is a case where the Appellant has applied for the certified copy of the order on 15.06.2022 i.e. after expiry of period of 30 days of limitation for filing an appeal. When application for obtaining certified copy of the order is applied after the period of limitation, Appellant is not entitled for benefit under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act. Bombay High Court in “Rajanarayan Singh Avadhraj Singh V. Smt Vidhyadevi, 2003 AIHC at page 3742 (Bom)” has held that where an applicant slept for an entire period of limitation for filing an appeal and thereafter filed an application for certified copy of the judgment and decree, the benefit of Section 12(2) cannot be availed.


# 7. Learned counsel for the Appellant submits that since the order was uploaded on 30.06.2022 and he filed the application for certified copy on 15.06.2022, thirty days period ended on 05.06.2022 and extended 45 days period also ended on 20.06.2022 but after giving the benefit of Section 12(2), there is delay of only 9 days.


# 8. The issue as to date from which period of limitation for filing shall commence in reference to an Appeal under Section 61 of the Code has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in V Nagarajan vs. SKS Ispat & Power Ltd. & Ors., (2022) 2 SCC 244”. In the case before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, NCLT passed an order on 31.12.2019. The copy of the order was not uploaded until 11-12 March, 2020. Corrected copy of order was uploaded on 20.03.2020. Appellant requested for free copy from the Registry and thereafter filed appeal on 08.06.2020 with the downloaded copy. NCLAT dismissed the Appeal as barred by time which order was challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. One of the questions formulated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court was when will the clock for calculating the limitation period run for appeals filed under IBC. Para 16.1 contains the question no.1 to the following effect:

  • “16.1. (i) when will the clock for calculating the limitation period run for appeals filed under the IBC; and”


# 9. Hon’ble Supreme Court after noticing the provision of Rule 22(2) of the NCLAT Rules, 2016, Section 12 of the Limitation Act as well as Section 421 of the Companies Act, 2013 recorded its conclusions in Paras 33, 34 and 35, which are to the following effect:-

  • “33. The answer to the two issues set out in Section C of the judgement- (i) when will the clock for calculating the limitation period run for proceedings under the IBC; and (ii) is the annexation of a certified copy mandatory for an appeal to the NCLAT against an order passed under the IBC – must be based on a harmonious interpretation of the applicable legal regime, given that the IBC is a Code in itself and has overriding effect. Sections 61(1) and (2) of the IBC consciously omit the requirement of limitation being computed from when the “order is made available to the aggrieved party”, in contradistinction to Section 421(3) of the Companies Act. Owing to the special nature of the IBC, the aggrieved party is expected to exercise due diligence and apply for a certified copy upon pronouncement of the order it seeks to assail, in consonance with the requirements of Rule 22(2) of the NCLAT Rules. Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act allows for an exclusion of the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree or order appealed against. It is not open to a person aggrieved by an order under the IBC to await the receipt of a free certified copy under Section 420(3) of the Companies Act 2013 read with Rule 50 of the NCLT and prevent limitation from running. Accepting such a construction will upset the timely framework of the IBC. The litigant has to file its appeal within thirty days, which can be extended up to a period of fifteen days, and no more, upon showing sufficient cause. A sleight of interpretation of procedural rules cannot be used to defeat the substantive objective of a legislation that has an impact on the economic health of a nation.

  • 34. On the second question, Rule 22(2) of the NCLAT Rules mandates the certified copy being annexed to an appeal, which continues to bind litigants under the IBC. While it is true that the tribunals, and even this Court, may choose to exempt parties from compliance with this procedural requirement in the interest of substantial justice, as re-iterated in Rule 14 of the NCLAT Rules, the discretionary waiver does not act as an automatic exception where litigants make no efforts to pursue a timely resolution of their grievance. The appellant having failed to apply for a certified copy, rendered the appeal filed before the NCLAT as clearly barred by limitation.

  • 35. The appellant was present before the NCLT on 31 December 2019 when interim relief was denied and the miscellaneous application was dismissed. The appellant has demonstrated no effort on his part to secure a certified copy of the said order and has relied on the date of the uploading of the order (12 March 2020) on the website. The period of limitation for filing an appeal under Section 61(1) against the order of the NCLT dated 31 December 2019, expired on 30 January 2020 in view of the thirty-day period prescribed under Section 61(2). Any scope for a condonation of delay expired on 14 February 2020, in view of the outer limit of fifteen days prescribed under the proviso to Section 61(2). The lockdown from 23 March 2020 on account of the COVID-19 pandemic and the suo motu order of this Court has had no impact on the rights of the appellant to institute an appeal in this proceeding and the NCLAT has correctly dismissed the appeal on limitation. Accordingly, the present appeal under Section 62 of the IBC stands dismissed.”


# 10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that a litigant has to file an appeal within thirty days which can be extended upto 45 days and not more. In the facts of the said case, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the period provided for filing an appeal under Section 61(1) against the order dated 31.12.2019 expired on 30.01.2020. The date of uploading of order as was claimed as 12.03.2020, in the above case, was not given any credence by the Hon’ble Supreme Court while computing the period of limitation for filing the appeal. Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in Para 33 that owing to the special nature of IBC, the aggrieved party is expected to exercise due diligence and apply for a certified copy upon pronouncement of the order it seeks to assail.


# 11. In the facts of the present case, when order was passed on 06.05.2022, the period of 30 days expired on 06.06.2022. 15 days period upto which delay is condonable under Section 61(2) also expired upto 20.06.2022. The appeal by the Appellant having been filed on 06.07.2022 is clearly beyond the 45 days. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Para 33 has also clearly held that it is not open to a person aggrieved by an order under IBC to await the receipt of a free certified copy and prevent limitation from running. When we look into the certified copy which has been annexed with the Appeal by the Appellant which is sought to be challenged, the certified copy annexed by the Appellant is “free of cost” copy issued on 04.07.2022. It is also to be noticed that the learned counsel for the Applicant (Appellant) was present when the order was pronounced by the Adjudicating Authority on 06.05.2022, which is noted in the order passed on 06.05.2022. When judgment is delivered by the Adjudicating Authority in open court, period of limitation starts running and could not be prevented and Appellant can neither wait for free of cost certified copy and nor he is prevented from applying for certified copy of the order sought to be challenged in appeal. He is entitled to take benefit of Section 12(2) by excluding the period during which certified copy was under preparation.


# 12. In the present case, as noted above, certified copy is claimed to be applied by the Appellant on 15.06.2022 i.e. after expiry of limitation. We, thus, are of the view that present appeal has been filed beyond 45 days from date of the order dated 06.05.2022 and delay of more than 15 days beyond the period of 30 days cannot be condoned by this Tribunal in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 61(2) of the I&B Code.


# 13. Learned counsel for the Appellant has placed reliance on the judgment of this Tribunal dated 02.09.2022 in “Bhawanishankar Harishchandra Sharma vs. Feedback Highways OMT Pvt. Ltd., Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 217/218 of 2022”. In the above case, this tribunal has allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Adjudicating Authority. The Adjudicating Authority in the said case has held that the order dated 10.01.2019 was not pronounced by the Bench competent to do so. This Tribunal held that order dated 10.01.2019 was not passed in accordance with law. Appellate Tribunal in Para 16 has held that order dated 10.01.2019 is void ab-initio. Following observations have been made in Para 16 of the judgment:-

  • “16. Thus, from the resume of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is clear to us that law does not permit that the case is heard by one entity and the order is pronounced by another who has not heard the case at all. In such circumstances, the question posed hereinabove is hereby answered in favour of the Appellant and it is held that the order dated 10.01.2018, having been passed by a bench in which one of the member was not a member of the bench who had heard the matter at the time when it was reserved, is patently illegal and void ab-initio.”


# 14. The above judgment of this Tribunal dated 02.09.2022, thus, does not come to any help to the Appellant in the facts of the present case. In the present case, the order has been pronounced in open court in the presence of learned counsel for the Appellant.


# 15. We, thus, do not find any good ground to allow section 5 application filed by the Appellant. Delay condonation application is dismissed. In result, Memo of Appeal stands rejected. 


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Disclaimer:

The sole purpose of this post is to create awareness on the "IBC - Case Law" and to provide synopsis of the concerned case law, must not be used as a guide for taking or recommending any action or decision. A reader must refer to the full citation of the order & do one's own research and seek professional advice if he intends to take any action or decision in the matters covered in this post.

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