Monday, 2 November 2020

Dharani Sugars and Chemicals Ltd. Vs. Union of India & Ors - Constitutional validity of RBI circular dated 12.02.2018.

Hon’ble Supreme Court (02.04.2019) in Dharani Sugars and Chemicals Ltd. Vs. Union of India & Ors. [Transferred Case (Civil) No. 66 of 2018 in Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 1399 of 2018] held that the impugned RBI circular is ultra vires Section 35AA of the Banking Regulation Act,

Issues;

i. Constitutional validity of sections 35AA and 35AB introduced by the Banking Regulation (Amendment) Act, 2017.

ii. Scope of power of the RBI under section 35AA vis-a-vis the impugned circular.

iii. Constitutional validity of the impugned circular issued by the RBI.


Excerpts of the order;

# 2. It will be noticed that the salient features of this circular are that restructuring in respect of borrower entities de hors the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 [“Insolvency Code”] can only occur if the resolution plan that involves restructuring is agreed to by all lenders, i.e., 100 per cent concurrence. Secondly, what has been chosen to be the subject matter of the circular is debts with an aggregate exposure of INR 2000 crore and over on or after 01.03.2018. With respect to such debts, if default persists for 180 days from 01.03.2018, or if the date of first default is after 01.03.2018, then 180 days calculated with effect from that date, lenders shall file applications singly or jointly under the Insolvency Code within 15 days from the expiry of the aforesaid 180 days. In short, unless a restructuring process in respect of debts with an aggregate exposure of over INR 2000 crore is fully implemented on or before 195 days from the reference date or date of first default, the lenders will have to file applications as financial creditors under the Insolvency Code. It will be noticed that the sources of power for issuance of the aforesaid circular have been stated to be Section 35A of the Banking Regulation Act read with the Central Government’s circular dated 05.05.2017, Sections 35AA and 35AB of the said Act, and Section 45L of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 [“RBI Act”]. It may be stated here that by an order dated 11.09.2018, this Court allowed various transfer petitions and made orders in Writ Petition No. 1086 of 2018, by which it was ordered that status quo as of today shall be maintained in the meantime. As a result, insofar as the petitions and transferred cases in this Court are concerned, the circular has, in effect, been stayed on and from 11.09.2018.


1. Constitutional validity, of sections 35AA and 35AB introduced by the Banking Regulation (Amendment) Act, 2017.


# 16.. ………..  They (provisions) are not excessive in any way nor do they suffer from want of any guiding principle. These are in the nature of amendments which confer regulatory powers upon the RBI to carry out its functions under the Act and are not different in quality from any of the sections which have already conferred such power. For example, section 21 makes it clear that the RBI may control advances made by banking companies in public interest, and in so doing, may not only lay down policy but may also give directions to banking companies either generally or in particular. Similarly, under section 35A, vast powers are given to issue necessary directions to banking companies in public interest, in the interest of banking policy, to prevent the affairs of any banking company being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interest of the depositors or in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the banking company, or to secure the proper management of any banking company. Therefore, these provisions which give the RBI certain regulatory powers cannot be said to be manifestly arbitrary.


# 17. When it comes to lack of any guidelines by which the power given to the RBI is to be exercised, it is clear from a catena of judgments that such guidance can be obtained not only from the Statement of Objects and Reasons and the Preamble to the Act, but also from its provisions. …………. A banking company is obligated to hold a license that is issued by the RBI, by which the RBI can impose such conditions as it thinks fit under Section 22 of the Act. Section 22(3), in particular, gives guidance as to how the banking company will run its business. These and other regulatory sections such as Sections 25, 29, 30, and 31, all give guidance as to how the RBI is to exercise these powers under the newly added provisions. We, therefore, agree with Shri Dwivedi that there was no dearth of guidance for the RBI to exercise the powers delegated to it by these provisions. Consequently, the plea of constitutional validity fails.


2. Scope of power of the RBI under section 35AA vis-a-vis the impugned circular.

# 24. A cursory reading of section 35A makes it clear that there is nothing in the aforesaid provision which would indicate that the power of the RBI to give directions, when it comes to the Insolvency Code, cannot be so given. The width of the language such as ‘public interest’, ‘banking policy’, etc. used in section 35A makes it clear that if otherwise available, use of section 35A as a source of power for the impugned circular cannot be interdicted on the ground that the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (Code) could not have been in the contemplation of Parliament in 1956, when section 35A was enacted.


# 26. ….   If a specific provision of the Banking Regulation Act makes it clear that the RBI has a specific power to direct banks to move under the Code against debtors in certain specified circumstances, it cannot be said that they would be acting outside the four corners of the statutes which govern them, namely, the RBI Act and the Banking Regulation Act. …..


# 29. Section 35AA makes it clear that the Central Government may, by order, authorise the RBI to issue directions to any banking company or banking companies when it comes to initiating the insolvency resolution process under the provisions of the Insolvency Code. The first thing to be noted is that without such authorisation, the RBI would have no such power. There are many sections in the Banking Regulation Act which enumerate the powers of the Central Government vis-à-vis the powers of the RBI.


# 30. The corollary of this is that prior to the enactment of Section 35AA, it may have been possible to say that when it comes to the RBI issuing directions to a banking company to initiate insolvency resolution process under the Insolvency Code, it could have issued such directions under Sections 21 and 35A. But after Section 35AA, it may do so only within the four corners of Section 35AA.


# 31. The matter can be looked at from a slightly different angle. If a statute confers power to do a particular act and has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any manner other than that which has been prescribed.


# 31.  ……… therefore, it is clear that the RBI can only direct banking institutions to move under the Insolvency Code if two conditions precedent are specified, namely, (i) that there is a Central Government authorisation to do so; and (ii) that it should be in respect of specific defaults. The Section, therefore, by necessary implication, prohibits this power from being exercised in any manner other than the manner set out in Section 35AA.


# 35. ……   the words “without prejudice” appearing in a Section make it clear that powers that are enumerated are only illustrative of a general power and do not restrict such general power. ……   Thus, the power to issue directions given by Section 35AB is in addition to the power that is given under Section 35A.


# 38. ……….. Therefore, the scheme of Sections 35A, 35AA, and 35AB is as follows:

(a) When it comes to issuing directions to initiate the insolvency resolution process under the Insolvency Code, Section 35AA is the only source of power.

(b) When it comes to issuing directions in respect of stressed assets, which directions are directions other than resolving this problem under the Insolvency Code, such power falls within Section 35A read with Section 35AB. 


This also becomes clear from the fact that Section 35AB(2) enables the RBI to specify one or more authorities or committees to advise any banking company on resolution of stressed assets. This advice is obviously de hors the Insolvency Code, as once an application is made under the Insolvency Code, such advice would be wholly redundant, as the Insolvency Code provisions would then take over and have to be followed.


# 39. When one section of a statute grants general powers, as opposed to another section of the same statute which grants specific powers, the general provisions cannot be utilised where a specific provision has been enacted with a specific purpose in mind.


# 40. Stressed assets can be resolved either through the Insolvency Code or otherwise. When resolution through the Code is to be effected, the specific power granted by Section 35AA can alone be availed by the RBI. When resolution de hors the Code is to be effected, the general powers under Sections 35A and 35AB are to be used. Any other interpretation would make Section 35AA otiose.


3. Constitutional validity of the impugned circular issued by the RBI.

# 41. Having grounded the power to issue directions to banking companies so far as the Insolvency Code is concerned, in Section 35AA, what is important to note is that the Section enables the Central Government to authorise the RBI to issue such directions in respect of “a default”.. Default would mean non-payment of a debt when it has become due and payable and is not paid by the corporate debtor. 


# 42. ……..   The Statement of Objects and Reasons for introducing Section 35AA also emphasises that directions are in respect of “a default”. Thus, it is clear that directions that can be issued under Section 35AA can only be in respect of specific defaults by specific debtors. This is also the understanding of the Central Government when it issued the notification dated 05.05.2017, which authorised the RBI to issue such directions only in respect of “a default” under the Code. Thus, any directions which are in respect of debtors generally, would be ultra vires Section 35AA.


# 44.  ……. In the present case, the context of Section 35AA makes it clear, as has been correctly argued by Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General, that the power to be exercised under the authorisation of the Central Government requires “due deliberation and care” to refer to specific defaults.


# 45. ……. There is nothing to show that the provisions of Section 45L(3) have been satisfied in issuing the impugned circular. The impugned circular nowhere says that the RBI has had due regard to the conditions in which and the objects for which such institutions have been established, their statutory responsibilities, and the effect the business of such financial institutions is likely to have on trends in the money and capital markets.

.  ………...Further, it is clear that the impugned circular applies to banking and non-banking institutions alike, as banking and non-banking institutions are often in a joint lenders’ forum which jointly lend sums of money to debtors. Such non-banking financial institutions are, therefore, inseparable from banking institutions insofar as the application of the impugned circular is concerned. It is very difficult to segregate the non-banking financial institutions from banks so as to make the circular applicable to them even if it is ultra vires insofar as banks are concerned.

. ………  For these reasons also, the impugned circular will have to be declared as ultra vires as a whole, and be declared to be of no effect in law. Consequently, all actions taken under the said circular, including actions by which the Insolvency Code has been triggered must fall along with the said circular. As a result, all cases in which debtors have been proceeded against by financial creditors under Section 7 of the Insolvency Code, only because of the operation of the impugned circular will be proceedings which, being faulted at the very inception, are declared to be non-est.


# 46. In view of the declaration by this Court that the impugned circular is ultra vires Section 35AA of the Banking Regulation Act,


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Sunday, 1 November 2020

ArcelorMittal India Private Limited Vs. Satish Kumar Gupta and Ors - Disqualification of Resolution Applicant under section 29A.

Supreme Court of India (04.10.2018) in ArcelorMittal India Private Limited Vs. Satish Kumar Gupta and Ors.(Civil Appeal Nos. 9402 – 9405 of 2018) ruled on the issues relating to disqualification of Resolution Applicant under section 29A.


- However, it must not be forgotten that a Resolution Professional is only to “examine” and “confirm” that each resolution plan conforms to what is provided by Section 30(2). Under Section 25(2)(i), the Resolution Professional shall undertake to present all resolution plans at the meetings of the Committee of Creditors. 

- The fact that the Resolution Professional is also to confirm that a resolution plan does not contravene any of the provisions of law for the time-being in force, including Section 29A of the Code, only means that his prima facie opinion is to be given to the Committee of Creditors that a law has or has not been contravened. Section 30(2)(e) does not empower the Resolution Professional to “decide” whether the resolution plan does or does not contravene the provisions of law.

- This regulation shows that the disapproval of the Committee of Creditors on the ground that the resolution plan violates the provisions of any law, including the ground that a resolution plan is ineligible under Section 29A, is not final. The Adjudicating Authority, acting quasi-judicially, can determine whether the resolution plan is violative of the provisions of any law, including Section 29A of the Code, after hearing arguments from the resolution applicant as well as the Committee of Creditors, after which an appeal can be preferred from the decision of the Adjudicating Authority to the Appellate Authority under Section 61.

 

Excerpts of the order;

1). Whether section 29A should have wooden, literal interpretation or the text and context should inform its interpretation ? Whether ‘acting jointly’ requires ‘joint venture agreement’? What is the meaning of the phrase ‘in concert’? 

# 29. The opening lines of Section 29A of the Amendment Act refer to a de facto as opposed to a de jure position of the persons mentioned therein. This is a typical instance of a “see through provision”, so that one is able to arrive at persons who are actually in “control”, whether jointly, or in concert, with other persons. A wooden, literal, interpretation would obviously not permit a tearing  of the corporate veil when it comes to the “person” whose eligibility is to be gone into. However, a purposeful and contextual interpretation, such as is the felt necessity of interpretation of such a provision as Section 29A, alone governs. For example, it is well settled that a shareholder is a separate legal entity from the company in which he holds shares. This may be true generally speaking, but when it comes to a corporate vehicle that is set up for the purpose of submission of a resolution plan, it is not only permissible but imperative for the competent authority to find out  as to who are the constituent elements that make up such a company. In such cases, the principle laid down in Salomon v. A Salomon and Co. Ltd. [1897] AC 22 will not apply. For it is important to discover in such cases as to who are the real individuals or entities who are acting jointly or in concert, and who have set up such a corporate vehicle for the purpose of submission of a resolution plan.

 

# 35. The expression “acting jointly” in the opening sentence of Section 29A cannot be confused with “joint venture agreements”, as was sought to be argued by Shri Rohatgi. He cited various judgments including Faqir Chand Gulati v. Uppal Agencies Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., (2008) 10 SCC 345, and Laurel Energetics Private Limited v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, (2017) 8 SCC 541, to buttress his submission that a joint venture is a contractually agreed sharing of control over an economic activity. We are afraid that these judgments are wholly inapplicable. All that is to be seen by the expression “acting jointly” is whether certain persons have got together and are acting “jointly” in the sense of acting together. If this is made out on the facts, no super added element of “joint venture” as is understood in law is to be seen. The other important phrase is “in concert”. By Section 3(37) of the Code, words and expressions used but not defined in the Code but defined inter alia by the SEBI Act, 1992, and the Companies Act, 2013, shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in those Acts. In exercise of powers conferred by Sections 11 and 30 of the SEBI Act, 1992, the 2011 Takeover Regulations have been promulgated by SEBI. The Code adopts definitions from the SEBI Act, 1992 and consequently the definition of ‘acting in concert’ from the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 1994. It includes any understanding, even if it is informal, and even if it is to indirectly cooperate to exercise control over a target company. Whether a person is or is not acting in concert depends upon the facts of each case.

 

# 39. It will be seen from the wide language used, that any understanding, even if it is informal, and even if it is to indirectly cooperate to exercise control over a target company, is included. Under sub-clause (2) of clause (q), a deeming fiction is enacted, by which a presumption is raised in the categories mentioned, that a person falling within one category is deemed to be acting in concert with another person mentioned in the same category, unless the contrary is established. The corporate veil is not merely torn but is left in tatters by sub-clauses (i) to (iv) of Regulation 2(1) (q)(2). What is also important to note is that “immediate relatives” are also covered by sub-clause (v) – i.e., father and son, brothers, etc. Also of importance is the definition of “associate” in the explanation to Regulation 2(1)(q)(2), which subsumes not merely immediate relatives but other forms in which a person can be associated with another - which includes the form of trust, partnership firm and HUF. What is of great importance is that wherever persons act jointly or in concert with the “person” who submits a resolution plan, all such persons are covered by Section 29A.

 

# 41. In M/s. Daiichi Sankyo Company Ltd. v. Jayaram Chigurupati & Ors., (2010) 7 SCC 449, this Court referred to the concept of “persons acting in concert” and held that there must be a shared common objective for substantial acquisition of shares of a target company under the SEBI regulations. A fortuitous relationship coming into existence by accident or chance obviously cannot amount to “persons acting in concert”. ……….  When coming to the presumption created by the provision, this Court held that the deeming provision is left open to rebuttal as  indicated by the words “unless the contrary is established” (see paragraph 54 of Daiichi (supra.). Finally, this Court held that whether a person is or is not acting in concert would depend upon the facts of each case.

 

2). Whether the clause (c) operates as at the date of commencement of CIRP or the date of submission of resolution plan? ii). Whether all three things - management, control and promoter – need to be present for ineligibility? iii). What are the meanings of management, control & promoter ?

# 42. When we come to sub-clause (c) of Section 29A, the first thing that was argued, at which the parties were at loggerheads, was the time at which sub-clause (c) can be said to operate. According to Shri Rohatgi, in the original sub-clause (c), preamendment, the time must necessarily be the date of commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution process, as is mentioned by the Section itself. According to Messrs Salve and Singhvi, it is clear that since submission of a resolution plan is spoken of, it is the time of submission of such plan and not any anterior stage.

 

# 43. According to us, it is clear that the opening words of Section 29A furnish a clue as to the time at which sub-clause (c) is to operate. The opening words of Section 29A state: “a person shall not be eligible to submit a resolution plan…”. It is clear therefore that the stage of ineligibility attaches when the resolution plan is submitted by a resolution applicant. The contrary view expressed by Shri Rohatgi is obviously incorrect, as the date of commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution process is only relevant for the purpose of calculating whether one year has lapsed from the date of classification of a person as a non performing asset. Further, the expression used is “has”, which as Dr. Singhvi has correctly argued, is in praesenti. This is to be contrasted with the expression “has been”, which is used in subclauses (d) and (g), which refers to an anterior point of time. Consequently, the amendment of 2018 introducing the words “at the time of submission of the resolution plan” is clarificatory, as this was always the correct interpretation as to the point of time at which the disqualification in sub-clause (c) of Section 29A will attach. In fact, the amendment was made pursuant to the Insolvency Law Committee Report of March, 2018. That report clearly stated:

  • “In relation to applicability of section 29A(c), the Committee also discussed that it must be clarified that the disqualification pursuant to section 29A(c) shall be applicable if such NPA accounts are held by the resolution applicant or its connected persons at the time of submission of the resolution plan to the RP.”

 

# 44. The ingredients of sub-clause (c) are that, the ineligibility to submit a resolution plan attaches if any person, as is referred to in the opening lines of Section 29A, either itself has an account, or is a promoter of, or in the management or control of, a corporate debtor which has an account, which account has been classified as a non-performing asset, for a period of at least one year from the date of such classification till the date of commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution process. For the purpose of applying this sub-section, any one of three things, which are disjunctive, needs to be established. The corporate debtor may be under the management of the person referred to in Section 29A, the corporate debtor may be a person under the control of such person, or the corporate debtor may be a person of whom such person is a promoter.

 

# 45. The expression “management” would refer to the de jure management of a corporate debtor. The de jure management of a corporate debtor would ordinarily vest in a Board of Directors, and would include, in accord with the definitions of “manager”, “managing director” and “officer” in Sections 2(53), 2(54) and 2(59) respectively of the Companies Act, 2013, the persons mentioned therein. 

 

# 46. The expression “control” is defined in Section 2(27) of the Companies Act, 2013 as follows:-

  • “(27) “control” shall include the right to appoint majority of the directors or to control the management or policy decisions exercisable by a person or persons acting individually or in concert, directly or indirectly, including by virtue of their shareholding or management rights or shareholders agreements or voting agreements or in any other manner;”

 

# 47. The expression “control” is therefore defined in two parts. The first part refers to de jure control, which includes the right to appoint a majority of the directors of a company. The second part refers to de facto control. So long as a person or persons acting in concert, directly or indirectly, can positively influence, in any manner, management or policy decisions, they could be said to be “in control”. A management decision is a decision to be taken as to how the corporate body is to be run in its day to day affairs. A policy decision would be a decision that would be beyond running day to day affairs, i.e., long term decisions. So long as management or policy decisions can be, or are in fact, taken by virtue of shareholding, management rights, shareholders agreements, voting agreements or otherwise, control can be said to exist.

 

# 48. Thus, the expression “control”, in Section 29A(c), denotes only positive control, which means that the mere power to block special resolutions of a company cannot amount to control. “Control” here, as contrasted with “management”, means de facto control of actual management or policy decisions that can be or are in fact taken.

 

# 50. Section 29A(c) speaks of a corporate debtor “under the management or control of such person”. The expression “under” would seem to suggest positive or proactive control, as opposed to mere negative or reactive control. This becomes even clearer when sub-clause (g) of Section 29A is read, wherein the expression used is “in the management or control of a corporate debtor”. Under sub-clause (g), only a person who is in proactive or positive control of a corporate debtor can take the proactive decisions mentioned in sub-clause (g), such as, entering into preferential, undervalued, extortionate credit, or fraudulent transactions. It is thus clear that in the expression “management or control”, the two words take colour from each other, in which case the principle of noscitur a sociis must also be held to apply. Thus viewed, what is referred to in sub-clauses (c) and (g) is de jure or de facto proactive or positive control, and not mere negative control which may flow from an expansive reading of the definition of the word “control” contained in Section 2(27) of the Companies Act, 2013, which is inclusive and not exhaustive in nature.

 

# 53. Here again, sub-clause (a) refers to a de jure position, namely, where a person is expressly named in a prospectus or identified by the company in an annual return as a promoter. Subclauses (b) and (c) speak of a de facto position. Under sub-clause (b), so long as a person has “control” over the affairs of a company, directly or indirectly, in any manner, he could be said to be a promoter of such company. Under sub-clause (c), such person need not be a member of the Board of Directors of a company, but can be a person who in fact advises, directs or instructs the Board to act. Under the proviso, only a person who acts in a professional capacity is excluded from the talons of subclause (c).

 

3). How can this ineligibility be removed?  Purpose of this provision. ii). When does this ineligibility attach? iii). Whether this ineligibility can be cured by paying off the debts of the corporate debtor? Does a prohibition similar to (f) outside India make one ineligible? iv). Does a prohibition on political considerations outside India make one ineligible?

# 54. …….. The first proviso to sub-clause (c) makes it clear that the ineligibility can only be removed if the person submitting a resolution plan makes payment of all overdue amounts with interest thereon and charges relating to the non-performing asset in question before submission of a resolution plan. The position in law is thus clear. Any person who wishes to submit a resolution plan acting jointly or in concert with other persons, any of whom may either manage, control or be a promoter of a corporate debtor classified as a non-performing asset in the period above mentioned, must first pay off the debt of the said corporate debtor classified as a non-performing asset in order to become eligible under Section 29A(c).

 

# 56. Since Section 29A(c) is a see-through provision, great care must be taken to ensure that persons who are in charge of the corporate debtor for whom such resolution plan is made, do not come back in some other form to regain control of the company without first paying off its debts. The Code has bifurcated such persons into two groups, as a perusal of sub-clauses (c) and (g) of Section 29A shows. If a person has been a promoter, or in the management, or control, of a corporate debtor in which a preferential transaction, undervalued transaction, extortionate credit transaction or fraudulent transaction has taken place, and in respect of which an order has been made by the Adjudicating Authority under the Code, such person is ineligible to present a resolution plan under Section 29A(g). This ineligibility cannot be cured by paying off the debts of the corporate debtor. Therefore, it is only such persons who do not fall foul of sub-clause (g), who are eligible to submit resolution plans under sub-clause (c) of Section 29A, if they happen to be persons who were in the erstwhile management or control of the corporate debtor.

 

# 58. When we come to sub-clause (f), it is clear that, if any of the persons mentioned in Section 29A is prohibited by SEBI from either trading in securities or accessing the securities market – again, ineligibility of the person submitting the resolution plan attaches. Under sub-clause (i), if a person situate abroad is subject to any disability which corresponds to sub-clause (f), such person also gets interdicted. …...

 

# 59. In the light thereof, it is clear that if a person is prohibited by a regulator of the securities market in a foreign country from trading in securities or accessing the securities market, the disability under sub-clause (i) would then attach.

 

# 103. What will be noticed is that the sanctions that have been imposed by the authorities of both the United States and the Council of the European Union are not on account of any misconduct on the part of VTB Bank. Rather, they have been imposed politically, because of the conduct of a particular country, i.e. Russia, which has sought to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, by illegally annexing Crimea and Sevastopol. We are of the view that Shri Rohatgi is right, inasmuch as VTB Bank cannot be said to have been prohibited by an authority outside India from trading in securities or accessing the securities markets, due to any fraudulent and/or unfair trade practices relating to the securities market generally. A prohibitory sanction by an authority situate outside India for political reasons would thus not be covered by sub-clause (i).

 

4). Whether the timeline is mandatory? ii). Whether the timeline of 180 days can be extended? iii). Nature of Timeline. iv). Nature of timeline for Adjudicating Authority. v). What happens if the Adjudicating Authority decides a matter beyond the time limit of 180 / 270 days?

# 71. What is important to note is that a consequence is provided, in the event that the said period ends either without receipt of a resolution plan or after rejection of a resolution plan under Section 31. This consequence is provided by Section 33, which makes it clear that when either of these two contingencies occurs, the corporate debtor is required to be liquidated in the manner laid down in Chapter III. Section 12, construed in the light of the object sought to be achieved by the Code, and in the light of the consequence provided by Section 33, therefore, makes it clear that the periods previously mentioned are mandatory and cannot be extended.

 

# 72. In fact, even the literal language of Section 12(1) makes it clear that the provision must read as being mandatory. The expression “shall be completed” is used. Further, sub-section (3) makes it clear that the duration of 180 days may be extended further “but not exceeding 90 days”, making it clear that a maximum of 270 days is laid down statutorily. Also, the proviso to Section 12 makes it clear that the extension “shall not be granted more than once”. It is of utmost importance for all authorities concerned to follow this model timeline as closely as possible.

 

# 74. Regulation 40A of the CIRP Regulations presents a model timeline of the corporate insolvency resolution process, on the basis that the time available is 180 days. ……..  It is of utmost importance for all authorities concerned to follow this model timeline as closely as possible.

 

# 81. If, on the other hand, a resolution plan has been approved by the Committee of Creditors, and has passed muster before the Adjudicating Authority, this determination can be challenged before the Appellate Authority under Section 61, and may further be challenged before the Supreme Court under Section 62, if there is a question of law arising out of such order, within the time specified in Section 62. Section 64 also makes it clear that the timelines that are to be adhered to by the NCLT and NCLAT are of great importance, and that reasons must be recorded by either the NCLT or NCLAT if the matter is not disposed of within the time limit specified. Section 60(5), when it speaks of the NCLT having jurisdiction to entertain or dispose of any application or proceeding by or against the corporate debtor or corporate person, does not invest the NCLT with the jurisdiction to interfere at an applicant’s behest at a stage before the quasi-judicial determination made by the Adjudicating Authority. The non-obstante clause in Section 60(5) is designed for a different purpose: to ensure that the NCLT alone has jurisdiction when it comes to applications and proceedings by or against a corporate debtor covered by the Code, making it clear that no other forum has jurisdiction to entertain or dispose of such applications or proceedings.

 

# 83. Given the fact that both the NCLT and NCLAT are to decide matters arising under the Code as soon as possible, we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that a large volume of litigation has now to be handled by both the aforesaid Tribunals. What happens in a case where the NCLT or the NCLAT decide a matter arising out of Section 31 of the Code beyond the time limit of 180 days or the extended time limit of 270 days? Actus curiae neminem gravabit - the act of the Court shall harm no man - is a maxim firmly rooted in our jurisprudence (see Jang Singh v. Brijlal & Ors. [1964] 2 S.C.R. 146 at page 149, and A.S. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak & Ors. [1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 1 at page 71). It is also true that the time taken by a Tribunal should not set at naught the time limits within which the corporate insolvency resolution process must take place. However, we cannot forget that the consequence of the chopper falling is corporate death. The only reasonable construction of the Code is the balance to be maintained between timely completion of the corporate insolvency resolution process, and the corporate debtor otherwise being put into liquidation. We must not forget that the corporate debtor consists of several employees and workmen whose daily bread is dependent on the outcome of the corporate insolvency resolution process. If there is a resolution applicant who can continue to run the corporate debtor as a going concern, every effort must be made to try and see that this is made possible. A reasonable and balanced construction of this statute would therefore lead to the result that, where a resolution plan is upheld by the Appellate Authority, either by way of allowing or dismissing an appeal before it, the period of time taken in litigation ought to be excluded. This is not to say that the NCLT and NCLAT will be tardy in decision making. This is only to say that in the event of the NCLT, or the NCLAT, or this Court taking time to decide an application beyond the period of 270 days, the time taken in legal proceedings to decide the matter cannot possibly be excluded, as otherwise a good resolution plan may have to be shelved, resulting in corporate death, and the consequent displacement of employees and workers. 

 

5). If a resolution plan is turned down at the threshold by a Resolution Professional under section 30(2), is it open to the concerned resolution applicant to challenge the rejection?

# 75. What has now to be determined is whether any challenge can be made at various stages of the corporate insolvency resolution process. Suppose a resolution plan is turned down at the threshold by a Resolution Professional under Section 30(2). At this stage is it open to the concerned resolution applicant to challenge the Resolution Professional’s rejection? It is settled law that a statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation thereof should be designed to make it so workable.

 

# 76. Given the timeline referred to above, and given the fact that a resolution applicant has no vested right that his resolution plan be considered, it is clear that no challenge can be preferred to the Adjudicating Authority at this stage. A writ petition under Article 226 filed before a High Court would also be turned down on the ground that no right, much less a fundamental right, is affected at this stage. This is also made clear by the first proviso to Section 30(4), whereby a Resolution Professional may only invite fresh resolution plans if no other resolution plan has passed muster.

 

# 78. Thus, the importance of the Resolution Professional is to ensure that a resolution plan is complete in all respects, and to conduct a due diligence in order to report to the Committee of Creditors whether or not it is in order. Even though it is not necessary for the Resolution Professional to give reasons while submitting a resolution plan to the Committee of Creditors, it would be in the fitness of things if he appends the due diligence report carried out by him with respect to each of the resolution plans under consideration, and to state briefly as to why it does or does not conform to the law.

 

# 79. Take the next stage under Section 30. A Resolution Professional has presented a resolution plan to the Committee of Creditors for its approval, but the Committee of Creditors does not approve such plan after considering its feasibility and viability, as the requisite vote of not less than 66% of the voting share of the financial creditors is not obtained. As has been mentioned herein above, the first proviso to Section 30(4) furnishes the answer, which is that all that can happen at this stage is to require the Resolution Professional to invite a fresh resolution plan within the time limits specified where no other resolution plan is available with him. It is clear that at this stage again no application before the Adjudicating Authority could be entertained as there is no vested right or fundamental right in the resolution applicant to have its resolution plan approved, and as no adjudication has yet taken place.

 

# 80. It is the Committee of Creditors which will approve or disapprove a resolution plan, given the statutory parameters of Section 30. ………  This regulation shows that the disapproval of the Committee of Creditors on the ground that the resolution plan violates the provisions of any law, including the ground that a resolution plan is ineligible under Section 29A, is not final. The Adjudicating Authority, acting quasi-judicially, can determine whether the resolution plan is violative of the provisions of any law, including Section 29A of the Code, after hearing arguments from the resolution applicant as well as the Committee of Creditors, after which an appeal can be preferred from the decision of the Adjudicating Authority to the Appellate Authority under Section 61.

 

6). Role of Resolution Professional, Committee of Creditors &  Scope of interference by NCLT. 

# 77. However, it must not be forgotten that a Resolution Professional is only to “examine” and “confirm” that each resolution plan conforms to what is provided by Section 30(2). Under Section 25(2)(i), the Resolution Professional shall undertake to present all resolution plans at the meetings of the Committee of Creditors. This is followed by Section 30(3), which states that the Resolution Professional shall present to the Committee of Creditors, for its approval, such resolution plans which confirm the conditions referred to in sub-section (2). This provision has to be read in conjunction with Section 25(2)(i), and with the second proviso to Section 30(4), which provides that where a resolution applicant is found to be ineligible under Section 29A(c), the resolution applicant shall be allowed by the Committee of Creditors such period, not exceeding 30 days, to make payment of overdue amounts in accordance with the proviso to Section 29A(c). A conspectus of all these provisions would show that the Resolution Professional is required to examine that the resolution plan submitted by various applicants is complete in all respects, before submitting it to the Committee of Creditors. The Resolution Professional is not required to take any decision, but merely to ensure that the resolution plans submitted are complete in all respects before they are placed before the Committee of Creditors, who may or may not approve it. The fact that the Resolution Professional is also to confirm that a resolution plan does not contravene any of the provisions of law for the time-being in force, including Section 29A of the Code, only means that his prima facie opinion is to be given to the Committee of Creditors that a law has or has not been contravened. Section 30(2)(e) does not empower the Resolution Professional to “decide” whether the resolution plan does or does not contravene the provisions of law.

 

# 78. Thus, the importance of the Resolution Professional is to ensure that a resolution plan is complete in all respects, and to conduct a due diligence in order to report to the Committee of Creditors whether or not it is in order. Even though it is not necessary for the Resolution Professional to give reasons while submitting a resolution plan to the Committee of Creditors, it would be in the fitness of things if he appends the due diligence report carried out by him with respect to each of the resolution plans under consideration, and to state briefly as to why it does or does not conform to the law.

 

# 80. It is the Committee of Creditors which will approve or disapprove a resolution plan, given the statutory parameters of Section 30. Under Regulation 39 of the CIRP Regulations, sub-clause (3) thereof provides:-

  • “(3) The committee shall evaluate the resolution plans received under sub-regulation (1) strictly as per the evaluation matrix to identify the best resolution plan and may approve it with such modifications as it deems fit:

  • Provided that the committee shall record the reasons for approving or rejecting a resolution plan.”

This regulation shows that the disapproval of the Committee of Creditors on the ground that the resolution plan violates the provisions of any law, including the ground that a resolution plan is ineligible under Section 29A, is not final. The Adjudicating Authority, acting quasi-judicially, can determine whether the resolution plan is violative of the provisions of any law, including Section 29A of the Code, after hearing arguments from the resolution applicant as well as the Committee of Creditors, after which an appeal can be preferred from the decision of the Adjudicating Authority to the Appellate Authority under Section 61.

 

# 81. If, on the other hand, a resolution plan has been approved by the Committee of Creditors, and has passed muster before the Adjudicating Authority, this determination can be challenged before the Appellate Authority under Section 61, and may further be challenged before the Supreme Court under Section 62, if there is a question of law arising out of such order, within the time specified in Section 62. Section 64 also makes it clear that the timelines that are to be adhered to by the NCLT and NCLAT are of great importance, and that reasons must be recorded by either the NCLT or NCLAT if the matter is not disposed of within the time limit specified. Section 60(5), when it speaks of the NCLT having jurisdiction to entertain or dispose of any application or proceeding by or against the corporate debtor or corporate person, does not invest the NCLT with the jurisdiction to interfere at an applicant’s behest at a stage before the quasi-judicial determination made by the Adjudicating Authority. The non-obstante clause in Section 60(5) is designed for a different purpose: to ensure that the NCLT alone has jurisdiction when it comes to applications and proceedings by or against a corporate debtor covered by the Code, making it clear that no other forum has jurisdiction to entertain or dispose of such applications or proceedings.

 

7. Purpose & objectives, i.e. the objectives of CIRP.

8. Eligibility of ArcelorMittal and Numetal.

9. Complete Justice.

# 83.  ……….  The only reasonable construction of the Code is the balance to be maintained between timely completion of the corporate insolvency resolution process, and the corporate debtor otherwise being put into liquidation. We must not forget that the corporate debtor consists of several employees and workmen whose daily bread is dependent on the outcome of the corporate insolvency resolution process. If there is a resolution applicant who can continue to run the corporate debtor as a going concern, every effort must be made to try and see that this is made possible. A reasonable and balanced construction of this statute would therefore lead to the result that, where a resolution plan is upheld by the Appellate Authority, either by way of allowing or dismissing an appeal before it, the period of time taken in litigation ought to be excluded. This is not to say that the NCLT and NCLAT will be tardy in decision making. This is only to say that in the event of the NCLT, or the NCLAT, or this Court taking time to decide an application beyond the period of 270 days, the time taken in legal proceedings to decide the matter cannot possibly be excluded, as otherwise a good resolution plan may have to be shelved, resulting in corporate death, and the consequent displacement of employees and workers.

 

# 113. Since it is clear that both sets of resolution plans that were submitted to the Resolution Professional, even on 02.04.2018, are hit by Section 29A(c), and since the proviso to Section 29A(c) will not apply as the corporate debtors related to AMIPL and Numetal have not paid off their respective NPAs, ordinarily, these appeals would have been disposed of by merely declaring both resolution applicants to be ineligible under Section 29A(c). Shri Subramanium, on behalf of the Committee of Creditors, requested us to give one more opportunity to the parties before us to pay off their corporate debtors’ respective debts in accordance with Section 29A, as the best resolution plan can then be selected by the requisite majority of the Committee of Creditors, so that all dues could be cleared as soon as possible. Acceding to this request, in order to do complete justice under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, and also for the reason that the law on Section 29A has been laid down for the first time by this judgment, we give one more opportunity to both resolution applicants to pay off the NPAs of their related corporate debtors within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of this judgment, in accordance with the proviso to Section 29A(c). If such payments are made within the aforesaid period, both resolution applicants can resubmit their resolution plans dated 02.04.2018 to the Committee of Creditors, who are then given a period of 8 weeks from this date, to accept, by the requisite majority, the best amongst the plans submitted, including the resolution plan submitted by Vedanta. We make it clear that in the event that no plan is found worthy of acceptance by the requisite majority of the Committee of Creditors, the corporate debtor, i.e. ESIL, shall go into liquidation. The appeals are disposed of, accordingly.


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Disclaimer:

The sole purpose of this post is to create awareness on the "IBC - Case Law" and to provide synopsis of the concerned case law, must not be used as a guide for taking or recommending any action or decision. A reader must refer to the full citation of the order & do one's own research and seek professional advice if he intends to take any action or decision in the matters covered in this post.