NCLAT (2025.03.25) in Santoshi Finlease Pvt. Ltd. Vs. .State Bank of India and Anr. [ (2025) ibclaw.in 165 NCLAT, Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 974 of 2023] held that.
If a corporate applicant initiates CIRP fraudulently or with malicious intent for any purpose other than insolvency resolution, holding that the Adjudicating Authority is bound to admit the Section 10 Application would contradict the statutory scheme under Section 65.
If the conditions under Section 65 are met, the Section 10 Application may be rejected, even if debt and default are proven. Thus, Section 65 serves as an enabling provision, allowing the rejection of an application despite the establishment of debt and default, and the admission of a Section 10 Application is not mandatory...”
For initiating proceedings under Section 7 of the Code, the existence of a “financial debt” and a corresponding “default” is a sine qua non.
Excerpts of the Order;
The present Appeal is being preferred by the Appellant challenging the order dated 12.06.2023 (“Impugned Order”) passed by the National Company Law Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi (Ld. Adjudicating Authority) in Company Application No.1695/D/2023 in CP. No. IB-662/2022 (the “Application”) in which the CP was dismissed and the IA No. 1695/2023 of the Respondent No. 1- Bank under Section 65 of IBC was allowed with penal cost of Rs.10,00,000/- against the Appellant.
Brief facts of the case
# 2. The Appellant, M/s Santoshi Finlease Pvt Ltd, filed a Section 7 Application under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016, against the Corporate Debtor – M/s Mothers Pride Dairy India Pvt Ltd for non-payment of a loan amount of INR 4,89,28,694/- (rupees four crores, eighty-nine lakhs, twenty-eight thousand, six hundred and ninety-four only) disbursed from 08.07.2019 to 15.11.2019. The loan was sanctioned under a term “loan agreement” signed on 17.08.2019, with interest set at 18% per annum, payable quarterly, and various terms for loan disbursement and processing fees. The total outstanding amount due from the Corporate Debtor is INR 9,32,52,937/- (rupees nine crores, thirty-two lakhs, fifty-two thousand, nine hundred and thirty-seven only) including both principal (INR 4,89,28,694/- rupees four crores, eighty-nine lakhs, twenty-eight thousand, six hundred and ninety-four only) and interest (INR 4,43,24,243/- rupees four crores, forty-three lakhs, twenty-four thousand, two hundred and forty-three only). The State Bank of India (SBI), as Respondent No. 1, filed IA No. 1695/2023 alleging that the Appellant’s application for Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) was fraudulent and malicious, seeking its dismissal under Section 65 of IBC. Against the same Corporate Debtor, earlier also CIR proceedings had been admitted on 13.11.2019 by the NCLT Delhi, but was later set aside by the NCLAT on 05.08.2022. Per contra the Appellant contends that the dismissal of the section 7 Petition was improper, as facts were overlooked and there was absence of any fraud or malice in the Application. The NCLT’s dismissal was accompanied by a penalty of Rs 10,00,000/- (rupees ten lakhs only) to be paid to the Prime Minister’s Relief Fund. Therefore, the Appellant has appealed to the Appellate Tribunal, seeking the initiation of the CIRP and justice for the non-payment of dues.
Case History:
# 3. Recapitulating the sequence of events, we note that the CD was incorporated on 30.09.2014. The original main promoters of the CD viz. Anant Kumar Chaudhary and Shalini Chaudhary had taken a term loan of Rs.26.67 crs from SBI as per sanction dated 20.12.2015. The original promoters of the Corporate Debtor, holding 90% of the shares resigned from the Board and transferred their entire shareholding to Navneet Jain, Sushil Kumar Singh and Vikash Yadav. Later on, in and around 2019, the then directors of the Corporate Debtor entered into some investment arrangement with a group (family members) of people namely: Ms Seema Mittal, Mr Kaushal Mittal, Mr Yug Mittal and Mr Rishik Mittal (“Mittal Family Members”) and all of them were directors of the Corporate Debtor from 01.07.2019 till 23/24.09.2019. During this period the Mittal Family Members constituted majority on the Board of the Corporate Debtor. During the said period, the alleged “board resolution” of the Corporate Debtor dated 30.07.2019 was passed and alleged “loan agreement” dated 17.08.2019 was executed between the Appellant and the Corporate Debtor. One Mr Kaushal Mittal passed the alleged board resolution dated 30.07.2019 on behalf of the Corporate Debtor who has been the Director of the Respondent since 02.8.2005 till today.
# 4. While Mr Yug Mittal, the then director of the Corporate Debtor and an existing director of the Appellant i.e. Santoshi Finlease executed the alleged loan agreement on behalf of the Corporate Debtor, one Ms. Kriti Mittal executed the alleged loan agreement on behalf of the Appellant.
# 5. Based on an application filed by one of the directors Smt. Shalini Chaudhury, Corporate Debtor was admitted into CIRP by way of the order passed by Hon’ble NCLT dated 13.11.2019 and the CIRP process was commenced in terms of the provisions of the IBC, 2016. In the CIRP of the Corporate Debtor, claims were invited and the collated by the Resolution Professional and accordingly the constitution of the CoC was carried over the period of the CIRP. During the CIRP the claims of the present Appellant (Santoshi Finlease Private Limited) as well as its sister concern (Santoshi Hyvolt Electricals Private Limited) were filed as financial debt. Accordingly, they were part of the list of financial creditors, without having a right to vote, being a related party to the Corporate Debtor. During the first few meetings of the CoC, the Mittal Family Members were attending the meetings, as part of “Suspended Management/Suspended Directors”. During the CIRP, the then resolution professional, following the process laid down under the Code, invited prospective resolution applicants to submit the resolution plan and accordingly certain resolution plans were submitted in the CIRP of the Corporate Debtor and were discussed by the CoC over the period of various CoC meetings. During the 14ª CoC meetings held on 06.01.2021, the then resolution professional of the Corporate Debtor, proposed before the CoC members having voting rights (State Bank of India and Shalini Chaudhary) certain resolution plans, which were submitted by proposed resolution applicants namely; Maharaja Agro Foods Private Limited, Sushil Kumar Singh in Consortium with M/S Fair Deal Food Ventures Private Limited, Mr. Navneet in consortium with M/s Capital Trade Link Limited and Santoshi Hyvolt Electricals Private Limited (an associate concern of the Respondent herein). However, none of the resolution plans were approved by the CoC, since none of the resolution plans were acceptable to the CoC. Meanwhile, on an appeal filed by one of the directors of the Corporate Debtor Shri. Sushil Kumar Singh this Tribunal vide its order dated 05.08.2022 dismissed the impugned order passed by Hon’ble NCLT dated 13.11.2019 and accordingly, the Corporate Debtor was out of the CIRP.
# 6. It is to be noted that almost during the same period, the Corporate Debtor was stamped as NPA on 31.03.2019 by Respondent No.1 – SBI. After the Corporate Debtor was out of CIRP, Respondent No.1 – SBI, as the sole secured financial creditor re-initiated SARFAESI action and arranged for fresh valuation of the properties, and for redirection of CMM/DM orders, which were issued three years back. Reserve Price for e-auction under SARFAESI Act was approved at Rs.28.68 crore on 08.02.2023. SBI as the sole secured financial creditor took physical possession of the plant on 22.02.2023, after the orders of CMM/DM. Respondent No.1 – SBI also revived the Original Application No. 1039 of 2019 originally filed by the Applicant before the Hon’ble DRT, Delhi. But this CIRP was set aside by the order of this Tribunal on 05.08.2022. SBI started its recovery proceedings under SARFAESI Act, 2002 and revived the O.A. No. 1039/2019, before DRT, Delhi. E-auction of secured assets has already been concluded and on 03.05.2024 sale deed has been executed in favour of the successful auction purchaser.
Appraisal
# 32. We have heard Counsels of both sides and perused materials on record.
# 33. The main issues before us are whether there is a debt and default for Section 7 Petition to be admitted and whether the Section 7 Petition was filed with malicious intent or not and also whether the penalty of Rs 10,00,000/- imposed on the Appellant is justified or not.
# 34. First of all, we go into the issue whether the Section 7 Petition was filed with malicious intent or not. Basis the materials on record Adjudicating Authority has noted in detail about common Directors at paragraph 11 and 12 in the Impugned Order and it has come to a conclusion that Section 7 Petition was filed with malicious intent. The details of common Directors in Appellant (Santoshi) and the Corporate Debtor (CD-Mothers Pride) with their tenures is captured in the following table:
# 35. We find that the purported Loan Agreement, dated 17.08.2019, on which the Appellant relies, was executed between the Appellant and Respondent No. 2 during the period from 01.07.2019 to 23/24.09.2019, when the Mittal family members were in control of Respondent No. 2. Notably, during this time, the Mittal family members, while managing Respondent No. 2, decided to borrow funds from the Appellant Company, which was also under their control. Mr Yug Mittal, who filed Company Petition CP (IB) No. 662 of 2022 before the Adjudicating Authority (AA) on behalf of the Appellant, signed the Loan Agreement on behalf of Respondent No. 2. Furthermore, his sister, Ms Kriti Mittal, signed the same agreement on behalf of the Appellant Company. This demonstrates that the Agreement was essentially a Mittal-to-Mittal transaction. Additionally, the original loan tenure was short, spanning from 08.07.2019 to 31.10.2019, with an option for an extension only until 31.10.2019. Mr Yug Mittal and Mr Kaushal Mittal, who were common Directors in both the Appellant and the CD, did not make any genuine efforts to recover the loan. Instead, they resigned from their directorship of the CD on 23.09.2019, which was within one month of the filing of the Section 7 Petition on 30.08.2019 in the matter of M/S Shalini Choudhary vs Mother Pride India Pvt Ltd. This Petition was ultimately admitted by the Adjudicating Authority (AA) on 13.11.2019 but was later set aside by the Appellate Authority. The AA has rightly concluded that there could not have been a default on 15.11.2019, the date mentioned in Part IV of the Company Petition, because by that time, a moratorium had come into effect due to the first round of insolvency. Given that the Loan Agreement was valid from 08.07.2019 to 31.10.2019, and during this period, both Kaushal Mittal and Yug Mittal were Directors in both the CD and the Appellant, they were directly responsible for any default by the CD. The filing of the Section 7 Petition by these individuals, while being Directors of the Financial Creditor, was not intended to seek a genuine resolution for the CD but rather to harm its interests, thereby demonstrating malicious intent. The Appellant is a related party to the CD, with common Directors during the relevant period when the alleged debt and default occurred. We find merit in the argument that the Mittal family members, who controlled both entities at the time, orchestrated the Loan Arrangement, making the claim self-serving and legally untenable. The Appellant and its related entities were actively involved in the management of the CD during the transactions in question, reinforcing the case for malice.
# 36. Thus, we find strength in the arguments of Respondent No. 1–SBI that the Appellant’s Section 7 Petition was filed with ulterior motives. Consequently, we see no infirmity in the findings of the AA, as they are based on the material on record.
# 37. This Tribunal, in its judgment dated 05.01.2023, in the case of Wave Megacity Centre Private Limited vs Rakesh Taneja & Ors. (Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 918 of 2022), held the following:
“15. When the Adjudicating Authority has recorded a finding that a Section 10 Application has been initiated fraudulently and maliciously, the Authority is not obligated to admit the Application, even if debt and default exist. Section 10 and Section 65, being part of the same statutory framework, must be read together to give full effect to the legislative intent of the Code. If a corporate applicant initiates CIRP fraudulently or with malicious intent for any purpose other than insolvency resolution, holding that the Adjudicating Authority is bound to admit the Section 10 Application would contradict the statutory scheme under Section 65. If the conditions under Section 65 are met, the Section 10 Application may be rejected, even if debt and default are proven. Thus, Section 65 serves as an enabling provision, allowing the rejection of an application despite the establishment of debt and default, and the admission of a Section 10 Application is not mandatory...”
Applying this principle, the AA extended these observations to the Section 7 Petition, dismissing IB-662/2022 filed by the Appellant and allowing the Section 65 Application under the IBC, 2016, filed by SBI. Given the facts and circumstances of the present case, we find no infirmity in the AA’s decision to impose a penalty of Rs 10 lakhs on the Appellant—M/S Santoshi Finlease Pvt Ltd.
# 38. As noted above by us that rejection of attempted CIRP due to reasons of its fraudulent and malicious initiation, we need not go into the issue of the existence of financial debt and default, yet for sake of completeness we are delving into it to find out the real nature of the transactions in this case. On the issue of the existence of debt, we find that the Appellant transferred a sum of Rs 92,00,000/- (Page 147 of the Appeal) to the CD, as per the account statement of the Appellant. The true nature of the purported ‘Loan Agreement’ has been noted by us previous in paragraphs. Contemporaneously, we find that Seema Mittal, Kaushal Mittal, Yug Mittal and Rishik Mittal were appointed as Directors in the CD on 01.07.2019 and remained Directors of the CD till 23/24.09.2019 [Page 14 and 15 of Reply]. Contemporary Investment Term Sheet dated 19.06.2019 was also signed, under which the Santoshi Group/Mittal Family acquired 80% shareholding in CD [@ Page 13 of the Rejoinder filed by the Appellant]. Even though it is claimed by the Appellant that the Term Sheet dated 19.06.2019 was entered amongst Mr Navneet Jain, Santoshi Group, Vikas Yadav and Mr Anant Choudhary for reviving the company, yet we don’t find any other consideration except for payment of Rs 92 lakhs from the Santoshi Finance to the CD for acquiring stake in the company by subscribing to equity or preference share and obtaining Directorship in the CD and cannot be considered as loan. Therefore, in the facts and the circumstances of the case we find that all the amounts shown as amount paid by the Appellant, were paid to acquire stake in CD and appoint the Directors. We cannot but conclude that the amount of Rs 92,00,000/- in question was not a loan but instead infused by the Appellant as an investment in equity to acquire control and Directorship in the CD, and not as a loan or financial debt. And the said investment was not in the nature of a disbursement against time value of money, which is a fundamental criterion for a financial debt.
# 39. As previously noted, the rejection of the CIRP Application was due to its fraudulent and malicious initiation. While it is unnecessary to examine the existence of financial debt and default, we do so for the sake of completeness to ascertain the true nature of the transactions in this case. Regarding the existence of debt, the Appellant transferred a sum of INR 92,00,000/- (Page 147 of the Appeal) to the CD, as reflected in the Appellant’s account statement. The actual nature of this purported ‘Loan Agreement’ has already been discussed in earlier paragraphs. Simultaneously, we observe that Seema Mittal, Kaushal Mittal, Yug Mittal, and Rishik Mittal were appointed as Directors of the CD on 01.07.2019 and remained in their positions until 23/24.09.2019 (Page 14 and 15 of Reply). Additionally, an Investment Term Sheet dated 19.06.2019 was signed, under which the Santoshi Group/Mittal Family acquired 80% shareholding in the CD (Page 13 of the Rejoinder filed by the Appellant). Although the Appellant claims that the Term Sheet dated 19.06.2019 was executed among Mr Navneet Jain, Santoshi Group, Vikas Yadav, and Mr Anant Choudhary to revive the company, we find no evidence of any consideration other than the payment of Rs 92 lakhs by Santoshi Finance to the CD for acquiring a stake in the company—either by subscribing to equity or preference shares—and obtaining Directorship in the CD. This transaction cannot be considered a loan.
# 40. Given the facts and circumstances of this case, we conclude that the amounts purportedly paid by the Appellant were, in fact, investments intended to acquire a stake in the CD and secure directorship. Accordingly, the sum of Rs 92,00,000/- was not a loan but an equity infusion aimed at obtaining control over the CD. Moreover, this investment does not satisfy the essential criteria of a financial debt, as it was not a disbursement made against the time value of money.
# 41. The Appellant has claimed that it made several payments on behalf of the CD to its vendors and employees. These payments were made by the Appellant in its capacity as an implied holding company, given that the Mittal family controlled both the Appellant and the CD during the relevant period. However, as these payments were not directly disbursed to the CD, they do not qualify as a financial debt under Section 5(8) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“Code”). Consequently, no debt, as defined under the Code, has arisen from these transactions, rendering the present claim untenable and failing to meet the necessary threshold for initiating proceedings under Section 7 of the Code.
# 42. For initiating proceedings under Section 7 of the Code, the existence of a “financial debt” and a corresponding “default” is a sine qua non. In the present case, we examine when the loan was recalled by the Appellant and whether a consequent default occurred. Assuming the alleged debt was disbursed under the purported Loan Agreement dated 17.08.2019, we note that the Agreement does not clearly specify a repayment date. The debt has been disbursed from 08.07.2019 to 15.11.2019 according to Part IV of the Company Petition under Section 7 of the Code, and the Appellant has designated 15.11.2019 as the date of default [Page 83 of the Appeal]. However, as of 13.11.2019, the CD had already been admitted into CIRP under another Company Petition. Furthermore, under Clause 7(d) of the alleged Loan Agreement [Page 97-98 of the Appeal], admission of the CD into insolvency constitutes an Event of Default. As a consequence of such an event, Clause 8(a) [Page 97 of the Appeal] requires the Appellant to issue a Recall Notice for the loan amount to become due and payable. However, no such Recall Notice was ever issued. Additionally, no document substantiating the Date of Default has been placed on record. In the absence of both disbursements directly to the CD and default, the attempt to invoke proceedings under Section 7 of the Code is unsustainable. Since no debt, as envisaged under the Code, has arisen from the said transaction, the present claim is untenable and does not satisfy the threshold for initiating proceedings under Section 7 of the Code.
# 43. The Appellant has sought to rely on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Innoventive Industries Ltd vs ICICI Bank, 2018 (1) SCC 407, which established that an application under Section 7(5) of the IBC cannot be rejected if a default has occurred and the application is complete. The Appellant has also referred to M. Suresh Kumar Reddy vs Canara Bank (Civil Appeal No. 7121 of 2022, dated 11/05/2023), wherein it was held that once the NCLT is satisfied that a default has occurred, it has limited discretion to refuse admission of an application under Section 7 of the IBC. The only exception is when the debt is not due and payable, in which case the application may be rejected. However, the facts of the present case are distinguishable, as neither debt nor default has been established and as noted by us separately in the facts of this case malice has been established. Consequently, these judgments do not support the Appellant’s case.
# 44. The Appellant has sought to rely on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indowind Energy Ltd vs Wescare (I) Ltd and Anr (Civil Appeal No. 3874 of 2010, which affirmed that companies are separate and distinct legal entities, even if they share common directors or have the same authorized signatory when entering into agreements. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is evident that the Section 7 petition was filed fraudulently and maliciously, and for its determination if necessary corporate veil can be pierced. Notably, in the first round of CIRP, the available material indicates that Santoshi Hyvolt Electricals Private Limited—an associate concern of the Appellant—had submitted a resolution plan to acquire the CD [@ Page 37 of Reply]. Moreover, the Appellant and its related entities were actively involved in the management of the CD at the time of the alleged transactions, demonstrating a clear element of malice. We find merit in the argument that the Mittal Family Members, who controlled both the CD and the Appellant during the relevant period, orchestrated the alleged loan arrangement, rendering the claim self-serving and legally untenable. It is evident that the present petition was filed with the sole intention of obstructing recovery proceedings. Although the first round of CIRP, initiated in 2019, was ultimately dismissed by this Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal on 05.08.2022, the current events indicate that, through this second unsuccessful attempt at CIRP—now the subject of this appeal—the Appellant is merely seeking to delay the legitimate recovery proceedings initiated by Respondent No. 1 under the SARFAESI Act.
# 45. The Appellant has sought to rely on the judgment of this Appellate Tribunal in Rahul Aneja vs Sushant Aneja and Anr (Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 407 of 2018, dated 7th September 2018, which upheld the right of shareholders who have provided loans to a company to initiate CIRP. This principle affirms that Financial Creditors—whether shareholders or otherwise—are entitled to initiate insolvency proceedings for the recovery of loans. However, this judgment does not support the Appellant’s case, as the present matter concerns a Section 7 petition under the Code, where both debt and default must be established—requirements that have not been met in this instance.
# 46. The Appellant has sought to rely on the judgment of this Appellate Tribunal in Jagmohan Bajaj vs Shivam Fragrances Pvt. Ltd. (Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 428 of 2018, dated 14th August 2018, which clarified that internal disputes among directors or the pendency of proceedings under Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act do not constitute a valid defense against the initiation of CIRP under the IBC. The Appellant contends that the AA overlooked the legal principles established by the Appellate Tribunal, specifically that internal disputes among directors or ongoing proceedings under Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013, do not serve as a valid defense to CIRP initiation under the IBC. It is further argued that the IBC, as a special law with overriding authority under Section 238, cannot be subordinated to disputes or actions governed by general corporate law. Consequently, the Appellant asserts that the AA’s failure to recognize the precedence of the IBC, particularly the Financial Creditor’s right to initiate CIRP, constitutes a significant error. However, this judgment does not support the Appellant’s case, as the AA has explicitly established that the petition was filed with malicious intent. Furthermore, as previously noted, neither the existence of debt nor default—both prerequisites for the admission of a Section 7 petition—have been proven.
# 47. The Appellant argues that before concluding collusion, the Adjudicating Authority did not provide sufficient opportunity for submissions on the matter. Consequently, the impugned order under Section 65 of the Code is alleged to be in violation of natural justice. The IA filed by Respondent No. 1— SBI—was an application under Section 65 of the Code read with Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules, 2016, to which the Appellant had submitted a reply. Section 65(1) is reproduced below to clarify the authority vested regarding the fraudulent or malicious initiation of proceedings:
“65. Fraudulent or malicious initiation of proceedings: 1) If, any person initiates the insolvency resolution process or liquidation proceedings fraudulently or with malicious intent for any purpose other than for the resolution of insolvency, or liquidation, as the case may be, the Adjudicating Authority may impose upon such person a penalty which shall not be less than one lakh rupees, but may extend to one crore rupees.”
The IA filed by SBI specifically addressed this issue, and the Appellant had already submitted a written reply, including arguments, which are recorded on page 68 of the APB. Therefore, the claim that the principles of natural justice were not followed by the AA is unfounded. Furthermore, there is no requirement for the AA to form a prima facie view under Section 65, as the provision does not necessitate such a determination.
# 48. The Appellant has also contended that Respondent No. 1—SBI— acted with mala fide intent when filing its application to dismiss the Section 7 Petition submitted by the Appellant. Respondent No. 1 had already initiated SARFAESI proceedings against Respondent No. 2 before the DRT. The purpose of this application, according to the Appellant, was to secure a favorable outcome that would enable Respondent No. 1 to recover funds from Respondent No. 2 while undermining the interests of other stakeholders seeking to revive Respondent No. 2 through CIRP. However, this claim is not supported by the facts. Respondent No. 2 had undergone multiple CIRPs, and Respondent No. 1—SBI—had been pursuing CIRP proceedings for approximately three years. As a creditor, it has the legal right to recover its dues. Given the facts and circumstances of the case, we find merit in the arguments of Respondent No. 1—SBI—that the Petition CP (IB) No. 662 of 2022 before the AA was filed in bad faith and with mala fide intent, aiming to push Respondent No. 2 into CIRP. This would have provided the Appellant an opportunity to take control of Respondent No. 2.
# 49. Based on the facts and circumstances, we conclude that the alleged loan from the Financial Creditor (FC)—Appellant Santoshi—was not a genuine loan but rather an arrangement designed to obstruct SBI’s recovery efforts under the SARFAESI Act. Furthermore, in light of the investment term sheet, the transfer of Rs.62 lakhs cannot be considered a debt. Therefore, we find that no debt, as defined under the Code, has arisen from this transaction, rendering the present claim untenable and failing to meet the threshold for initiating proceedings under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. Additionally, we find that the Section 7 petition was filed fraudulently and with malicious intent. Given the facts and circumstances, the imposition of a Rs.10,00,000 penalty is justified.
Orders:
# 50. Based on the facts and circumstances, we conclude that the Section 7 petition was filed with malicious intent. We find no error in the AA’s decision to dismiss the CP and grant SBI’s I.A. Accordingly we dismiss this appeal filed by the Financial Creditor (Santoshi) in CP (IB) No. 662/2022, which sought to initiate CIRP against Respondent No. 1 (Mother’s Pride). Additionally, the orders concerning Application No. I.A. 1695/2023, filed by SBI under Section 65, are upheld along with the imposition of a Rs.10,00,000 penalty. Each party shall bear its own costs.
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