SCI (30.09.2021) In Rajendra Narottamdas Sheth & Anr. Vs. Chandra Prakash Jain & Anr. [Civil Appeal No.4222 of 2020] held that;
If general authorisation is made by any ‘Financial Creditor’ or ‘Operational Creditor’ or ‘Corporate Applicant’ in favour of its officers to do needful in legal proceedings by and against the ‘Financial Creditor’ / ’Operational Creditor’ / ‘Corporate Applicant’ in favour of its officer, mere use of word ‘Power of Attorney’ while delegating such power will not take away the authority of such officer and for all purposes it is to be treated as an ‘authorization’ by the ‘Financial Creditor’ / 'Operational Creditor' / ‘Corporate Applicant’ in favour of its officer, which can be delegated even by designation. In such case, officer delegated with power can claim to be the ‘Authorized Representative’ for the purpose of filing any application under section 7 or Section 9 or Section 10 of ‘I &B Code’.
We have already held that the burden of prima facie proving occurrence of the default and that the application filed under Section 7 of the Code is within the period of limitation, is entirely on the financial creditor. While the decision to admit an application under Section 7 is typically made on the basis of material furnished by the financial creditor, the Adjudicating Authority is not barred from examining the material that is placed on record by the corporate debtor to determine that such application is not beyond the period of limitation.
Excerpts of the order;
# 1. Respondent No. 2 filed an application under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Code’) which was admitted by the National Company Law Tribunal, Ahmedabad bench (hereinafter referred to as the ‘NCLT’ or ‘Adjudicating Authority’) on 01.06.2020. The Appellants, who are the suspended directors of the board of R.K. Infratel Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Corporate Debtor’), filed an appeal which was rejected by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the ‘NCLAT’). Therefore, this Appeal.
# 4. The Corporate Debtor reiterated its stand that the application under Section 7 of the Code was barred by limitation before the NCLAT. According to the Corporate Debtor, the payments made by it to the Bank after its account was declared as NPA could not extend the period of limitation. It was further contended by the Corporate Debtor that the “cut back offer” cannot be taken into account for attracting Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Limitation Act’). It was argued on behalf of the Corporate Debtor that Section 18 of the Limitation Act is also not applicable to the facts of this case. The further argument of the Corporate Debtor was that the power of attorney in favour of the individual who has signed the application under Section 7 of the Code had been granted prior to the Code coming into force without any specific authorisation to initiate proceedings under the Code, and therefore, the application was not maintainable.
# 5. The NCLAT examined the power of attorney given by the Bank to Mr. Praveen Kumar Gupta and found no merit in the argument of the Corporate Debtor that the application under Section 7 of the Code was not maintainable as it was filed by a power of attorney holder. In so far as limitation is concerned, the NCLAT referred to all the documents as well as the “cut back arrangement” relied on by the NCLT to hold that the application under Section 7 of the Code was filed within the prescribed time. It was further observed by the NCLAT that the Corporate Debtor could not demonstrate any error in the order of the Adjudicating Authority. Accordingly, the NCLAT dismissed the appeal of the Corporate Debtor.
# 6. Essentially, there are two issues that arise for consideration in this Appeal. The first pertains to the maintainability of the application under Section 7 of the Code filed by a power of attorney holder. The second relates to the question of limitation. Maintainability of the application under Section 7 when filed by a power of attorney holder
# 7. Mr. Rana Mukherjee, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellants, submitted that the application filed on behalf of the Financial Creditor under Section 7 of the Code was on the basis of a power of attorney. He relied upon a judgment of the NCLAT in Palogix Infrastructure Private Limited v. ICICI Bank Limited in which it was held that an ‘authorised person’, distinct from a ‘power of attorney holder’, can file an application under Section 7 and that a ‘power of attorney holder’ is not competent to file an application on behalf of a financial creditor. According to Mr. Mukherjee, the defect in filing of the application by an unauthorised person is not curable. Assuming it is curable, the Financial Creditor failed to rectify the defect within the time stipulated under Section 7 (5) of the Code, in spite of an order passed by the Adjudicating Authority on 22.01.2020 granting time to the Financial Creditor. He submitted that the person who filed the application under Section 7 of the Code is not the authorised representative of the Financial Creditor and therefore, the application was liable to be dismissed.
# 8. On the other hand, the Financial Creditor contended that the power of attorney was executed in favour of Mr. Praveen Kumar Gupta, which was perused by both the adjudicating Authority and the NCLAT to conclude that the application was filed by the authorised person. Mr. Alok Kumar, the learned Counsel appearing for the Financial Creditor, also relied upon the judgment in Palogix Infrastructure (supra) and argued that a person authorised by way of a power of attorney can file an application under Section 7 of the Code.
# 11. The NCLAT in its judgment in Palogix Infrastructure (supra) held that a ‘power of attorney holder’ is not competent to file an application under Section 7 on behalf of the financial creditor. However, the NCLAT made certain further observations, as reproduced below:
“41. In so far as the present case is concerned, the ‘Financial Creditor’-Bank has pleaded that by Board’s Resolutions dated 30th May, 2002 and 30th October, 2009, the Bank authorised its officers to do needful in the legal proceedings by and against the Bank. If general authorisation is made by any ‘Financial Creditor’ or ‘Operational Creditor’ or ‘Corporate Applicant’ in favour of its officers to do needful in legal proceedings by and against the ‘Financial Creditor’ / ’Operational Creditor’ / ‘Corporate Applicant’ in favour of its officer, mere use of word ‘Power of Attorney’ while delegating such power will not take away the authority of such officer and for all purposes it is to be treated as an ‘authorization’ by the ‘Financial Creditor’ / 'Operational Creditor' / ‘Corporate Applicant’ in favour of its officer, which can be delegated even by designation. In such case, officer delegated with power can claim to be the ‘Authorized Representative’ for the purpose of filing any application under section 7 or Section 9 or Section 10 of ‘I &B Code’. ”
The NCLAT was of the opinion that general authorisation given to an officer of the financial creditor by means of a power of attorney, would not disentitle such officer to act as the authorised representative of the financial creditor while filing an application under Section 7 of the Code, merely because the authorisation was granted through a power of attorney. Moreover, the NCLAT in Palogix Infrastructure (supra) has held that if the officer was authorised to sanction loans and had done so, the application filed under Section 7 of the Code cannot be rejected on the ground that no separate specific authorisation letter has been issued by the financial creditor in favour of such officer. In such cases, the corporate debtor cannot take the plea that while the officer has power to sanction the loan, such officer has no power to recover the loan amount or to initiate corporate insolvency resolution process, in spite of default in repayment. We approve the view taken by the NCLAT in Palogix Infrastructure (supra).
# 12. In the present case, Mr. Praveen Kumar Gupta has been given general authorisation by the Bank with respect to all the business and affairs of the Bank, including commencement of legal proceedings before any court or tribunal with respect to any demand and filing of all necessary applications in this regard. Such authorisation, having been granted by way of a power of attorney pursuant to a resolution passed by the Bank’s board of directors on 6.12.2008, does not impair Mr. Gupta’s authority to file an application under Section 7 of the Code. It is therefore clear that the application has been filed by an authorised person on behalf of the Financial Creditor and the objection of the Appellants on the maintainability of the application on this ground is untenable.
Limitation
# 19. Any suit, appeal or application filed after the prescribed period of limitation shall be dismissed in spite of limitation not being set up as a defence, as per Section 3 of the Limitation Act. Section 238A of the Code makes the provisions of the Limitation Act applicable to the proceedings before the Adjudicating Authority, as far as may be. Therefore, the Adjudicating Authority is duty-bound to scrutinise the application filed under Section 7 of the Code and come to a conclusion on whether such application is barred by limitation, even in the absence of any plea with respect to limitation. (See: Noharlal Verma v. District Cooperative Central Bank Limited, Jagdalpur)
# 20. There can be no doubt that it is the responsibility of the financial creditor to give all particulars relating to the debt due and the date of default, along with the requisite documents, at the time of filing of an application under Section 7 of the Code. A plain reading of Section 7, Rule 4 of the 2016 Rules and Form 1 makes it clear that the Adjudicating Authority may admit an application under Section 7 only if he is satisfied that a default has occurred. The definition of ‘default’ under Section 3 (12) of the Code refers to non-payment of debts which are “due and payable” in law, meaning thereby that an application under Section 7 of the Code is maintainable only with respect to debts that are not time-barred. (See: B.K. Educational Services Private Limited v. Parag Gupta and Associates) The primary obligation of making out a prima facie case of default is on the financial creditor. There is no necessity for the corporate debtor to provide any information at the stage of admission of the application under Section 7 of the Code, as the burden of showing non-payment of a legally recoverable debt, which is not time-barred, is on the financial creditor. At the same time, it is clear from the judgments of this Court in Asset Reconstruction (supra) and Dena Bank (supra) that non-furnishing of information by the financial creditor at the time of filing an application under Section 7 of the Code need not necessarily entail in dismissal of the application. An opportunity can be provided to the financial creditor to provide additional information required for satisfaction of the Adjudicating Authority with respect to the occurrence of the default.
# 21. In the instant case, there is no dispute that the date of default is 30.09.2014 and the application under Section 7 of the Code was filed on 25.04.2019. According to the Financial Creditor, Section 18 of the Limitation Act is applicable in view of the Corporate Debtor acknowledging its debt by way of letters, written in and after 2018, giving details of amount repaid, acknowledging the amount outstanding and requesting consideration of a one-time settlement proposal. Sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Limitation Act reads as under:
18. Effect of acknowledgement in writing. – (1) Where, before the expiration of the prescribed period for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgement of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by any person through whom he derives his title or liability, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgement was so signed.
It is no more res integra that Section 18 of the Limitation Act is applicable to applications filed under Section 7 of the Code. In case the application under Section 7 is filed beyond the period of three years from the date of default and the financial creditor furnishes the required information relating to the acknowledgement of debt, in writing by the corporate debtor, before the Adjudicating Authority, with such acknowledgement having taken place within the initial period of three years from the date of default, a fresh period of limitation commences and the application can be entertained, if filed within this extended period.
# 22. There is no dispute that the date of default in this case is 30.09.2014, as mentioned by the financial creditor in its application under Section 7. A copy of the debit balance confirmation letter dated 07.04.2016 was filed along with the application. As the application was filed only on 25.04.2019, which is beyond a period of three years even after taking into account the debit balance confirmation letter dated 07.04.2016, the application was barred by limitation. However, the Corporate Debtor had, in its reply before the Adjudicating Authority, placed on record a letter dated 7.11.2018, which detailed the amount repaid till 30.09.2018 and acknowledged the amount outstanding as on 30.09.2018. On the basis of this letter and the record showing that the Corporate Debtor had executed various documents amounting to acknowledgement of the debt even in the financial year 2019-20, the NCLT was of the opinion that the application was filed within the period of limitation. The said view was upheld by the NCLAT.
# 23. We have already held that the burden of prima facie proving occurrence of the default and that the application filed under Section 7 of the Code is within the period of limitation, is entirely on the financial creditor. While the decision to admit an application under Section 7 is typically made on the basis of material furnished by the financial creditor, the Adjudicating Authority is not barred from examining the material that is placed on record by the corporate debtor to determine that such application is not beyond the period of limitation. Undoubtedly, there is sufficient material in the present case to justify enlargement of the extension period in accordance with Section 18 of the Limitation Act and such material has also been considered by the Adjudicating Authority before admitting the application under Section 7 of the Code. The plea of Section 18 of the Limitation Act not having been raised by the Financial Creditor in the application filed under Section 7 cannot come to the rescue of the Appellants in the facts of this case. It is clarified that the onus on the financial creditor, at the time of filing an application under Section 7, to prima facie demonstrate default with respect to a debt, which is not time-barred, is not sought to be diluted herein. In the present case, if the documents constituting acknowledgement of the debt beyond April, 2016 had not been brought on record by the Corporate Debtor, the application would have been fit for dismissal on the ground of lack of any plea by the Financial Creditor before the Adjudicating Authority with respect to extension of the limitation period and application of Section 18 of the Limitation Act.
# 24. In view of the aforesaid, the Appeal is dismissed.
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