Monday, 12 October 2020

K. Kishan vs. M/s Vijay Nirman Company Pvt. Ltd - Arbitration Award & Pre-existing Dispute in Insolvency proceedings

Supreme Court of India (14.08.2018) in K. Kishan vs. M/s Vijay Nirman Company Pvt. Ltd.(Civil Appeal No. 21824 of 2017 With Civil Appeal No. 21825 of 2017) held that; 

  • Such a company would be well within its rights to state that it is challenging the Arbitral Award passed against it, and the mere factum of challenge would be sufficient to state that it disputes the Award. Such a case would clearly come within para 38 of Mobilox Innovations (supra), being a case of a pre-existing ongoing dispute between the parties.

  • the filing of a Section 34 petition against an Arbitral Award shows that a pre-existing dispute which culminates at the first stage of the proceedings in an Award, continues even after the Award, at least till the final adjudicatory process under Sections 34 & 37 has taken place. 

  • There may be cases where a Section 34 petition challenging an Arbitral Award may clearly and unequivocally be barred by limitation, in that it can be demonstrated to the Court that the period of 90 days plus the discretionary period of 30 days has clearly expired, after which either no petition under Section 34 has been filed or a belated petition under Section 34 has been filed. It is only in such clear cases that the insolvency process may then be put into operation.

  • We may hasten to add that there may also be other cases where a Section 34 petition may have been instituted in the wrong court, as a result of which the petitioner may claim the application of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to get over the bar of limitation laid down in Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act. In such cases also, it is obvious that the insolvency process cannot be put into operation without an adjudication on the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

 

Excerpts of the judgement; 

1. The present appeals raise an important question as to whether the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) can be invoked in respect of an operational debt where an Arbitral Award has been passed against the operational debtor, which has not yet been finally adjudicated upon.

 

# 2. The brief facts necessary to appreciate the controversy at hand are as follows:- 

XXXXX

iii) During the course of the project, disputes and differences arose between the parties and the same were referred to an Arbitral Tribunal, which delivered its Award on 21.01.2017. One of the claims that was allowed by the said Award was in favour of the respondent for a sum of Rs.1,71,98,302/- which arises out of certain interim payment certificates. Another claim that was allowed related to higher rates of payment in which a sum of Rs.13,56,98,624/- was awarded. Three cross claims that were made by the Respondent were rejected.

 

v) It is pertinent to note that, at this stage, a notice dated 06.02.2017 was sent by the Respondent to KCPL to pay an amount of Rs. 1,79,00,166/-. This notice was stated to be a notice under Section 8 of the Code. Within 10 days, by a letter dated 16.02.2017, KCPL disputed the invoice that was referred to in the said notice, stating that the said amount was, in fact, the subject-matter of an arbitration proceeding, and as per KCPL’s accounts, the Respondent was liable to pay larger amounts to them.

 

v) It may be noted that after the notice and reply, on 20.04.2017, a Section 34 petition was filed by KCPL under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) challenging the aforesaid Award. Needless to add, this petition was filed within the period of limitation set down in Section 34(3) of the Act.

 

vi) It is only thereafter that a petition was filed under Section 9 of the Code, on 14.07.2017. In the gist of the case presented to the National Company Law Tribunal (‘NCLT’), it was clearly stated as follows:-

  • “The above amount was included in the Statement of Claims filed before the Arbitral Tribunal duly constituted on 17.8.2014 along with other claims. The Tribunal gave its award on 21.1.2017 and upheld the above claim of VNCPL and awarded the above amount in favour of VNCPL and against KCPL. (Award copy enclosed) Thus, the above amount has become an ‘Operational Debt’ to be paid by the corporate debtor M/s KCPL as defined u/Sec. 3(11) of the I&B Code 2016. A notice in Form-3 U/Sec. 8(1) of the I&B Code 2016 has already been served on the Corporate Debtor, M/s KCPL and a reply received from KCPL is also enclosed herewith for ready reference.”

 

vii) The NCLT, by its order dated 29.08.2017, referred to the aforestated facts, and also referred to the fact that the Award which was challenged under Section 34 specifically stated that learned counsel for the first Respondent (i.e. the corporate debtor) was fair enough to admit that the claimant is entitled to the said sum of Rs.1,71,98,302/-. According to the NCLT, the fact that a Section 34 petition was pending was irrelevant for the reason that the claim stood admitted, and there was no stay of the Award. For these reasons, therefore, the Section 9 petition was admitted.

 

viii) An appeal filed to the Appellate Tribunal met with the same fate, as according to the Appellate Tribunal, the non obstante clause contained in Section 238 of the Code would override the Arbitration Act. Also, according to the Appellate Tribunal, since Form V of Part 5 of the Insolvency & Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2016 requires particulars of an order of an arbitral panel adjudicating on the default, this would have to be treated as “a record of an operational debt”, as a result of which the petition would have to be admitted, as was correctly done by the NCLT. The appeal was, accordingly, dismissed

 

# 5.  . . . . .A reading of Section 9(5)(ii)(d) would show that an application under Section 8 must be rejected if notice of a dispute has been received by the operational creditor. In the present case, it is clear on facts that the entire basis for the notice under Section 8 of the Code is the fact that an Arbitral Award was passed on 21.07.2017 against the Appellant. As has been pointed out by us, this clearly appears from the gist of the case that was filed along with the insolvency petition. The fact that the reply of 16.02.2017 to the notice given under Section 8 was within 10 days, and raised the existence of a dispute, also cannot be doubted. 

 

# 7. Our recent judgment in Mobilox Innovations (supra) throws considerable light on the issue at hand. While referring to the legislative history of the Code, this Court referred to the Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. One of the things the Legislative Guide spoke about was whether the debt is subject to a legitimate dispute or set-off, in an amount equal to or greater than the amount of the debt. . . . . . 

 

# 11. The Adjudicating Authority, therefore, when examining an application under Section 9 of the Act, will have to determine the following:-

  • (i) Whether there is an “operational debt” as defined exceeding Rs 1 lakh? (See Section 4 of the Act)

  • (ii) Whether the documentary evidence furnished with the application shows that the aforesaid debt is due and payable and has not yet been paid? And

  • (iii) Whether there is existence of a dispute between the parties or the record of the pendency of a suit or arbitration proceeding filed before the receipt of the demand notice of the unpaid operational debt in relation to such dispute?

If any one of the aforesaid conditions is lacking, the application would have to be rejected. Apart from the above, the adjudicating authority must follow the mandate of Section 9, as outlined above, and in particular the mandate of Section 9(5) of the Act, and admit or reject the application, as the case may be, depending upon the factors mentioned in Section 9(5) of the Act. (Para 34).

 

# 13. Following this judgment, it becomes clear that operational creditors cannot use the Insolvency Code either prematurely or for extraneous considerations or as a substitute for debt enforcement procedures. The alarming result of an operational debt contained in an arbitral award for a small amount of say, two lakhs of rupees, cannot possibly jeopardize an otherwise solvent company worth several crores of rupees. Such a company would be well within its rights to state that it is challenging the Arbitral Award passed against it, and the mere factum of challenge would be sufficient to state that it disputes the Award. Such a case would clearly come within para 38 of Mobilox Innovations (supra), being a case of a pre-existing ongoing dispute between the parties. The Code cannot be used in terrorem to extract this sum of money of Rs. two lakhs even though it may not be finally payable as adjudication proceedings in respect thereto are still pending. We repeat that the object of the Code, at least insofar as operational creditors are concerned, is to put the insolvency process against a corporate debtor only in clear cases where a real dispute between the parties as to the debt owed does not exist.

 

# 18. We repeat with emphasis that under our Code, insofar as an operational debt is concerned, all that has to be seen is whether the said debt can be said to be disputed, and we have no doubt in stating that the filing of a Section 34 petition against an Arbitral Award shows that a pre-existing dispute which culminates at the first stage of the proceedings in an Award, continues even after the Award, at least till the final adjudicatory process under Sections 34 & 37 has taken place.

 

# 19. There may be cases where a Section 34 petition challenging an Arbitral Award may clearly and unequivocally be barred by limitation, in that it can be demonstrated to the Court that the period of 90 days plus the discretionary period of 30 days has clearly expired, after which either no petition under Section 34 has been filed or a belated petition under Section 34 has been filed. It is only in such clear cases that the insolvency process may then be put into operation.

 

# 20. We may hasten to add that there may also be other cases where a Section 34 petition may have been instituted in the wrong court, as a result of which the petitioner may claim the application of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to get over the bar of limitation laid down in Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act. In such cases also, it is obvious that the insolvency process cannot be put into operation without an adjudication on the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

 

# 22. We also accept Mr. Banerji’s submission that the Appellate Tribunal was in error in referring to Section 238 of the Code. Section 238 of the Code would apply in case there is an inconsistency between the Code and the Arbitration Act in the present case. We see no such inconsistency. On the contrary, the Award passed under the Arbitration Act together with the steps taken for its challenge would only make it clear that the operational debt, in the present case, happens to be a disputed one.

 

# 23. We are also of the view that the Appellate Tribunal, when it relied upon Form V Part 5 of the 2016 Rules to state that the operational debt would, therefore, be said to have been proved, missed the vital sub-clause (iii) in para 34 of Mobilox Innovations (supra).  Even if it is clear that there be a record of an operational debt, it is important that the said debt be not disputed. If disputed within the parameters laid down in Mobilox Innovations, an insolvency petition cannot be proceeded with further.

 

# 24. For all these reasons, we are of the view that the judgment of the Appellate Tribunal needs to be set aside and is therefore reversed. 

 

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The sole purpose of this post is to create awareness on the "IBC - Case Law" and to provide synopsis of the concerned case law, must not be used as a guide for taking or recommending any action or decision. A reader must refer to the full citation of the order & do one's own research and seek professional advice if he intends to take any action or decision in the matters covered in this post.

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