Wednesday, 19 February 2025

Home Kraft Avenues Vs. Jayesh Sanghrajka, RP - Section 3(4) of IBC defines charge and Section 3(31) of IBC states secured interest means and includes “Charge”. Thus, combine reading of all the section clarifies only a Liquidator will not consider a claim without registration, however, the RP is bound to consider a “Charge” and a Creditor having charge is a Secured Creditor.

 NCLAT (2025.02.14) in Home Kraft Avenues Vs. Jayesh Sanghrajka, RP [(2025) ibclaw.in 122 NCLAT, Company Appeal (AT)(INS) No.756/2023], held that; 

  • In addition, the `non-registration of the Mortgage', as per Section 77 of the Companies Act, 2013, is not a sufficient / enough ground, to come to an `opinion', that the `Appellant', is not a `Secured Creditor'. In reality, the 'rights' of a `Mortgagee', under the `Transfer of Property Act', 1882 and the 'SARFAESI Act', are not to be diluted, in terms of Regulation 21 of IBBI (Liquidation process) Regulations, 2016.

  • Section 3(4) of IBC defines charge and Section 3(31) of IBC states secured interest means and includes “Charge”. Thus, combine reading of all the section clarifies only a Liquidator will not consider a claim without registration, however, the RP is bound to consider a “Charge” and a Creditor having charge is a Secured Creditor.


Blogger’s Comments; With all humility, I have a different point of view. Section 77(1) & 77(3) of The Companies Act, 2013 reads as under;

  • 77. Duty to register charges, etc.—

  • (1) XXXX

  • Provided also that any subsequent registration of a charge shall not prejudice any right acquired in respect of any property before the charge is actually registered.

  • 77(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no charge created by a company shall be taken into account by the liquidator or any other creditor unless it is duly registered under sub-section (1) and a certificate of registration of such charge is given by the Registrar under sub-section (2).


RP, recognizing the unregistered charge in CIRP, will adversely affect the rights (priority of charge) of other secured creditors, in case distribution is decided by CoC on the basis of value of security interest, as permitted by the Appellate Authority in the following case


NCLAT (2025.01.30) in HDFC Bank Ltd. Vs Pratim Bayal, RP of Birla Tyres Ltd. & Ors. [Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1472 of 2023] held that;.
  • The use of expression "may" in Section 30(4) clearly indicate the discretion vested in the CoC to take into account of the matter of security interest of the secured creditors in approving the Resolution Plan.

  • The decision of the CoC approving the Resolution Plan as per security interest was in accordance with Section 30(4) and has rightly been not interfered with by the Adjudicating Authority in the impugned order.


Excerpts of the order;

This appeal is filed against an impugned order dated 02.05.2023. The appellant is aggrieved of the fact it has been kept in the category of an unsecured creditor instead of being a secured creditor. 


# 2. The learned counsel for the Appellant has referred to Loan Agreement dated 29.10.2015 to show the Appellant had granted a loan of Rs.11 crores to the Corporate Debtor on 29.10.2015, initially payable after three years, but the date was later extended from time to time. Two options were given qua interest payable on such loan (a) the interest @ 18% or (b) four flats bearing No.1501, 1502, 1504 and 1601 could be transferred in favour of the appellant towards interest in its full and final payment. It was one of the clauses of the agreement that in case the Corporate Debtor fails to pay the principal amount of Rs.11 crore then also four apartments bearing No.1901, 1902, 1904 and 2001 would be transferred in favour of the appellant. Admittedly the Corporate Debtor could not pay the principal amount of Rs.11 crore and the cheques given were dishonoured due to insufficient funds. 


# 3. On 29.06.2020 the Corporate Debtor was admitted to CIRP. The appellant filed two claims, one in Form C for Rs.11 crore as a secured financial creditor and another in Form CA as the holder of four flats towards the interest payable. 


# 4. The RP had admitted the claim of the appellant as home buyer qua four flats allotted in lieu of interest and the appellant has no grievance qua the same. However, he is aggrieved as the four flats to be given to him towards non-payment of principal amount Rs.11 crores, the appellant was shown as  an unsecured financial creditor. To proceed further it would be important to examine relevant clauses of the agreement dated 29.10.2015 as under: 

  • “2.1 It is agreed by and between the Parties that the tenure of the Loan shall be twenty nine (29) months (Loan Period) to be commenced from the date of receipt of the first tranche of Loan amount (Loan Period). The Developer shall within fifteen (15) days from the expiry of the Loan Period i.e. on or before November 15, 2017, repay the entire Loan to the Firm in the manner provided in this Agreement. 

  • “3.1 It is agreed by and between the Parties that the Developer would be liable to pay to the firm, interest on a lump sum basis of Rs.____(Interest Amount) on the Loan from the date of receipt of the Loan tranches as provided above in Clause 2, till expiry of the Loan Period as and by way of interest during the entire loan period. 

  • 3.2 However, in lieu of the Interest Amount Payable by the Developer to the Firm on the Loan advanced in terms of this Agreement, the Developer has proposed to allot, transfer and assign to the Firm, in consideration of the Interest Amount four apartments being apartment No.s 1501, 1502, 1504 and 1601, admeasuring in aggregate about 4508 sq ft carpet area and 9304 sq ft saleable area, on the 15th and 16th floor of the Building to be constructed on the Property by the Developer together with four car parking spaces in the (basement/podium/automatic) in the Building (the Car Parking Spaces) (the aforesaid apartment No.1501, 1502, 1504 and No.1601 and the Car Parking Spaces are hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Allotted Apartments”) and more particularly described in schedule II hereunder written, to which the Firm has agreed. The floor plans of the Allotted apartments are annexed as Annexure III to this Agreement. 

  • 3.3 The Developer has, simultaneously on the execution of this Agreement, executed four (4) separate Agreements for Sale, as required under the provisions of the Maharashtra Ownership of Flats Act, 1961 (MOFA), in respect of each of the Allotted apartments thereby, inter alia, selling, transferring and conveying the Allotted Apartments absolutely in favour of the Firm in consideration of the Interest Amount and on the terms and conditions more particularly set out therein. It is clarified that the Firm shall not be liable to pay to the Developer, any amount under any name whatsoever, in respect of the Allotted apartments save and except the amounts shown specifically payable in the Agreements for Sale and the Interest amount shall be deemed to be an adequate and full purchase consideration in respect of the transfer/conveyance of the Allotted Apartments in favour of the Firm. 

  • 4.1 In order to secure the due and punctual repayment of the Loan (in proportion to the amount lent by the Firm in terms of Clause Error ! Reference source not found) , the developer has allotted to the Firm, as and by way of security, four apartments being apartment No.1901, 1902, 1904 and 2001 admeasuring about 4508 sq ft carpet area and 9304 sq ft saleable area in aggregate, on the 19th and 20th floor of the building to be constructed on the Property by the Developer together with four car parking spaces in the (basement/podum/automatic) in the Building (the “Car Parking”) (the aforesaid apartment No. No.1901, No.1902, No.1904 and No.2001 and the Car Parking are hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Secured Apartments”) and more particularly described in Schedule III hereunder written, with the following undertaking: 

  • 4.1.1 The Developer shall, simultaneously on the execution of this Agreement, sign and execute the Agreement for Sale (AFS of Secured Apartments) in respect of the Secured Apartments in favour of the Firm. 

  • 4.1.2 The Developer shall also, simultaneously on the execution of this Agreement sign and execute a Power of Attorney (POA) in favour of the Firm thereby inter alia, authorising (1) the Firm or its partners/representatives to register the AFS of Secured Apartments in terms of this Agreement and (2) such other matters incidental to the main matters including but not limited to procuring the NOC from ECL Finance. 

  • 4.1.3 The signed and executed AFS of Secured Apartments shall, however, neither be stamped nor registered but shall be kept in escrow with Rajani, Singhania and Partners, Solicitors (Escrow Agent) 

  • 4.1.6.3 have the AFS of Secured Apartments duly stamped and registered and have the Secured Apartments conveyed, transferred and assured unto the Firm absolutely in lieu of the repayment of the Loan. 

  • 4.1.7 In the event the Firm opts to have the Secured Apartments conveyed, transferred and assured in favour of the Firm, the Escrow Agent shall, upon receipt of joint intimation from the Parties that the Developer has failed to repay the entire Loan within the Loan Period set out herein, immediately release the signed and executed AFS of Secured Apartments and the POA to the Firm. 

  • 5.3 In the event the Developer repays the entire amount of Loan within fifteen (15) days from the expiry of the Loan Period as 5 provided hereinabove, the Escrow Agent shall, upon receipt of intimation from the Firm that the Developer has repaid the entire Loan within the period set out herein, immediately release the AFS of Secured Apartments and the executed POA to the Developer and the Developer shall thereafter, be entitled to deal with the Secured Apartments in such manner as it may deem fit without any recourse to the firm. 


# 5. The learned senior counsel for the appellant argued the appellant has a first charge on four flats secured for repayment of its principal amount of Rs.11 crore. He relied upon Sections 3(4), 3(31) and 3(33) of the IBC Code. The sections are as below: 

  • “3(4) “charge” means an interest or lien created on the property or assets of any person or any of its undertakings or both, as the case may be, as security and includes a mortgage; 

  • “3(30) "secured creditor" means a creditor in favour of whom security interest is created; 

  • 3(31) “security interest” means right, title or interest or a claim to property, created in favour of, or provided for a secured creditor by a transaction which secures payment or performance of an obligation and includes mortgage, charge, hypothecation, assignment and encumbrance or any other agreement or arrangement securing payment or performance of any obligation of any person: Provided that security interest shall not include a performance guarantee; 

  • 3(33) “transaction” includes a agreement or arrangement in writing for the transfer of assets, or funds, goods or services, from or to the corporate debtor; 


# 6. Thus it was argued per above facts and law, the appellant needs to be treated as a secured creditor and its name ought to have been included in the list of secured creditors.


# 7. Thus the issue is whether the appellant is a secured creditor?. The appellant did file an application before the Ld. NCLT to claim its status as a secured creditor for the principal amount of loan granted. 


# 8. The impugned order, however, rejected the claim of the appellant only on the ground the charge was not registered under Section 77 of the Companies Act, 2013. The impugned order records: 

  • “14.xxxxxThe security of 4 flats, given under the loan agreement is not registered with the registrar of companies in terms of Section 77 of the Companies act, 2013. It is noticed that Section 77(3) the Companies Act, 2013 provides that no charge created by a company shall be taken into account by the liquidator appointed under this act or I&B code or any other creditor unless it is duly registered u/s 77(1) and a certificate of registration is given by the Registrar. Accordingly, this bench is of the view that the resolution professional has not committed any error in classifying the applicant as unsecured financial creditor.” 


# 9. The respondent relies upon the reasoning given in the impugned order. 


# 10. Heard. 

# 11. Section 77 (3) of Companies Act 2013 read as follows:- 

  • “Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no charge created by a company shall be taken into account by the ‘liquidator’ or any other creditor unless it is duly registered under subsection (1) and a certificate of registration of such charge is given by the Registrar under sub-section (2). 

  • (4) Nothing in sub-section (3) shall prejudice any contract or obligation for the repayment of the money secured by a charge.” 


# 12. A bare reading of Section 77 (3) of Companies Act, 2013 casts an obligation upon ‘Liquidator’. However, the present case is confined to the duty and role of ‘Resolution Professional’ and admittedly company is not under liquidation. 


# 13. The intent of legislature was never to apply Section 77 of Companies Act upon the ‘Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process’. This is for the reason the treatment of “secured creditor” and “security interest” in liquidation  process is entirely different from that of during the ‘Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process’. A ‘secured creditor’ under ‘liquidation process’ has an indefeasible right to realise its security interest by excluding its assets from the Liquidation Estate per Section 52. In case of ‘liquidation’ a ‘Secured Creditor’ who intends to realise its ‘security’ outside the ‘waterfall mechanism’ as per section 53, has to prove that he has a “Charge” over a property. In that case the Liquidator has to ‘recognise a charge’ which is “registered as per section 77 of Companies Act”. Further, the definition of “Liquidation Estate” under 36(3) (g) includes ‘secured assets’ only and only if the ‘secured creditor’ has relinquished its interest. Distinctively, Section 18 (1) (f) and 25 (2) (a) mandates the Resolution Professional to take control of ‘all assets’ of the Corporate Debtor irrespective of any encumbrance. Further, no secured creditor has right to ‘realise’ its ‘security interest’ during ‘CIRP’


# 14. For the same reason while Regulation 21 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (‘Liquidation’ Process) Regulations, 2016 prescribes evidences for proving “security interest”, consciously no such corresponding provision has been included in Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process) Regulations, 2016. Only under liquidation process a question of charge under section 77 comes into play and the same has nothing to do with “CIRP”. 


# 15. Legislature never intended that “registration of charge” under section 77 is sine qua non to qualify as “secured creditor”. The Resolution Professional has to follow the provisions of IBC. Section 3 (4) of IBC defines ‘charge’ as interest or lien created on a property as ‘security’ and includes mortgage. As per Section 3(30) ‘Secured Creditor’ means a Creditor in favour 8 of whom ‘security interest’ is created. Further Section 3(31) states “Security interest” means right, title or interest or a claim to a property created in favor of or provided for a ‘Secured Creditor’ by a ‘transaction’ which ‘secures payment’ or performance of an obligation and includes mortgage, charge, hypothecation, assignment and encumbrance or any other agreement or ‘arrangement’ securing payment or performance of any obligation of any person. Section 3(33) states that “transaction” includes an ‘agreement’ or ‘arrangement in writing’ for transfer of assets, or funds, goods or service from or to the Corporate Debtor and section 3(34) of IBC states that transfer includes mortgage, pledge, gift, loan or any other form of transfer of right, title or lien. ‘Registered Charge under section 77’ is not mentioned in the definition of ‘secured creditor’ and infact a creditor is secured by way of any ‘arrangement’ like the ‘loan agreement’ in present case which secures 4 flats as secured property of Appellants against repayment of its Loan. 


# 16. This Tribunal in “Canara Bank vs. Mr. S. Rajendran, Liquidator of M/s Cape Engineers Pvt. Ltd. [Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 277 of 2023]” held: 

  • “53. In addition, the `non-registration of the Mortgage', as per Section 77 of the Companies Act, 2013, is not a sufficient / enough ground, to come to an `opinion', that the `Appellant', is not a `Secured Creditor'. In reality, the 'rights' of a `Mortgagee', under the `Transfer of Property Act', 1882 and the 'SARFAESI Act', are not to be diluted, in terms of Regulation 21 of IBBI (Liquidation process) Regulations, 2016.” 


# 17. Thus, it is a settled law right of a mortgagee under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 cannot be taken away only because of non-registration of the charge u/s 77 of the Companies Act, 2013. 


# 18. This is in consonance with Section 77 of the Companies Act 2013. Section 78(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 states no charge shall be created by the Company shall be taken in account by the “Liquidator” unless it is registered under subsection 1 and 2. Section 77 (4) of the Companies Act, 2013 clarifies nothing in subsection (c) shall prejudice any contract or obligation for repayment of money secured by charge. The obligation is only on the Liquidator. In fact, Section 3(4) of IBC defines charge and Section 3(31) of IBC states secured interest means and includes “Charge”. Thus, combine reading of all the section clarifies only a Liquidator will not consider a claim without registration, however, the RP is bound to consider a “Charge” and a Creditor having charge is a Secured Creditor. 


# 19. In the case of Pashchimanchal Vidyut (Civil Appeal No.7976 of 2019) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has clarified Section 3(31) of IBC is wider than Section 77 and 78 of Companies Act and defines security interest, however, the issue of non registration of charge was kept open. 


# 20. In fact, in Canara Bank (Supra) it was held Section 77 of the Companies Act, 2013 is not a sine qua non for a Creditor being a Secured Creditor and held it is not a sufficient ground to reject such claim of Creditor. The said Order was passed after considering Volkswagen case as well. 


# 21. Thus non registration of charge per Section 77 of Companies Act, 2013 will not make a difference in the claim of the Applicant being treated as a Secured Creditor.


# 22. Hence, there exists a debt and the Corporate Debtor had secured it by creation of security interest/charge., therefore, the Appellant is a secured financial creditor. Necessary correction be thus made in the record. 


23. The next issue was qua a direction in the impugned order to initiate proceedings against the appellant under section 66 of the Code. It is alleged there was never any application moved by the Resolution Professional seeking initiation of proceedings under Section 66 of the Code and this part of impugned order appears to be violative of principle of natural justice as no show cause/or notice was ever issued to the Appellant giving them opportunity to contend as to why such directions could not have been passed and that such direction has rather been passed in an application filed by the Appellant himself seeking categorisation of it as a secured creditor. 


24. Admittedly the aforesaid proceedings are presently initiated and there is no final finding by the Ld. NCLT as to if appellant is a related party or not, hence it would be premature at this stage to give any finding on this issue. Thus while keeping this issue open, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is hereby set aside. Pending applications, if any, are disposed of. 


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Tuesday, 18 February 2025

Shikha La! & Anr. Vs. Earthcon Universal Infratech Pvt. Ltd. - Thus, sine qua non for termination of the agreement between the parties was the refund of the amount as well as cancellation of the document executed between the parties which did not happen and before that the Appellants changed their mind and informed the Respondent that they do not want cancellation of their flat and refund of their money etc.

  NCLAT (2025.01.21) in Shikha La! & Anr.  Vs. Earthcon Universal Infratech Pvt. Ltd. [Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 1027 of 2024 & LA. No. 3408 of 2024], held that; 

  • Thus, sine qua non for termination of the agreement between the parties was the refund of the amount as well as cancellation of the document executed between the parties which did not happen and before that the Appellants changed their mind and informed the Respondent that they do not want cancellation of their flat and refund of their money etc.


Excerpts of the order;

This appeal is directed against the order dated 18.12 2023, passed by the National Company Law Tribunal, New Delhi, Court No. III (in short 'Tribunal') by which an application filed by the Appellants bearing I.A No. 2791 of 2021 with the prayer to direct the RP to include the name of the Appellants in the category of 'Flat Buyers', has been dismissed.


# 2. The Appellants who are the father and daughter had applied for allotment of an apartment on 16th floor, D-1602, 4 BHK, Size 2225 Sq. Ft. for total sale consideration of Rs. 52,59,900/-in the project 'Casa Royale' at plot no. GH-10, Sector 1, Greater Noida West, Greater Noida, UP- 201306, an undertaking by the Respondent/Corporate Debtor (CD) vide booking form dated 21.01.2019. A Builder Buyer's Agreement dated 09.01.2019 was executed between the parties and as per Article 4 of the said agreement, CD was to complete the construction work of the said apartment on or before 12 months with grace period of 3 months i.e. 09.04.2020 from the date of agreement. 


# 3. The Appellant deposited total amount of Rs. 26,22,9552- from 22 01.2019 to 22.03.2019 and since no construction was being done, therefore, the Appellant requested for cancellation of their allotment and refund of their money. In this regard, the appellant submitted a cancellation affidavit dated 03.08.2019 with original documents to AR of the CD. It was stated in the affidavit that the Appellant shall have no dues left after taking the refundable amount but neither the CD responded to their affidavit nor refunded the amount.


# 4. The Appellant also registered a case before the UPRERA on 05.09.2019. The argument in the said case was heard and order was reserved but vide order dated 28.02.2020, UPRERA adjourned the case and kept the application in abeyance because the CD was admitted into the CIRP.


# 5. An application under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (In short 'Code') was filed by the Financial Creditor, namely, M/s Nisus Finance 85 Investment LLP 85 Anr. against the CD which was admitted on 08.11.2020 and Jitendra Arora was appointed as Interim Resolution Professional (HIP) but subsequently Gaurav Katiyar was confirmed as the RP. 


# 6. It is also pertinent to mention that the resolution plan submitted by consortium of M/s D S Infraheights Pvt. Ltd. and M/s Anand Buildtech Pvt. Ltd. which was approved by the CoC in its 26th meeting held on 19.08.2023 by 70.18% voting share. The RP of the CD submitted an application bearing I.A No. 4466 of 2023 for approval of the resolution plan in terms of Section 30(6) r/w Section 31 of the Code on 22.08.2023 which is pending adjudication.


# 7. When the Appellant came to know about the CIRP of the CD, they submitted their claim in Form CA being financial creditor on 25.02.2020 which was accepted by the earlier RP vide email dated 03.03.2020.


# 8. The Appellant No. 1, vide letter dated 19.11.2020 and email dated 20.12.2020 addressed to RP, withdrew the cancellation and opted for the flat as no refund was made and none of the documents executed between the parties were cancelled or terminated.


# 9. The RP vide his email dated 05.01.2021 circulated the list of homebuyers as on 24.03.2021 in which the Appellant No. 1 was reflected as "flat cancelled/surrendered, claim collated on provisional basis" despite the fact that the Appellants opted for flat by withdrawing the cancelation vide email dated 20.12.2020 and hence, the list sent by the RP was. not found proper and the Appellant fell in the category of flat buyer. The appellant through their counsel, vide email dated 15.04.2021, requested to correct the list dated 24.03.2021 by including the name of the Appellant in the category of flat buyers but did not receive any response, therefore, the Appellant filed I.A No. 2791 of 2021 before the Tribunal.


# 10. The application was contested by the CD alleging that BBA was executed on 09.01.2019 and as per the said BBA, the CD was to offer the possession of the flat to the Appellants by April, 2019 but the Appellant submitted an affidavit of cancellation on August, 2019 and as per para 4 and 8 of the affidavit of cancellation, the CD before the insolvency commencement date repudiated the contract and decided to refund the money.


# 11. The Tribunal dismissed the application of the Appellants on the ground that they had willfully and voluntarily surrendered their unitand RP had rightly collated the claim under the refund category and  as such the Appellants were held entitled to refund the money as the only remedy left.


# 12. The Tribunal found that RP had not committed any illegality with respect to the Appellants classification under the e refund category and dismissed the application bearing I.A No. 2791 of 2021 on 18.12.2023.


# 13. Counsel for the Appellants has• argued that though the Appellants had submitted cancellation certificate but it was clearly mentioned that the Appellant shall have no right over the property in question after taking the refundable amount, so far neither the amount has been refunded nor the document executed between the parties for the allotment of the flat was cancelled or terminated. It is further submitted that the Appellant had also sent a letter dated 19.11.2020 brining to the notice of the Respondent its decision to keep the flat and return all the original booking documents because by that time Respondent had neither returned the amount received from the Appellants nor cancelled the documents executed between the parties, therefore, there is no binding contract between the parties. It is further submitted that against the same Respondent/CD one Mukesh Sharma filed an I.A No. 1822 of 2021 before the same Court on behalf of 31 home buyers in the same project. In this case, there was a tripartite agreement amongst buyers, seller and the Bank being the subvention scheme home buyers. In that case also there was a cancellation affidavit but no refund was made nor the agreement was cancelled, therefore, the Tribunal allowed the application with the following order:-

  • "With regard to prayer (e) of the application, we direct the RP to consider the claim of the buyers who had submitted an affidavit for cancellation but to whom no refund was made, nor the tripartite agreement was  cancelled, in respect of such buyers, the unit cancellation shall be revoked and they shall rank pan i pasu in relation to all other homebuyers in class in relation to all their claim, rights and obligations etc."


# 14. It is further submitted that in another application filed by two applicants / joint allottees bearing I.A No. 2230 of 2021, namely, Savita Rani Bakshi and Sikha Bakshi. The allotment was cancelled on the basis of execution of settlement deed dated 05.07.2019 and it was agreed before the Mediator that the amount of the home buyers shall be returned. In the said case also, direction was issued to the RP to consider the claim of the said Applicants as home buyers/ allottees and in this regard, the following observations have been made:-

  • "10. We have heard the Ld. Counsel for both the sides and perused the petition, reply along with documents as well as written submissions filed by them. On an analysis of the averments and pleadings it is seen that the Corporate Debtor /Respondent has admitted the claim of the. Applicants and in the settlement before the mediation, it has also agreed to refund an amount of Rs. 30.40 Lakhs. In the said settlement deed, it is not mentioned that the settlement deed will override the earlier agreement entered between the parties. Therefore, the contention raised by the Respondent that the earlier agreement stands cancelled / revoked automatically is not correct.

  • 11. From perusal of the submissions made by Applicants it is seen that Corporate Debtor has been in default with regard to honoring the Mediation Agreement arrived at between the parties. It is clearly brought on record that the Applicants have re-served their right towards the flat in que-stion till such time the terms of agreement are complied with. The Applicants in this case have already paid more than 95o / o of the Base Sale Consideration for the Flat B-203 and so far, no third-party interest is stated to have been created With respect to the said flat. Therefore, we feel no prejudice is likely to be caused to anyone if prayers of the Applicants are allowed.

  • 12. Further the Counsel for the Applicants have already stated on bar that Applicants shall pay all such legitimate payments qua the said flat as may be demanded from the class/category of Homebuyers to whom any flat has been allotted but the possession has not been delivered as part of the resolution plan as may he approved 1;>y this Authority. We are also convinced that in the given facts and circumstances of the case the Corporate Debtor cannot be permitted to undue benefit of its own wrongs.

  • 13. In view of the above, we hereby allow the present petition in its totality and direct the Resolution Professional to consider the claim of Applicants at par with "Home buyers/ Allottees: other approved units sold and possession not yet given" and consequently extend same/identical benefits to the Applicants as are available to all other allottees/homebuyers. It is made clear that the Applicants shall remain liable to pay all balance • dues in terms of Builder Buyer Agreement and the Resolution Plan as may be approved by this Authority. Accordingly, IA is disposed of."


# 15. On the other hand, Counsel for Respondent has submitted that the claim of the Appellant cannot to be collated as homebuyer instead of financial creditor - in class - refund category because they have willfully and voluntarily surrendered their unit which is acknowledged by way of an affidavit of cancellation filed by the Appellants. It is submitted that as per of Section 5(8)(f) and explanation, to become to homebuyer there should be a valid subsisting builder buyer agreement or allotment but the Appellants before the commencement of CIRP had surrendered their allotment to the CD therefore the RP had collated the claim of Appellant as financial creditor in class under refund category. It is further submitted that the cancellation has been asked for by the Appellants, therefore, the Appellant cannot approbate and reprobate at this stage for the allotment of the flat and to be included in the list as a home buyer.


# 16. As regards, the orders passed in I.A No. 1822 of 2021 is concerned, it is submitted that the said order was passed in the context of subvention buyers whereas there is nothing on record to show that the Appellants are under the category of subvention buyers. It is further submitted that the decision in I.A No. 2230 of 2021 is not applicable because in that case it was concluded by the Tribunal that settlement cannot resulted into novation and older BBA stands on the date of commencement of CIRP whereas in the present case the Appellants have acknowledged the cancellation by their affidavit.


# 17. We have heard Counsel for the parties and perused the record with their able assistance.


# 18. It has been categorically averred in the affidavit of cancellation by the Appellants that "after taking refundable amount from the • Company, I shall have no dues left with the Company in any manner whatsoever. It was also averred that "I agree to surrender all relevant original documents given by the company to me at the time of booking and later on, i.e .allotment letter, receipt etc. regarding the said unit". The Appellant made clear to the Respondent that they shall not have any right over the allotment of flat after taking refundable amount from the company which was a point from which the relationship between both the parties had come to an end but before the amount could have been returned by the Respondent, the Appellant served a letter dated 19.11.2020 in which it was clearly mentioned that the appellants have not received payment from the Respondent, therefore, the Appellants changed their approach to keep their flat and return of their original booking documents. Thus, sine qua non for termination of the agreement between the parties was the refund of the amount as well as cancellation of the document executed between the parties which did not happen and before that the Appellants changed their mind and informed the Respondent that they do not want cancellation of their flat and refund of their money etc. In this regard, it is also relevant to refer to the order passed by the Tribunal in I.A No. 1822 of 2021 by which the application filed by similarly situated persons has been allowed on the ground that after the cancellation no refund was made and nor tripartite agreement was cancelled. Even if that was a case where the home buyers have taken loan from the Bank by executing a tripartite agreement and that is why called subvention home buyers but it does not make any difference in so far as the case of the Appellant is concerned because the moot issue is about the refund of the money and cancellation of documents which would have brought an end to the relationship between the parties as the buyer and the seller.


# 19. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we find force in the submission made by the Appellants and hence, the present appeal is hereby allowed, the impugned order is set aside and direction is issued to RP to include the name of the Appellants in the category of flat buyers. No costs. Pending IAs, if any, are closed.

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Greenshift Initiatives Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Sonu Gupta, Resolution Professional - Disqualification that existed at the time of initiating the CIRP cannot be removed by a mere assignment. It is submitted that assignment is transfer of one's right to recover debt to another person and that the rights of the 'assignee' are no better than those of an 'assignor'.

 NCLAT (2025.02.11) in Greenshift Initiatives Pvt. Ltd.  Vs. Sonu Gupta,   Resolution Professional  [Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No.1936 of 2024], held that; 

  • As such, the financial creditor who in praesenti is not a related party, would not be debarred from being a member of the CoC. However, in case where the related party financial creditor divests itself of its shareholding or ceases to become a related party in a business capacity with the sole intention of participating in the CoC and sabotage the CIRP, by diluting the vote share of other creditors or otherwise, it would be in keeping with the object and purpose of the first proviso to Section 21(2), to consider the former related party creditor, as one debarred under the first proviso.

  • It is based on the first principles of law that 'one cannot assign a better right that he himself possess'

  • Disqualification that existed at the time of initiating the CIRP cannot be removed by a mere assignment. It is submitted that assignment is transfer of one's right to recover debt to another person and that the rights of the 'assignee' are no better than those of an 'assignor'.

  • Accordingly, the assignee does not get the right to change its status from 'related' to 'unrelated'. At the same time, it is humbly submitted that the bar is on the person who is holding the debt and not the nature of the debt per se. It will not be entirely correct to bar somebody (who is otherwise eligible) from voting just because it bought the debt from a related party.”


Excerpts of the order;

11.02.2025: Resolution Professional appearing in person submits that the Resolution Professional does not propose to file a reply. We record the statement.


# 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties. This appeal has been filed against order of the Adjudicating Authority dated 13.01.2025 by which order application filed by the Appellant being IA No.331/2024 has been rejected.


# 3. Brief facts necessary to be noticed for deciding this appeal are:

3.1 CIRP against the Corporate Debtor - Rolta Bi & Big Data Analytics Pvt. Ltd. commenced on 13.10.2023. Form A was published on 16.10.2023 and last date was 28.10.2023. Appellant’s case is that it entered into Assignment Agreement on 06.11.2023 with Rolta Pvt. Ltd. and in terms of the said Assignment Agreement, Rolta Pvt. Ltd. assigned the debt for an amount of Rs.3,25,000-/to the Assignee. A claim was filed by the Applicant before the Resolution Professional and claim was admitted for Rs.3,48,742/-. However, the Applicant was not permitted a seat in the CoC, hence, an IA was filed by the Applicant to give a seat in CoC with voting rights, which application has been rejected by the impugned order. Aggrieved by which order this appeal has been filed.


# 4. Learned counsel for the Appellant submits that the mere fact that Rolta Pvt. Ltd., the Assignor was a related party cannot ipso-facto led to conclusion that Assignee/Applicant is also a related party. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the Appellant has relied on judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Phoenix ARC Private Limited vs. Spade Financial Services Ltd. & Ors., (2021) 3 SCC 475”.


# 5. The Resolution Professional appearing in person opposing the submission of learned counsel for the Appellant submits that the Appellant has entered into Assignment Agreement subsequent to commencement of CIRP with a motive to come in the CoC. A reply was also filed by the Resolution Professional opposing the application of the Appellant.


# 6. We have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.


# 7. There is not dispute to the facts and sequence of events. CIRP was commenced against the Corporate Debtor on 13.10.2023. Public Announcement was made on 16.10.2023 inviting claims and last date of submission of claims was 28.10.2023. Subsequently, Assignment Agreement was entered between the Appellant and Rolta Pvt. Ltd. on 06.11.2023 and on that basis the Appellant claim to be member of the CoC. The judgment in Phoenix ARC Private Limited has been relied by the Appellant in Para 100, 101 & 102, which is as follows:

  • “100. Therefore, it could be stated that where a financial creditor seeks a position on the CoC on the basis of a debt which was created when it was a related party of the corporate debtor, the exclusion which is created by the first proviso to Section 21(2) must apply. For, it is on the strength of the financial debt as defined in Section 5(8) that an entity claiming as a financial creditor under Section 5(7) seeks a position on the CoC under Section 21(2). If the definition of the expression ‘related party’ under section 5(24) applies at the time when the debt was created, the exclusion in the first proviso to Section 21(2) would stand attracted.

  • 101. However, if such an interpretation is given to the first proviso of Section 21(2), all financial creditors would stand excluded if they were a ‘related party’ of the corporate debtor at the time when the financial debt was created. This may arguably lead to absurd conclusions for entities which have legitimately takenover the debt of related parties, or where the related party entity had stopped being a ‘related party’ long ago.

  • 102. In this regard, it is relevant to note the observations in the Insolvency Law Committee Report of 2020 clarifying the eligibility of third-party assignees of the debt of a related party creditor, to be members of the CoC. It was observed:

  • “11.09 … As a third-party assignee, who by itself is not a related party, would not have any such conflict of interest, it should not be disabled from participating in the CoC. Further, the aforesaid disability is not related to the debt itself but is based on the relationship existing between a related party creditor and the corporate debtor. Therefore, as the disability imposed under the first proviso to Section 21(2) pertains to the related party financial creditor and not to the debt it is owed, the Committee agreed that it is clear that when a related party financial creditor assigns her debt to a third party in good faith, such third party should not be disqualified from participating, voting or being represented in a meeting of the CoC.

  • 11.10. However, the Committee discussed that in certain cases, a related party creditor may assign its debts with the intention of circumventing the disability imposed under the first proviso to Section 21(2) by indirectly participating in the CoC through the assignee. As a related party is expressly prohibited from participating in the CoC, it cannot do so indirectly by assigning its debt to a third-party assignee for the purposes of circumventing this restriction. Therefore, in order to prevent any misuse, the Committee recommended that prior to including an assignee of a related party financial creditor within the CoC, the resolution professional should verify that the assignee is not a related party of the corporate debtor. In cases where it may be proved that a related party financial creditor had assigned or transferred its debts to a third party in bad faith or with a fraudulent intent to vitiate the proceedings under the Code, the assignee should be treated akin to a related party financial creditor under the first proviso to Section 21(2).”    (emphasis supplied)”


# 8. There can be no disputed to the proposition laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above case that the financial creditor who in praesenti is not a related party, would not be debarred from being a member of CoC, but that proposition comes with a caveat that it should not be with intention of participating in the CoC and sabotage the CIRP by diluting the vote share of other creditors and it would be in keeping with the object and purpose of the first proviso to section 21(2), to consider said party out of CoC. In Para 103 of the judgment the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down following:

  • “103. Thus, it has been clarified that the exclusion under the first proviso to Section 21(2) is related not to the debt itself but to the relationship existing the financial creditor party financial creditor and the corporate debtor. As such, the financial creditor who in praesenti is not a related party, would not be debarred from being a member of the CoC. However, in case where the related party financial creditor divests itself of its shareholding or ceases to become a related party in a business capacity with the sole intention of participating in the CoC and sabotage the CIRP, by diluting the vote share of other creditors or otherwise, it would be in keeping with the object and purpose of the first proviso to Section 21(2), to consider the former related party creditor, as one debarred under the first proviso.


# 9. Learned counsel for the Appellant has pointed out the reply, which was filed by the Resolution Professional before the Adjudicating Authority. Resolution Professional clearly opposed the claim of the Appellant to be given seat in the CoC. Para 5 of the Reply gives details of the facts, which is as follows:

  • “5. The Applicant submitted its claim to me and after verification, I admitted the claim amount and I sent an email on 18.12.2023 to the applicant stating that, "Dear Sir, With reference to the trailing mail, please be updated that your claim as a Financial Creditor of Rs. 3,48,742/- is hereby accepted in full. However, the claim was originally submitted by the related party of the corporate debtor and the said assignment took place on 06.11.2023 which is after the CIRP commencement date i.e. 13.10.2023. Therefore, participation in CoC and voting rights cannot be given with respect to the said claim as per the provisions of section 21 of IBC, 2016".

  • It is humbly submitted that the Applicant is not entitled to right of representation, participation or voting in a meeting of the committee of creditors as on date. It is based on the first principles of law that 'one cannot assign a better right that he himself possess', if a related party creditor has assigned its debts with ulterior motives, the diminished voting share of the applicant creditor would be appropriate. Disqualification that existed at the time of initiating the CIRP cannot be removed by a mere assignment. It is submitted that assignment is transfer of one's right to recover debt to another person and that the rights of the 'assignee' are no better than those of an 'assignor'. Accordingly, the assignee does not get the right to change its status from 'related' to 'unrelated'. At the same time, it is humbly submitted that the bar is on the person who is holding the debt and not the nature of the debt per se. It will not be entirely correct to bar somebody (who is otherwise eligible) from voting just because it bought the debt from a related party.”


# 10. In the facts of the present case and sequence of time, it is clear that the Assignment was only with object to get a seat in the CoC to affect the interest and rights of other creditors. We, thus, are of the view that the Adjudicating Authority has rightly rejected the application of the Appellant claiming right in the CoC. We thus do not find any error in the order of the Adjudicating Authority. There is no merit in the appeal. Appeal is dismissed.


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Disclaimer:

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